Electric Vehicles (EVs), Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), and Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) form the foundation of next-generation grid-connected ecosystems, where bidirectional energy and data flows require strong, low-latency cybersecurity. As quantum computing advances, classical cryptography used in standards such as ISO 15118, IEEE 2030.5, and IEC 61850 faces obsolescence. This paper bridges security and grid engineering through a reproducible post-quantum testbed that models hybrid TLS 1.3 handshakes with NIST standardised algorithms ML-KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber) and ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) across HEMS-mediated EV-DER communication links. The framework benchmarks classical and post-quantum schemes by evaluating latency, key size, and interoperability, and subjects them to four adversarial trials: man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, downgrade, and fuzz/DoS. A Quantum-Readiness Index (QRI) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) fit Deployment Matrix translate these results into deployment guidance for utilities and aggregators. Findings show that quantum-resilient cryptography can be integrated into grid communication stacks without breaching operational budgets, offering a practical pathway toward secure, standards-aligned migration. Index Terms-Post-quantum cryptography, electric vehicles (EVs), distributed energy resources (DERs), home energy management systems (HEMS), grid-connected systems.
Electric Vehicles (EVs), Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), and Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) form the foundation of next-generation grid-connected ecosystems, where bidirectional energy and data flows require strong, low-latency cybersecurity. As quantum computing advances, classical cryptography used in standards such as ISO 15118, IEEE 2030.5, and IEC 61850 faces obsolescence. This paper bridges security and grid engineering through a reproducible post-quantum testbed that models hybrid TLS 1.3 handshakes with NIST standardised algorithms ML-KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber) and ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) across HEMS-mediated EV-DER communication links. The framework benchmarks classical and post-quantum schemes by evaluating latency, key size, and interoperability, and subjects them to four adversarial trials: man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, downgrade, and fuzz/DoS. A Quantum-Readiness Index (QRI) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) fit Deployment Matrix translate these results into deployment guidance for utilities and aggregators. Findings show that quantum-resilient cryptography can be integrated into grid communication stacks without breaching operational budgets, offering a practical pathway toward secure, standards-aligned migration. Index Terms-Post-quantum cryptography, electric vehicles (EVs), distributed energy resources (DERs), home energy management systems (HEMS), grid-connected systems.
Long lived assets and digitised grid operations expose the energy sector to quantum era breakdown of classical public key trust anchors. This paper critically reviews postquantum cryptography (PQC) for power systems and energy communication networks, spanning smart grids, metering, distributed energy resources, monitoring, electric vehicle charging, industrial control, and critical infrastructure, with emphasis on embedded and gateway deployments. We compare leading families including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon, NTRU, FrodoKEM, Saber, BIKE, HQC, and SPHINCS+ using latency, memory, message expansion, implementation complexity, and deployment maturity. Integration is discussed for TLS 1.3, IEEE 2030.5, blockchain based energy services, system on chip platforms, and hybrid or quantum key distribution (QKD) assisted migration. No universal best scheme appears; selection rests on key exchange versus signatures, device constraints, and operational criticality. We summarise a risk based roadmap, stress the need for utility scale field validation, and identify open questions for standards aligned, energy aware, quantum safe adoption.
The rapid progress of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography, particularly to RSA and elliptic-curve schemes that are vulnerable to Shor and Grover based attacks. This paper investigates the practical transition toward quantum-resilient security through a comprehensive evaluation of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We combine threat modeling, quantum-attack simulation, and empirical benchmarking of NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and SPHINCS+. Results demonstrate that although PQC introduces larger key sizes and computational overhead, its integration into real network environments via hybrid TLS deployments—remains feasible with acceptable latency and resource impact. Based on these findings, we propose a crypto-agile migration strategy supporting phased deployment, interoperability with legacy systems, and risk-driven prioritization. The study provides practical guidance for organizations preparing for the transition to quantum-resilient infrastructures.
Currently available cryptographic algorithms such as the RSA, Diffie-Hellman and the ECC are used in securing most Internet communications across the Internet. Theoretical quantum algorithms (and the Shor algorithm in particular) were demonstrated to be able to efficiently break that type of classical cryptography as soon as large-scale quantum computers are developed. To handle this new emerging security problem, PQC has been proposed as a class of cryptographic algorithms that is resistant to both quantum and classical attackers. It is a research paper offering and experimentally implementing a hybrid PQC-TLS protocol in a heterogeneous network architecture which includes edge computing devices and cloud computing and IoT devices. The suggested architecture integrates both lattice-based CRYSTALS-Kyber key encapsulation scheme and CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature scheme in the TLS 1.3 handshake without being interoperable with the older ECC-based key exchange schemes. Five measures of performance that included handshake latency, CPU consumption, memory consumption, bandwidth overhead and energy consumption were analyzed in detail through experimentation. The experiments were conducted using in Iot, edge and cloud nodes under controlled conditions that were repeated a number of times to give reliability in the statistics. The results indicate that the integration of PQC has moderate overhead (mean increase in latency about 1517) and decent computational and energy requirements. Another method of resisting popular attacks on networks like as the man in the middle, replay, and downgrade attacks, is security validation. The findings indicate that quantum resilient secure communication migration to a heterogeneous distributed infrastructure can be practically and scalably provided using hybrid PQC-TLS protocols. Statistical analysis including standard deviation and 95% confidence intervals was performed to validate the reliability of the results.
Quantum computing is rapidly approaching a stage where classical cryptographic systems, particularly RSA, ECC, and Diffie–Hellman, will no longer provide adequate security for critical infrastructure. The emergence of Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms introduces unprecedented vulnerability to national cyber-defense ecosystems, underpinning power grids, transportation, military communications, and banking systems. This paper presents a unified post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) security framework integrating lattice-based primitives, hybrid key-exchange mechanisms, and secure orchestration for resource-constrained operational-technology environments. The proposed architecture leverages NIST-recommended schemes, including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+, to ensure long-term confidentiality, integrity, and interoperability across legacy and modern control environments. A defense-in-depth trust-fabric is introduced to protect critical data flows across edge controllers, automation PLCs, substations, cloud-SCADA gateways, and defense communication systems. Performance evaluation demonstrates a 39.4% reduction in key-exchange latency, 46% faster authentication cycles, and zero-downtime cryptographic transition capability. Our findings position this framework as a practical migration blueprint supporting national PQC readiness and cyber-resilience mandates.
With the advancement of quantum computing, traditional public-key cryptographic algorithms are increasingly at risk of being broken. This paper investigates the applicability of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within modernized power grid infrastructures, commonly known as smart grids, that rely heavily on interconnected and sometimes internet-facing devices and distributed control systems. To help safeguard these critical infrastructures against quantum-enabled threats, we benchmark and evaluate the performance of NIST-standardized and finalist PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) in a realistic smart grid testbed. Our evaluation includes both benchmarking of core cryptographic operations, key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation, as well as full TLS 1.3 handshake benchmarking across a real network of embedded devices and smart grid nodes. A key contribution of this work is the development of a smart grid testbed spanning multiple buildings with distributed energy resources (DERs) such as batteries and photovoltaic arrays, enabling an in-depth, system-level evaluation of post-quantum key exchange protocols in this context. We conclude by discussing the trade-offs between algorithmic efficiency and system constraints such as bandwidth, key rotation frequency, and device capability. Our findings offer actionable recommendations for the deployment of PQC algorithms tailored to the smart grid.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.