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Formal Security Proof For Nonlinear Post-Quantum Digital Signature Schemes

Nguyen Kim Tuan, Nguyễn Thị Phượng Hằng, Hoang Duc Tho, Luu Hong Dung

Published Jan 1, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.13140/rg.2.2.16992.56323/39

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This work addresses the threat that quantum computers pose to conventional digital signatures. It focuses on remote signing scenarios, specifically in the context of national identification systems such as ID Austria. We propose a new blind signature scheme that is secure against quantum attacks, preserves user privacy, and supports remote signing. The construction uses a commitment scheme and a post-quantum digital signature. We formally define the security model and prove that the scheme satisfies the IND-CMA and EUF-CMA properties. We discuss a specific instance using the Dilithium algorithm and other PQ algorithms. The result is a practically deployable scheme suitable for electronic identification and digital services. A novelty is the combination of blind signatures with post-quantum signatures in a remote signing model and the proof of its security.
Modern-day cryptographic schemes are threatened by the rapid development of quantum computers, which are capable of solving discrete-logarithm-based problems in a reasonable amount of time. The paper proposes a novel approach to a PORS post-quantum secure signature. The main idea of the proposal is integrating a PORS signature scheme with a Verkle tree, which greatly reduces the signature size compared to a PORST that uses a Merkle tree, while reducing authentication overhead through constant-size vector commitment proofs at each tree level. The work is highly relevant as it proposes a post-quantum digital signature which has compact proofs and at the same time solves the problems of the original HORS signature scheme (subset-resilience problem). The work contributes to the ongoing standardization efforts in post-quantum cryptography by providing a theoretically scalable and efficient signature scheme that balances security, size, and verification speed.
Digital signatures guarantee the authenticity and transferability of messages and are widely used in modern communication. The security of currently used classical digital signature schemes, however, relies on computational assumptions. In contrast, quantum digital signature (QDS) schemes offer information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. We present two QDS protocols which have the same experimental requirements as quantum key distribution, which is already commercially available. We also give a security proof for the presented QDS schemes against coherent forging attacks.