Bitcoin transaction relay is decentralized and governed by locally defined, non consensus policies that are neither globally enforced nor externally observable as explicit configuration. While the effects of these policies may in principle be indirectly inferred through relay metadata only under aggregate adversary level observation accumulated over time and with significant uncertainty, their opacity results in probabilistic and heterogeneous propagation behavior. Each node maintains an independent mempool and propagates transactions according to local rules and network conditions. Under hypothetical cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) assumptions, transaction relay behavior becomes a relevant factor in public key exposure risk. This paper presents a defensive threat model in which an adversary operates a coordinated network of protocol compliant Bitcoin peer to peer nodes to probabilistically obtain preferential locally first seen visibility at standard broadcast time into transactions that reveal public key material. Observation occurs only upon normal transaction broadcast from ordinary network nodes and is limited to what individual nodes receive and infer relative to their connected peers and local mempool state. The model relies on probabilistic network positioning rather than pre broadcast access, protocol deviation, or relay interference. The analysis does not assume deterministic control of relay, miner collusion, eclipse attacks, privileged network access, or present day quantum feasibility. Instead, it formalizes how partial node local observability, relay variance, and adaptive analytical selection may increase expected adversarial value under uncertainty while remaining indistinguishable from benign network participation. A quantitative expected value framework and a lightweight simulation are introduced to bound adversarial advantage as a function of network coverage, propagation delay variance, and cryptographic feasibility. The work is grounded in prior empirical measurement literature and is intended to inform defensive monitoring and mitigation research rather than predict specific attacks or timelines.
Bitcoin transaction relay is decentralized and governed by locally defined, non consensus policies that are neither globally enforced nor externally observable as explicit configuration. While the effects of these policies may in principle be indirectly inferred through relay metadata only under aggregate adversary level observation accumulated over time and with significant uncertainty, their opacity results in probabilistic and heterogeneous propagation behavior. Each node maintains an independent mempool and propagates transactions according to local rules and network conditions. Under hypothetical cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) assumptions, transaction relay behavior becomes a relevant factor in public key exposure risk. This paper presents a defensive threat model in which an adversary operates a coordinated network of protocol compliant Bitcoin peer to peer nodes to probabilistically obtain preferential locally first seen visibility at standard broadcast time into transactions that reveal public key material. Observation occurs only upon normal transaction broadcast from ordinary network nodes and is limited to what individual nodes receive and infer relative to their connected peers and local mempool state. The model relies on probabilistic network positioning rather than pre broadcast access, protocol deviation, or relay interference. The analysis does not assume deterministic control of relay, miner collusion, eclipse attacks, privileged network access, or present day quantum feasibility. Instead, it formalizes how partial node local observability, relay variance, and adaptive analytical selection may increase expected adversarial value under uncertainty while remaining indistinguishable from benign network participation. A quantitative expected value framework and a lightweight simulation are introduced to bound adversarial advantage as a function of network coverage, propagation delay variance, and cryptographic feasibility. The work is grounded in prior empirical measurement literature and is intended to inform defensive monitoring and mitigation research rather than predict specific attacks or timelines.
This work presents a formal, state-machine-based treatment of protocol-level quantum safety in Bitcoin under quantum polynomial-time (QPT) adversaries. We model Bitcoin as a deterministic state transition system over the UTXO set and define authorization as a game-based property. We introduce a set of invariants including authorization integrity, no double-spend, and deterministic validation, and formally prove their preservation under valid state transitions. We provide a reduction showing that any unauthorized spend implies either a break of EUF-CMA security of the signature scheme or a violation of hash-based binding properties, in both the classical and quantum random oracle model (QROM), without relying on oracle reprogramming or rewinding techniques. The model explicitly incorporates adversarial network conditions, including mempool observation, transaction reordering, and chain reorganizations, and proves that such capabilities do not enable unauthorized state transitions. We formalize a consensus-semantic equivalence relation over transactions via a normalization function, ensuring that validation and state transitions are invariant under representation-level differences. Additionally, we analyze identifier integrity under quantum collision search (BHT) and provide system-level bounds relative to the active UTXO set. Finally, we prove a no-free-migration result: under purely cryptographic authorization, no transformation of the current UTXO set can simultaneously preserve both safety (no unauthorized spend under quantum adversaries) and liveness (all coins remain spendable), making migration trade-offs unavoidable. This work aims to distinguish between localized constructions and system-wide security guarantees, and to provide a formal foundation for evaluating quantum safety claims at the protocol level.
All blockchain networks are based on classical cryptographic primitives and employ distributed consensus algorithms to guarantee their security and trustworthiness in a decentralized system. However, with advancements in quantum computing, these pillars are rendering the computational assumptions of common cryptographic primitives vulnerable to attacks via Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. This paper has made a systematic and comparative study of the quantum-related vulnerabilities in various widely used blockchain platforms like Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric, Solana, and Ripple to expose the vulnerabilities in each platform because of the quantum abilities of the adversaries. This paper presents a commitment-based key exposure mitigation and Quantitative Quantum Risk Scoring (QRS) Model.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computers introduces structural uncertainty regarding the long-term security of blockchain systems relying on elliptic-curve cryptography. During the transitional migration toward post-quantum schemes, public key exposure events create a selective attack surface: exploitation depends on a time-constrained race between quantum key recovery and blockchain confirmation dynamics rather than on instantaneous cryptographic collapse. This paper makes three contributions. First, we formally define public key exposure events and model the resulting quantum exposure surface as a stochastic process governed by on-chain settlement frequency. Second, we introduce a confirmation-aware exploitation model that captures the race between quantum recovery and network confirmation, and we derive a closed-form upper bound on expected extractable loss under bounded adversarial capacity. Third, we propose a federated, hardware-confined off-chain custody architecture that reduces exposure frequency and value concentration without modifying existing blockchain consensus rules, while relying on independently auditable and certifiable mediators to provide governable institutional trust. Together, these results transform transitional quantum risk from a binary collapse scenario into a parameterized and bounded engineering problem deployable within current blockchain infrastructures.
Blockchain-based sensor networks rely on public-key cryptography for transaction verification, auditability, and data integrity. However, widely used public-key mechanisms are quantum-vulnerable in the presence of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs), requiring sensor-to-blockchain transactions to address both post-quantum security and exposure control. This paper proposes a post-quantum sensor-to-blockchain transaction framework that minimizes CRQC-aware exposure while preserving low-cost auditability. It defines a transaction workflow that represents sensor data through hash-based commitments instead of storing raw measurements on-chain. The workflow combines Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)-based authentication, threshold-based authorization, Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)-protected relay communication, and an event-based smart contract (EBSC) for compact audit recording. A Quantum Exposure Score (QES) is introduced as a transaction-level metric to quantify CRQC-induced exposure across cryptographic, relay, key-lifecycle, migration-readiness, and authorization dimensions. The framework is evaluated using differential pulse voltammetry (DPV) electrochemical sensor data, Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) communication, and a Ganache-based blockchain, with scalability runs of up to 10,000 sensor transactions and ablation baselines. Compared with full on-chain storage, EBSC reduces gas consumption by approximately 80%, while QES decreases from 100 in the classical open scenario to 4 in the full framework. These results demonstrate that the proposed design provides a practical path for post-quantum secure sensor-to-blockchain transactions.
Bitcoin miners equipped with purpose-built quantum computers that execute Grover’s algorithm on classical candidate blocks, measuring the resulting quantum state to yield a potentially valid proof-of-work, pose a threat to Bitcoin’s security against 51% attacks. I aim to assess this threat by employing a game-theoretic framework inspired by the Lee-Ray-Santha quantum races model, extending it to better reflect how quantum miners would behave in practice. These extensions address some of the simplifications of prior works, where quantum miners performed only one quantum measurement (which does not maximise their resources), and were assumed to employ a peaceful strategy, wherein the quantum miners discard the resources already invested into searching upon receiving a broadcast of a newly-mined block (which is not enforceable). I consider a setting in which the quantum miners perform multiple quantum measurements between successive blocks, employ Sattath’s Aggressive Quantum Mining Strategy (AQMS), and must allocate limited quantum resources across these measurements. When employing Sattah’s AQMS, a quantum miner halts their execution of Grover’s algorithm and measures the resulting quantum state upon receiving a broadcast of a newly mined block, attempting to create a temporary fork and thereby decreasing the effective hash rate required for a 51% attack. In this novel setting, I derive the payoff matrices for the quantum miners and compute optimal quantum mining strategies that correspond to Nash equilibria. I simulate the deployment of these optimal quantum mining strategies within the Bitcoin network and estimate their effect on Bitcoin’s security against a 51% attack. I determine how two quantum miners should optimally allocate their quantum resources based on the network difficulty. Overall, I find that even when behaving optimally, two quantum miners cannot create enough temporary forks to render the Bitcoin network vulnerable to this quantum threat, given realistic constraints on their quantum resources. This thesis contributes to the growing body of research on the potential threats posed by scalable quantum computers, using the case of two quantum miners as a step toward understanding how quantum miners in general could affect Proof-of-Work-based cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.
Abstract Secure key distribution is crucial for maintaining communication confidentiality in networks with multiple communicating partners. Asymmetric key algorithms are vulnerable to quantum attacks because of the computational advantage offered by quantum computers, whereas symmetric key algorithms with sufficiently large keys remain comparatively more resistant. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has emerged as a promising quantum-secure key distribution technique based on the principles of quantum physics. However, practical QKD networks often rely on relay nodes to extend communication distance, and malicious relay nodes can compromise quantum keys during the relaying process. This study proposes a secure key relaying approach based on Shamir's Secret Sharing to mitigate this vulnerability. The proposed method uses a probabilistic behavioural model to assess relay nodes according to their curiosity and collaboration tendencies. By splitting a quantum key into multiple shares and routing them through paths with minimum compromise risk, the approach reduces exposure to malicious or colluding relay nodes. The proposed algorithm assigns risk to network paths by evaluating node-level curiosity and collaboration potential, determines the appropriate number of shares, and selects secure routing paths to minimise key compromise. The study further analyses the parameters influencing the ideal number of shares for a given network, thereby offering a resilient mechanism for quantum-safe communication in QKD networks with malicious relay nodes.