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TheNon-DeterminismofthePast

IKE QD

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We challenge the classical assumption that the past consists of fixed, determinate events.By applying the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and Time-Reversal Symmetry to theverification of historical data, we propose that the past exists as a probability distributionthat remains "fuzzy" even after measured. We introduce the "Measurement Stacking"effect, where subsequent attempts to verify a past event amplify its inherent uncertainty.Furthermore, we argue that the act of remembering or accessing recorded data is itself aquantum interaction that re-disturbs the historical state, suggesting that as we movefurther back in time, the past becomes increasingly open to probabilistic interpretation

DOI
10.17605/osf.io/m35de

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We challenge the classical assumption that the past consists of fixed, determinate events.By applying the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and Time-Reversal Symmetry to theverification of historical data, we propose that the past exists as a probability distributionthat remains "fuzzy" even after measured. We introduce the "Measurement Stacking"effect, where subsequent attempts to verify a past event amplify its inherent uncertainty.Furthermore, we argue that the act of remembering or accessing recorded data is itself aquantum interaction that re-disturbs the historical state, suggesting that as we movefurther back in time, the past becomes increasingly open to probabilistic interpretation
We challenge the classical assumption that the past consists of fixed, determinate events. By applying the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and Time-Reversal Symmetry to the verification of historical data, we propose that the past exists as a probability distribution that remains "fuzzy" even after measured. We introduce the "Measurement Stacking" effect, where subsequent attempts to verify a past event amplify its inherent uncertainty. Furthermore, we argue that the act of remembering or accessing recorded data is itself a quantum interaction that re-disturbs the historical state, suggesting that as we move further back in time, the past becomes increasingly open to probabilistic interpretation.
Quantum theory encounters a difficulty when attempting to describe recording devices. If the recording is of events in which quantum uncertainty plays a role, such as an experiment on a quantum system, quantum theory is unable to correctly predict the probabilities of both future and past states of the recording. The nature of this difficulty will be laid out at the outset. A resolution then will be presented, in which the Born rule will be lightly amended so as to correctly predict all probabilities. The resolution will have the further benefit of clarifying how quantum theory applies to an array of situations in which the theory can be ambiguous, such as the descriptions of continuous measurements, and of closed systems containing all observers.
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is conventionally interpreted as a constraint on the precision of future measurement outcomes. We argue that this temporal asymmetry is not justified by the underlying mathematics of quantum mechanics, which is fundamentally time-symmetric. We propose that uncertainty applies equally in both temporal directions: the past has no greater ontological determinacy than the future. Between collapse events, prior states were no more determined than future states are now. Only the present moment of collapse constitutes anything approaching a definite physical state, and that moment is immediately receding into a past that was never fully determined before collapse occurred. We formalize this interpretation through a timesymmetric reading of the existing uncertainty relations and discuss its implications for the ontological status of the past, the measurement problem, and the foundations of physical determinism.
Discussions on indeterminism in physics focus on the possibility of an open future, i.e. the possibility of having potential alternative future events, the realisation of one of which is not fully determined by the present state of affairs. Yet, can indeterminism affect also the past, making it open as well? We show that by upholding principles of finiteness of information one can entail such a possibility. We provide a toy model that shows how the past could be fundamentally indeterminate, while also explaining the intuitive (and observed) asymmetry between the past-which can be remembered, at least partially-and the future-which is impossible to fully predict.
From data in the present we can predict the future and retrodict the past. These predictions and retrodictions are for histories – most simply time sequences of events. Quantum mechanics gives probabilities for individual histories in a decoherent set of alternative histories. This paper discusses several issues connected with the distinction between prediction and retrodiction in quantum cosmology: the difference between classical and quantum retrodiction, the permanence of the past, why we predict the future but remember the past, the nature and utility of reconstructing the past(s), and information theoretic measures of the utility of history.
Time can be defined as the duration between events. It is irreversible. When used as a variable in quantifying the changing properties of matter, this irreversibility of time is incompatible with Newton's deterministic mechanics and with its quantum mechanical prolongation. Experimental evidence, involving rejection of the traditional isolation paradigm, points to a solution of this paradox. No system may be thought of as isolated. Irreversibility is imported from ``elsewhere''. The popular objection of the followers of determinism, consisting in extrapolating local behaviour to the scale of the universe and stressing alleged contradictions generated by the non-isolation hypothesis, is intellectually unacceptable. It is unjustifiable to draw conclusions by extrapolating beyond the domain of scientific observation.