Abstract Albert Einstein thought of physics as the search for the order and harmony of the world—a harmony he spoke of in quasi-religious terms. In his theories of relativity, he succeeded brilliantly in discerning a hidden unity in nature. But by pursuing his unfinished quest for a unified field theory, he abandoned the mainstream of research that was increasingly dominated by the quantum theory he had helped to found, but whose foundations he continued to question. That research has now produced a (partially) unified physics based on quantum field theory. But the ontology of quantum field theory remains opaque. This essay will explore, but reject, the radical proposal that quantum field theory describes a single, non-composite object—the World, and that everything else (elementary particles, chairs, people, planets, space-time) arises as an aspect of the World’s enormously rich structure.
Abstract Albert Einstein thought of physics as the search for the order and harmony of the world—a harmony he spoke of in quasi-religious terms. In his theories of relativity, he succeeded brilliantly in discerning a hidden unity in nature. But by pursuing his unfinished quest for a unified field theory, he abandoned the mainstream of research that was increasingly dominated by the quantum theory he had helped to found, but whose foundations he continued to question. That research has now produced a (partially) unified physics based on quantum field theory. But the ontology of quantum field theory remains opaque. This essay will explore, but reject, the radical proposal that quantum field theory describes a single, non-composite object—the World, and that everything else (elementary particles, chairs, people, planets, space-time) arises as an aspect of the World’s enormously rich structure.
Abstract Quantum field theory (QFT) is the union of quantum mechanics and Einstein’ s special theory of relativity. QFT is the most fundamental physical theory and provides the answers to questions about the basic structure of the physical world. However, the way QFT describes the world is so different from the way our senses present it to us that it requires an overhaul of philosophic categories and arguments. How can we know the microscopic world without a satisfactory measurement theory? What are the general conditions of the world that make possible such knowledge? What are the presuppositions of physical theories? Dr.Auyang argues that the current relational substantial debate on space-time is inadequate and the observer-observed distinction in quantum interpretations illusory because they are hampered by philosophical constructs too narrow to accommodate the complicated structures of modern philosophical theories. Modern physical theories have incorporated many presuppositions of empirical knowledge, and consequently the theories inform us about the general nature of the world and out relation to it, in addition to information about elementary particles. The conceptual structure of QFT is extracted and articulated in commonsense terms, and used to answer many longstanding philosophical questions.
When metaphysicians pay attention to theories in fundamental physics, they are usually interested in their implications for fundamental metaphysics: they want to know what the theories imply or suggest concerning the ultimate structure of reality. This essay, by contrast, is concerned with the “derivative metaphysics” of quantum mechanics. I will be considering a certain hypothesis about the fundamental structure of reality, which I will call H. I am interested in H because it strikes me as embodying the most obvious, flat-footed way to read an account of the fundamental structure of reality off the mathematical apparatus of elementary quantum mechanics. But I won’t be defending this claim here, or trying to argue that the members of H are more plausible than other accounts of the fundamental structure of reality inspired by quantum mechanics. Instead, my question is: if H were true, could there be (non-fundamentally speaking, of course) such ordinary objects as plants, planets and people? More specifically: could there be such ordinary objects as ourselves and the things we are familiar with, having more or less the ordinary properties we take them to have? And more generally: given that the fundamental structure of a possible world is such as to make H true, what is its correct description in ordinary terms? Of course, I care about these questions in part because I want to explore the extent to which we might have good reason to believe H, or something akin to it. But even if H turned out to be consistent with our ordinary knowledge about the world of ordinary objects, it would obviously take a lot more work to show that it has any serious claim on our credence. At a minimum, one would have to say something about how likely we should regard our evidence as being, given H; one would want to make some sort of survey of alternative hypotheses; and one would want to take into account our specialised scientific knowledge as well as our ordinary knowledge, including the facts that make trouble for elementary quantum mechanics and force us to look beyond it to quantum field theory and ultimately towards some kind of theory of quantum gravity.
For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.
Introduction The central claim of this book is that all intentional phenomena are quantum mechanical. That goes both for the private thoughts inside our heads and for public or collective intentions like norms, culture, and language, which we might generically call institutions. I suggested in Chapter 1 that by virtue of their dependence on consciousness, a classical, materialist ontology cannot explain these phenomena, and as such from that perspective they must be epiphenomenal or illusions. In the rest of this book I show that a quantum, panpsychist ontology can provide a physical basis for what we all know to be true, which is that both private and collective intentions are part of the natural order. The elementary parts of social ontology are human beings in their biological individuality, which in this Part I consider in abstraction from their lived social contexts. By taking humans out of their natural habitat I aim to focus attention on what we bring to the social table simply by virtue of being organisms of a certain kind. The abstract individual is a common enough starting point in classical social theory (think Hobbes and the state of nature). However, it might seem an odd place to begin a quantum social theory, given the holism of quantum phenomena, both “all the way down” in having no elementary parts, and “all the way across” in universal non-locality. What look like separate organisms are just local decoherence effects of quantum fields; everything really is related to everything else. In that light the abstract individual appears not just as an abstraction, but as positively occluding what “the individual” really is. However, there is a difference between what is true of a universal ontology and what is practically relevant to specifically socialontologies, which are constrained by the properties of their constituent organisms. Unlike some organisms, humans live in highly interdependent societies, and most of what is interesting about us is socially constituted as well.
The origin of the universe and matter are topics on which science and philosophy have been questioning themselves for thousands of years and have not received a complete and exhaustive answer. The revolution brought about by quantum physics and astrophysics a hundred years ago produced a completely new vision of the universe, transforming the certainties postulated by classical physics into a probabilistic conception of natural phenomena. In searching for a unifying conception of matter and the universe, quantum mechanics has developed an impressive mass of knowledge and has deepened the investigation up to the most hidden levels of elementary particles and the most remote space, thanks to the most advanced technologies and with the help of artificial satellites. However, many aspects of cosmic immensity and life remain unexplored on earth and many questions remain unanswered. Starting from these uncertainties and doubts that feed other research, in this article I’m going to conduct a critical examination of the conception of matter and the origin of the universe as we describe quantum theory. Emphasizing above all the presumed role of protagonism and infallibility that this discipline claims to absolve with respect to all the others.
Abstract Everyone familiar with modern physics knows that Einstein’s attitude regarding quantum mechanics was one of skepticism. No biography of him fails to mention his saying that God does not throw dice. He was indeed given to such utterances (as I know from experience), and stronger ones, such as ‘It seems hard to look in God’s cards. But I cannot for a moment believe that He plays dice and makes use of “telepathic” means (as the current quantum theory alleges He does)’ [E1]. However, remarks such as these should not create the impression that Einstein had abandoned active interest in quantum problems in favor of his quest for a unified field theory. Far from it. In fact, even in the search for a unified theory, the quantum riddles were very much on his mind, as I shall discuss in Chapter