Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Beyond Quantum Individuals: Quasi-Sets and the Philosophy of Quantum Logics

J. A. F. Cuesta, Juan Pablo Jorge

Published Mar 1, 2026• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Beyond Quantum Individuals: Quasi-Sets and the Philosophy of Quantum Logics

J. A. F. Cuesta, Juan Pablo Jorge

•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations

Non-Reflexive Logics, Non-Individuals, and the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics

Jonas R. Becker Arenhart, Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo

Synthese Library/Synthese library•Jan 1, 2023•13 citations

Beyond Quantum Individuals: Quasi-Sets and the Philosophy of Quantum Logics

José Alejandro Fernández Cuesta, Juan Pablo Jorge

Abstract Standard quantum logics are typically defined over the orthomodular lattice associated with Hilbert space, yet there is no consensus on how this structure should be interpreted logically or ontologically. This paper offers a unified perspective on these issues by combining an epistemological three-layer model for scientific theories with quantum set theory. We argue that quasi-set theory is best understood not as an alternative semantics for quantum logics, but as an ontological framework operating at a different epistemological level: the ontological one. From this standpoint, the distinctive non-classical features of quantum logic are explained by representational assumptions about identity and individuality, rather than by positing any direct revisions of the logical principles themselves.

International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Mar 27, 2026•0 citations

A phenomenological foundation of quantum logic

G. Fáy

Acta Physica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae•Jun 1, 1970•4 citations

Uma estrutura quase-conjuntista para a mecânica quântica não-relativista

Jaison Schinaider

In this article, we discuss some questions about the nature of elementary particles treated by quantum mechanics, in particular related to the concepts of identity and individuality of these particles. We started briefly exposing the philosophical and formal concepts of the identity and individuality, and then show how these notions are problematic when applied to elementary particles such as electrons, protons and neutrons. In particular, we emphasize that both philosophy, logic and set theory (and thus the mathematics) admit the usual assumption that things have a ‘type’ of identity and individuality (i.e., are individuals), in the sense that objects which have all the same properties are the same object (are equal). Nevertheless, we show that in the quantum universe is possible to find objects that share all their properties, but are not just one, constituting in something like “nonindividuals” (thesis defended by many physicists and philosophers of science). In sequence, we show how classical mathematics — which, as we said, assumes an individuality to your entities — handle this situation, in particular admitting assumptions external to the physical theories. To avoid this procedure, and look for a formalism more ‘natural’ and appropriate to work with these quantum characteristics, we suggest the use of a non-classical set theory called the quasi-set theory, based on a non-reflective logics, which admits objects devoid of identity and individuality ab initio. Finally, we show another application of this theory: the search to a quasi-set mathematical structure that describes the ‘behaviour’ of non-relativistic quantum theory, and discuss some advantages of this ‘quasi-structure’ to a classical one.

Principia an international journal of epistemology•Apr 30, 2011•0 citations

On identity, indiscernibility and (non-)individuality in the quantum domain

Décio Krause

The topics of identity, individuality and indiscernibility had already entered the domain of the philosophy of physics, mainly in what respects the philosophy of quantum theories. In this paper, I present the main ideas of an underlying metaphysics that considers the basic entities of quantum physics as non-individuals, that is, as entities to which the standard theory of identity of classical logic and standard mathematics (set theory) does not apply. Two things must be emphasized: the first is that we pursue Erwin Schrödinger’s ideas that the notion of identity (or sameness ) does not apply to quantum things; the second is to follow Heinz Post’s claim that the non-individuality of quantum entities ‘must be introduced right at the start’ and not by taking individuals and making them pretend to be non-individuals ‘by hand’, say by confining them to non-rigid structures. Thus, this paper should be regarded as an attempt to justify the metaphysics of non-individuals and the logical systems that cope with them, although these systems are here only referred to. We also answer some criticisms that have been directed to such a view. The paper is directed to an audience of both physicists interested in foundations and philosophers of physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences•Jul 30, 2023•9 citations
Abstract Standard quantum logics are typically defined over the orthomodular lattice associated with Hilbert space, yet there is no consensus on how this structure should be interpreted logically or ontologically. This paper offers a unified perspective on these issues by combining an epistemological three-layer model for scientific theories with quantum set theory. We argue that quasi-set theory is best understood not as an alternative semantics for quantum logics, but as an ontological framework operating at a different epistemological level: the ontological one. From this standpoint, the distinctive non-classical features of quantum logic are explained by representational assumptions about identity and individuality, rather than by positing any direct revisions of the logical principles themselves.
In this article, we discuss some questions about the nature of elementary particles treated by quantum mechanics, in particular related to the concepts of identity and individuality of these particles. We started briefly exposing the philosophical and formal concepts of the identity and individuality, and then show how these notions are problematic when applied to elementary particles such as electrons, protons and neutrons. In particular, we emphasize that both philosophy, logic and set theory (and thus the mathematics) admit the usual assumption that things have a ‘type’ of identity and individuality (i.e., are individuals), in the sense that objects which have all the same properties are the same object (are equal). Nevertheless, we show that in the quantum universe is possible to find objects that share all their properties, but are not just one, constituting in something like “nonindividuals” (thesis defended by many physicists and philosophers of science). In sequence, we show how classical mathematics — which, as we said, assumes an individuality to your entities — handle this situation, in particular admitting assumptions external to the physical theories. To avoid this procedure, and look for a formalism more ‘natural’ and appropriate to work with these quantum characteristics, we suggest the use of a non-classical set theory called the quasi-set theory, based on a non-reflective logics, which admits objects devoid of identity and individuality ab initio. Finally, we show another application of this theory: the search to a quasi-set mathematical structure that describes the ‘behaviour’ of non-relativistic quantum theory, and discuss some advantages of this ‘quasi-structure’ to a classical one.
The topics of identity, individuality and indiscernibility had already entered the domain of the philosophy of physics, mainly in what respects the philosophy of quantum theories. In this paper, I present the main ideas of an underlying metaphysics that considers the basic entities of quantum physics as non-individuals, that is, as entities to which the standard theory of identity of classical logic and standard mathematics (set theory) does not apply. Two things must be emphasized: the first is that we pursue Erwin Schrödinger’s ideas that the notion of identity (or sameness ) does not apply to quantum things; the second is to follow Heinz Post’s claim that the non-individuality of quantum entities ‘must be introduced right at the start’ and not by taking individuals and making them pretend to be non-individuals ‘by hand’, say by confining them to non-rigid structures. Thus, this paper should be regarded as an attempt to justify the metaphysics of non-individuals and the logical systems that cope with them, although these systems are here only referred to. We also answer some criticisms that have been directed to such a view. The paper is directed to an audience of both physicists interested in foundations and philosophers of physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.