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Post-Quantum Authentication for Quantum Key Distribution Control Channels

Sylvain Cormier

Published Feb 26, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Corrected version (November 2026). It replaces the versions of September 2025 and February 2026, which contained errors. Those versions merged the classical channel of the QKD protocol with the key delivery link, presented statements as proofs that were not proofs, and gave figures (machine-checked theorems, performance against RSA) that did not describe this software. The corrections are listed on the first page. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) produces keys whose secrecy rests on physics. Those keys are then handed to the applications that use them through a key delivery interface, in most deployments the REST/HTTPS interface of ETSI GS QKD 014. That interface is protected by TLS, which today authenticates with RSA or elliptic curve signatures and, in most configurations, agrees its session keys with an elliptic curve exchange. Both are broken by Shor's algorithm. This paper is about that delivery link. It is not about the classical channel that the two QKD units use between themselves for sifting, error correction and privacy amplification, which is authenticated separately and is outside its scope. It states what follows for the delivered keys: an adversary who records delivery traffic today can recover the delivered keys once a quantum computer breaks the session's key exchange, and from that day can also impersonate a client or a key manager. It then describes the Post-Quantum Transport Gateway (PQTG), an open-source gateway that runs next to a key manager and replaces the exposed TLS endpoint with a post-quantum channel (ML-KEM-768, Falcon-512, AES-256-GCM), with no change to the vendor's equipment. It reports what has been checked (symbolic models, tests, fuzzing, structural lemmas in Lean 4, one end-to-end run on a testbed) and what has not: there is no computational security proof of the protocol and no external audit, and the software is pre-stable. Source code: https://github.com/Paraxiom/pq-transport-gateway (GPL-3.0-only, or a commercial licence).

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.18786525

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•Apr 22, 2026•0 citations
Corrected version (November 2026). It replaces the versions of September 2025 and February 2026, which contained errors. Those versions merged the classical channel of the QKD protocol with the key delivery link, presented statements as proofs that were not proofs, and gave figures (machine-checked theorems, performance against RSA) that did not describe this software. The corrections are listed on the first page. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) produces keys whose secrecy rests on physics. Those keys are then handed to the applications that use them through a key delivery interface, in most deployments the REST/HTTPS interface of ETSI GS QKD 014. That interface is protected by TLS, which today authenticates with RSA or elliptic curve signatures and, in most configurations, agrees its session keys with an elliptic curve exchange. Both are broken by Shor's algorithm. This paper is about that delivery link. It is not about the classical channel that the two QKD units use between themselves for sifting, error correction and privacy amplification, which is authenticated separately and is outside its scope. It states what follows for the delivered keys: an adversary who records delivery traffic today can recover the delivered keys once a quantum computer breaks the session's key exchange, and from that day can also impersonate a client or a key manager. It then describes the Post-Quantum Transport Gateway (PQTG), an open-source gateway that runs next to a key manager and replaces the exposed TLS endpoint with a post-quantum channel (ML-KEM-768, Falcon-512, AES-256-GCM), with no change to the vendor's equipment. It reports what has been checked (symbolic models, tests, fuzzing, structural lemmas in Lean 4, one end-to-end run on a testbed) and what has not: there is no computational security proof of the protocol and no external audit, and the software is pre-stable. Source code: https://github.com/Paraxiom/pq-transport-gateway (GPL-3.0-only, or a commercial licence).
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD) address the quantum threat from opposite directions: PQC replaces vulnerable public-key algorithms with schemes believed to resist quantum cryptanalysis, while QKD derives keys whose secrecy rests on physical assumptions rather than computational ones. Because each approach has a distinct failure mode, a growing body of work combines them so that a session key remains secure if either component holds. We first establish the deployed baseline, hybrid classical-plus-PQC key exchange, against which QKD-augmented designs must be judged. We then propose a taxonomy of hybrid PQC-QKD designs along eight dimensions (integration layer, combiner construction, authentication scope and source, QKD topology, trusted entities, key-delivery interface, classical component, and evidence type), and use it to compare published protocols, including Muckle and its successors, MACsec and TLS integrations, and IKEv2 mechanisms standardised in RFCs 8784, 9370, and 9867. We examine key-combiner constructions in light of the KEM-combiner literature and of NIST, ETSI, and ITU-T guidance, and map the security arguments for hybrid PQC-QKD protocols onto a common grid of security model, assumptions, permitted compromise, established guarantee, and limitations. We synthesise deployment evidence from metropolitan and national QKD networks, distinguishing the few testbeds that have run PQC in the key path from pure-QKD deployments, and summarise the standards and policy landscape, including the positions of national security agencies that recommend against relying on QKD alone. We close with open problems: authentication of the QKD classical channel, shared-infrastructure threat models, device certification versus formal proofs, formal verification of hybrid handshakes, and the lack of peer-reviewed deployment economics.
Quantum-Safe Networks (QSNs) use quantum key distribution (QKD) to deliver keys generated using a Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) to consumers at scale. In practice, prevailing Quantum-Key-as-a-Service (QKaaS) offerings still assume that each consumer site deploys on-premise QKD hardware, creating cost and feasibility barriers that limit adoption. Although ETSI GS QKD 014 standardizes APIs for key retrieval between Secure Application Entities (SAEs) and Key Management Entities (KMEs), it does not address key delivery across untrusted classical networks to consumers without local QKD devices. We close this gap with a gateway architecture that transparently secures ETSI-compliant QKD APIs using Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)—applying PQC signatures and key-encapsulation mechanisms end-to-end—without requiring changes to existing devices or software. The design supports cryptographic agility, enabling runtime selection and rotation among standardized PQC schemes. Evaluations on both simulated QKD environments and production-grade hardware show minimal overhead (≈1.3×\approx 1.3\times≈1.3×–1.5× versus baseline) and robust scaling across concurrent connections and multiple consumer sites, extending the reach of QSNs beyond premises equipped with QKD while preserving end-to-end quantum-safe guarantees. Overall, this paper equips practitioners with a systematized view of PQC–QKD integration in QSNs, with an actionable gateway blueprint for extending QSNs without the need for on-premise QKD deployments.
Shor’s algorithm efficiently solves factoring and discrete logarithm problems using quantum computers, compromising all public key schemes used today. Algorithms such as RSA, DHKE, and ECC will not work in a world with quantum computers, since they can easily invert the functions that provide their computational strength in the classical world. These schemes rely on assumptions on their computational complexity, which quantum computers can easily bypass. The solutions have to come from new algorithms – called Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) – or from new methods, such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). The former replicate the computational security ideas of classical public key algorithms, while the latter recurs to use the quantum properties of nature, which also brings a mathematical security proof, potentially offering Information-Theoretic Security. To secure data in the future, we must adopt these paradigms. With the speed of quantum computing advancements, the transition to quantum-safe cryptography within the next decade is critical. Delays could expose long-lived confidential data, as current encryption may be broken before its value expires. However, the shift must balance the adoption of new technologies with maintaining proven systems to protect against present and future threats. In this work, we have selected Transport Layer Security (TLS), one of the most widely used protocols, as the foundation to hybridize classical, quantum, and post-quantum cryptography in a way suitable for broad adoption in Software-Defined Networking (SDN), the most flexible networking paradigm that has been used to deploy integrated quantum–classical networks. To this end, we use standards for QKD key extraction and SDN integration. The purposed implementation is based on the latest version of TLS (1.3) and demonstrates advanced capabilities such as rekeying and key transport across a large QKD network, while supporting crypto-agility and maintaining backward compatibility through the use of ciphersuites. The performance of this approach has been demonstrated using a deployed production infrastructure.
This paper introduces several hybrid protocols based on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) implemented in the OpenQKD testbed Berlin to improve the security of the QKD nodes. Instead of following the ETSI QKD014 standard of a key management system based on classical security, i.e., RSA authentication and ECC encryption, we implemented a quantum-secure Key Management System based on PQC Key Encapsulation and Signature algorithms. The hardware and the software components of the QKD network authenticate themselves using a PQC trust chain and Pre-Shared Secrets, wherever supported. The communication between QKD nodes, as for the encryption key forwarding process, is hardened by Post-Quantum Cryptography to prevent cryptographic key exposure on intermediate network nodes. Using the two implemented key exchange processes, based on QKD and PQC, applications are able to request any kind of encryption key from the Key Management System and combine them arbitrarily to compute more reliable cryptographic keys.
The impending arrival of viable quantum computing is a major worry to modern-day identity management systems that mainly depend on classical public-key cryptography techniques such as RSA and elliptic curve. Such systems are the basis of secure infrastructure in digital identities such as authentication, digital signature and trust models based on certificates. These cryptographic primitives can be broken using quantum algorithms like Shor and Grover, compromising the privacy of credentials and sessions stored and authenticated on digital ecosystems. The paper provides the necessity of the transition of identity management systems to post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms that will be resistant to quantum attacks. It gives a general overview of quantum-exposed identity protocols, as well as a look at the up-and-coming PQC algorithms under development, with a special call to digital signature algorithms capable of identity provision, authentication, and credential lifecycle management. Moreover, the paper isolates the problems of integration which include key size overhead, legacy system compatibility and performance trade-offs and suggests integration to take place through the use of hybrid and decentralized framework to allow a secure migration. This study will form part of a strategic plan to a post-quantum identity infrastructure, with the long term reliability, validity, and withstanding of quantum-era vulnerabilities.
Network defense platforms rely on authenticated management channels between sensors, agents, and controllers. These channels are typically secured with TLS using RSA or elliptic-curve public-key primitives that a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer executing Shor's algorithm will break. The National Security Agency's Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 mandates a transition to quantum-resistant cryptography for national security systems between 2030 and 2035, with hybrid classical-and-post-quantum constructions explicitly permitted during the transition. We present a hybrid attestation protocol for network management channels that combines Ed448 with ML-DSA-87 for mutual authentication and X448 with ML-KEM-1024 for session key establishment. An adversary must forge both a classical elliptic-curve signature and a lattice-based signature to impersonate a peer, and must recover both a classical elliptic-curve shared secret and a lattice-based encapsulated secret to decrypt session traffic. Authentication succeeds only when both signature verifications pass; session keys are derived from the concatenation of both shared secrets through HKDF-SHA-512. The protocol supports both trust-on-first-use key management and a PKI-backed enrollment mode under which peer public keys are authenticated by certificate chains from two parallel certificate authorities (Ed448 and ML-DSA-87). Deployments can select either mode, or a hybrid admitting both paths, allowing the protocol to fit air-gapped environments as well as deployments that require cryptographic rather than observational trust establishment. A cryptographic agility mechanism supports algorithm suite negotiation and hot-swap without device re-provisioning. We specify the protocol, analyze its security against classical and quantum adversaries, and report measured performance from a reference implementation in Python: the full handshake including mutual HELLO, hybrid key exchange, and session key derivation completes in approximately 330 milliseconds on commodity hardware using pure-Python post-quantum primitives. The protocol is one component of a larger network defense platform; a full system description appears in a companion paper.