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IEEE Access

From Policy to Practice: A Sector-Agnostic Operational Framework for Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition

Berat Birgin, Barış Çeliktaş

Published Jan 1, 2026• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The pace of quantum computing development necessitates not only the adoption of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, but also the establishment of an executable and auditable institutional transition process. Although guidance documents published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and roadmaps proposed by the Post-Quantum Cryptography Coalition (PQCC) articulate strategic objectives, they largely remain procedural constructs lacking a concrete operational execution model. This paper presents an industry-neutral operational framework that translates policy-level post-quantum cryptography (PQC) guidance into deterministic, proof-producing process flows encompassing cryptographic asset discovery, classification, risk modeling, algorithm selection, deployment, monitoring, and governance enforcement. Central to the framework is a deterministic Quantum Risk Scoring (QRS) function, calibrated using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which enables reproducible asset prioritization and policy-driven enforcement decisions. Framework executability is further strengthened through cryptography-aware continuous integration/continuous deployment (CI/CD) validation gates and downgrade protection mechanisms, ensuring the generation of verifiable and immutable audit artifacts. A scenario-based operational validation, implemented using open-source toolchains, demonstrates the framework’s operability, auditability, and governance alignment without relying on empirical cryptographic performance benchmarks, confirming that PQC transition can be operationalized as a verifiable lifecycle process bridging policy guidance with enforceable technical actions.

DOI
10.1109/access.2026.3669437

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The pace of quantum computing development necessitates not only the adoption of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, but also the establishment of an executable and auditable institutional transition process. Although guidance documents published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and roadmaps proposed by the Post-Quantum Cryptography Coalition (PQCC) articulate strategic objectives, they largely remain procedural constructs lacking a concrete operational execution model. This paper presents an industry-neutral operational framework that translates policy-level post-quantum cryptography (PQC) guidance into deterministic, proof-producing process flows encompassing cryptographic asset discovery, classification, risk modeling, algorithm selection, deployment, monitoring, and governance enforcement. Central to the framework is a deterministic Quantum Risk Scoring (QRS) function, calibrated using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which enables reproducible asset prioritization and policy-driven enforcement decisions. Framework executability is further strengthened through cryptography-aware continuous integration/continuous deployment (CI/CD) validation gates and downgrade protection mechanisms, ensuring the generation of verifiable and immutable audit artifacts. A scenario-based operational validation, implemented using open-source toolchains, demonstrates the framework’s operability, auditability, and governance alignment without relying on empirical cryptographic performance benchmarks, confirming that PQC transition can be operationalized as a verifiable lifecycle process bridging policy guidance with enforceable technical actions.
The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computing presents a strategic governance challenge for national security because contemporary digital infrastructures depend extensively on public-key cryptographic mechanisms whose long-term security may be threatened by sufficiently capable quantum computers. This research examines post-quantum cryptographic governance as a policy, risk-management, interoperability, and implementation problem rather than solely as a cryptographic algorithm-selection exercise. The study adopts a conceptual research-and-review methodology based exclusively on the supplied literature, using insights from security and privacy, interoperability, digital transformation, standards-based architectures, and emerging technology governance to construct an integrated post-quantum governance framework. Particular attention is given to cryptographic inventory, risk prioritization, migration governance, interoperability, institutional accountability, lifecycle management, and national-security continuity. The analysis indicates that post-quantum readiness requires coordinated governance across technical and organizational layers, with migration decisions guided by asset criticality, data longevity, dependency relationships, and operational constraints. The study further argues that interoperability principles are central to post-quantum migration because cryptographic transitions must coexist with heterogeneous legacy systems and distributed information environments. The proposed framework therefore combines risk assessment, policy development, technical migration, validation, monitoring, and institutional oversight. The research contributes a governance-oriented perspective in which cryptographic agility and standards-based interoperability become strategic national-security capabilities rather than isolated technical controls.
The advancement of quantum computing is increasingly recognized as a significant threat to classical public-key cryptographic systems, triggering a global shift toward Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This article presents a topical survey and comparative analysis of the transition strategies adopted by leading cybersecurity agencies—including National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI), Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC), and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). The technical foundations of standardized PQC algorithms (Module Lattice–Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module Lattice–Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), Fast-Fourier Lattice-based Compact Signatures over NTRU (FALCON), and Stateless Hash-based–Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA)) are reviewed, alongside a critical examination of hybrid cryptography, crypto-agility, and strategic alignment on standards and migration principles, despite jurisdictional differences in policy enforcement. The survey highlights shared priorities, such as phased implementation, backward compatibility, and risk mitigation via hybrid adoption. To enhance analytical depth, the study introduces the Institutional–Sectoral PQC Migration Convergence Framework, linking institutional pillars to sectoral readiness for reproducible comparative assessment. National strategies are shown to serve as potential roadmaps for global institutions, underscoring the importance of international coordination and adaptability. These insights support the development of secure, interoperable, and future-proof cryptographic infrastructures in the quantum era, operationalized via the proposed 10-step migration playbook.
Purpose This paper aims to examines the governance of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) transition in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) banking, identifies structural gaps in existing regulatory frameworks and proposes a regulatory readiness framework for orderly migration to quantum-resistant standards. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative policy-analytical methodology combines structured literature synthesis with comparative regulatory analysis of six GCC banking frameworks – Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, Central Bank of the UAE, Central Bank of Kuwait, Qatar Central Bank, Central Bank of Bahrainand Central Bank of Oman – against five PQC governance dimensions, stress-tested across three cryptographically relevant quantum computer timeline scenarios. Findings None of the six frameworks explicitly addresses PQC transition requirements and all show critical gaps in cryptographic agility, quantum threat timeline awareness and harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) risk assessment. National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)’s PQC standards (Federal Information Processing Standard 203, 204, 205) supply the technical foundation but not the regulatory coordination and supervisory capacity GCC banking requires. Practical implications The framework gives GCC banking regulators actionable guidance for introducing HNDL risk assessment, mandating cryptographic agility and establishing PQC transition planning before migration becomes compressed and disruptive. Originality/value This is among the first systematic PQC governance analyses of GCC banking, best characterised as a theoretically grounded contextual adaptation rather than a new governance theory. The proposed three-phase framework – inventory, prioritised migration, continuous resilience – is framed through a socio-technical transition lens, translating generic quantum-risk identification into a governance architecture grounded in the six GCC supervisors’ regulatory landscape.
The emergence of quantum computing is a serious threat to traditional cryptographic algorithms, making it critical to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This work proposes a holistic conceptual and analytical framework for deploying PQC in multi-cloud environments where the complexity of different infrastructure, workloads and key management schemes pose significant security and efficiency problems. The proposed framework for crypto-agility follows a layered approach, with a cryptographic abstraction layer, a policy-based orchestration engine, a centralized hardware security module (HSM) management plane, and an ongoing monitoring module to facilitate a smooth transition from classical to hybrid and fully quantum-resistant cryptographic systems. He researches identifies and critically analyzes major challenges in deploying PQC technologies in multi-cloud environments, such as inter-cloud interoperability, computational complexity, latency, key management, and regulatory and compliance considerations. The framework tackles these challenges by incorporating hybrid cryptographic protocols that blend classic cryptographic algorithms with NIST-approved PQC algorithms, namely ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), to maintain backward compatibility and increase security against quantum-powered adversaries. Moreover, the framework proposes dynamic policy-driven algorithm selection to implement context-sensitive cryptographic enforcement based on sensitivity labels, security threats, and regulatory considerations. An experimental framework is proposed to assess the efficiency and scalability of PQC algorithms deployed in a multi-cloud environment, including metrics such as CPU usage, memory usage, latency and throughput with different workloads. Although this research is conceptual, it draws on previous benchmarking to discuss the securityperformance trade-offs associated with PQC. The results highlight the need for centralized trust anchors, crypto-agility and hybrid deployment models to address risks from cryptographic diversity and ensure the sustainability of security operations. This study advances the research on quantum-safe cloud security by offering a systematic, scalable and policy-oriented framework for PQC deployment. It provides practical guidance for businesses, cloud architects, and security professionals on how to safeguard against quantum vulnerabilities and ensure efficient operations in distributed systems by implementing quantum-safe cryptographic infrastructures.
Background: In August 2024, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized the first three post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards — FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) — and, in November 2024, published the initial public draft of NIST IR 8547, which schedules the deprecation of classical public-key cryptography by 2030 and its disallowance after 2035. Organizations therefore face, for the first time, a regulator-defined deadline for a global cryptographic transition. Objective: This paper characterizes the state of PQC deployment as of the end of 2024 and develops a structured, reusable migration framework that converts the new standards into an actionable organizational process. Methods: We apply a design-science methodology combining (i) documentary analysis of the 2024 standards and transition guidance, (ii) a structured synthesis of publicly documented, at-scale PQC deployments in transport, messaging, and shell protocols during 2022–2024, (iii) characterization of wire-size and throughput overheads using published benchmark data, and (iv) construction and cross-validation of a five-phase Crypto-Agility Migration Process (CAMP) against NIST transition guidance and NCCoE migration practices. Results: Deployment evidence shows that hybrid key establishment (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) is already operational at Internet scale, adding approximately 1.2 KB to the TLS 1.3 handshake with negligible latency impact, whereas post-quantum signatures remain the dominant constraint (ML-DSA-65 signatures are 3309 bytes versus 256 bytes for RSA-2048). We identify four systemic migration bottlenecks — FIPS validation lead times, embedded device lifecycles, PKI signature-size pressure, and organizational cryptographic invisibility — and operationalize CAMP to address them, anchoring prioritization in Mosca's inequality and the 2030/2035 deadlines of NIST IR 8547. Conclusions: The 2024 finalization of the PQC standards transforms post-quantum readiness from a research question into an engineering and governance problem. Organizations that establish cryptographic inventory, hybrid piloting, and crypto-agile library interfaces during 2025 will be positioned to meet the 2030 deprecation horizon; organizations that do not will face compressed, higher-risk migrations later in the decade.
Quantum computing threatens the security foundations of global financial systems, exposing long-lived data and signed digital assets to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” attacks. While the timeline for cryptographically relevant quantum computers remains uncertain, regulatory signals from the USA, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia converge: financial institutions and payment infrastructures must begin migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) now to preserve confidentiality, integrity, and systemic stability. This paper maps emerging standards and roadmaps, contrasting binding requirements like the EU’s DORA crypto-agility provisions with non-binding guidance from NIST, ENISA, and ETSI. Despite a shared intent to secure high-risk use cases by 2030–2031 and complete migration by 2035, divergences in enforcement and milestones create uncertainty for cross-border banks and financial market infrastructures. In parallel, technical adoption is advancing: major browsers, cryptographic libraries (OpenSSL/BoringSSL), and CDNs (e.g., AWS CloudFront) have deployed hybrid PQC key exchange in TLS 1.3, proving confidentiality defenses are viable at internet scale. The paper synthesizes historical transition lessons, sector-specific regulatory drivers, and operational constraints in payment infrastructures to derive a new, principle-based migration: crypto-agility, risk-prioritized scoping, hybrid deployment, vendor and supply-chain alignment, independent testing, and proactive supervisory engagement. Acting now reduces long-tail exposure and ensures readiness for imminent compliance and interoperability deadlines.