The development of quantum computers presents a threat to the security of modern communication systems; with Shor’s algorithm, all currently used asymmetric cryptography schemes can be broken. Fortunately, secure communication is still possible in the post-quantum era using symmetric encryption algorithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or the provably secure one-time pad (OTP). However, the main problem of symmetric cryptography, the key distribution, has to be solved. Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics to distribute encryption keys in a provably secure manner. In this thesis, the practical applicability of QKD is examined. This is achieved by testing the performance, stability, and usability of one of the few commercially available QKD platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis 2. The tested system was stable for multiple months in normal operation and did not require any intervention from the user. The maximum distance with the test platform was 54 km. However, at these distances, the secret key rate was only tens of bits per second. For distances below 25 km, secret key rates in the kilobits per second range were achieved. Thus, if high data rates or communication distances close to 50 km are desired, ciphers less secure than OTP have to be used. Additionally, two flaws were discovered in the tested system, one making the system unstable, and the other preventing the key distribution process from starting. Fortunately, neither issue reduces the security of the system, and both could be fixed by modifying the software. Our results show that QKD can be considered as a mature technology that is ready for practical applications and even for commercial use.
The development of quantum computers presents a threat to the security of modern communication systems; with Shor’s algorithm, all currently used asymmetric cryptography schemes can be broken. Fortunately, secure communication is still possible in the post-quantum era using symmetric encryption algorithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or the provably secure one-time pad (OTP). However, the main problem of symmetric cryptography, the key distribution, has to be solved. Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics to distribute encryption keys in a provably secure manner. In this thesis, the practical applicability of QKD is examined. This is achieved by testing the performance, stability, and usability of one of the few commercially available QKD platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis 2. The tested system was stable for multiple months in normal operation and did not require any intervention from the user. The maximum distance with the test platform was 54 km. However, at these distances, the secret key rate was only tens of bits per second. For distances below 25 km, secret key rates in the kilobits per second range were achieved. Thus, if high data rates or communication distances close to 50 km are desired, ciphers less secure than OTP have to be used. Additionally, two flaws were discovered in the tested system, one making the system unstable, and the other preventing the key distribution process from starting. Fortunately, neither issue reduces the security of the system, and both could be fixed by modifying the software. Our results show that QKD can be considered as a mature technology that is ready for practical applications and even for commercial use.
Currently many symmetric key cryptographic tools which are known to be quantum-safe. They all share Secret symmetric keys through an untrusted medium which is usually done with public key methods which are prone to quantum attacks. One among the recommended solutions to the key distribution problem is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). QKD utilizes an authenticated Communication channel along with a quantum communication channel so that a secret key is generated. Whatever may be the protocol to implement proposed QKD, they all need both a quantum channel, and an authenticated classical. OTP (One Time Pad) is used when two parties wish to communications have to share a key called pad. This pad is a randomly generated key and the length of the key should be equal to the message so it can be sent. The proposed QKD parameters that result in almost 35.67% smaller keys for quantum security and an implementation of QKD in network which is publicly available and usable in practice.
Quantum cryptography Ð quantum key distribution (QKD) Ð was one of the first fields of study of quantum information theory.It reached a mature scientific level and has been implemented in commercial systems for secure quantum communications.The key distribution problem is the central issue of symmetric cryptography.Quantum cryptography solves this problem on the basis of the fundamental laws of nature: the principles of quantum mechanics.Quantum key distribution is essentially matching two independent random sequences on the transmitting and receiving sides by exchanging quantum states.Required in addition to the quantum channel is an authentic classical communication channel.Both communication channels are open and vulnerable to a perpetrator's attack.To ensure the authenticity of the classical channel at initial system startup, a seed key is required, which is used to provide information-theoretic authentication.In essence, quantum cryptography systems are mechanisms for expanding this seed key.Subsequent sessions generate a quantum key, part of which is used for authentication, while another part is employed for other cryptographic purposes, such as encryption.An issue fundamental for quantum cryptography is the number of quantum key distribution sessions that can be conducted from the initial system launch until a new system reboot, when the cryptographic properties of the quantum keys reach a critical level, after which they can no longer be used for cryptographic purposes, and a new system reboot is needed.Although a number of reviews on quantum cryptography are currently available, this issue has not been discussed in detail.It is shown that for realistic parameters of quantum cryptography systems that are currently achievable, a QKD system can operate for I.
With the current development of quantum computing, some existing cryptographic protocols may be broken in the future, such as RSA with Shor's algorithm. To secure the future secret communications, but also the current ones from retrospective decryption, Pre-Shared Keys (PSK) can be used today, and two types of complementary solutions are currently being studied: Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). The objective of this paper is to describe the latest, which relies on the laws of quantum physics to secure the sharing of secret keys. Among the current QKD systems, some are already commercially available. Their distance range is limited, generally around 100 km. To overcome this distance limitation, a first solution is currently being deployed in field trials using trusted nodes, forming the so-called Quantum Communication Infrastructure (QCI). The drawback is that users must trust QCI nodes, in which quantum communication are stopped, going back to classical data processing that can be eavesdropped. To overcome this problem, researchers are investigating solutions to build future quantum networks and Quantum Internet (QI), in which the processing in the networks remains quantum, using quantum buffers and entanglement swapping in quantum repeaters to increase the distance range of QKD. We briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of QKD versus PQC, with the two actually being complementary.
The Wireless communication networks have been increasing their speed at a fast pace while the data sent over unsecured channels has become a major concern due to security issues. The advancement in cryptography techniques is based mainly on computational hardness, which will be endangered as quantum computing technology advances. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a way to share keys in a secure manner based on quantum mechanics principles, which do not allow any kind of unauthorized access. Here we present a wireless communication framework that is secure in nature and makes use of Quantum Key Distribution along with support from Grover’s quantum search algorithm. In particular, the overall system provides generation, distribution, and verification of keys among communicating partners through both quantum channel and classical communication channel security features. Using Grover’s algorithmize one can make key validation more efficient without much increasing computational need for compromising system performance. This will result in high performance systems. This thesis proposed model covers the basic aspects of the techniques, error correction and key sifters. All this together helps to determine a verifiable secret key implementation as a practicable instrument. The system’s performance is simulated in an assesment based evaluation for system security strength, rate of key generation and resistance to eavesdropping threats .This shows that the Security System provides protection against both Classical as well as Quantum Threats and also guarantees efficiency in their communication. The method proposed above is a scalable and future-ready security solutions for the next generation of wireless networks. It does so by contributing to the fortified communication systems in the quantum era and helping develop an enhanced quantum cryptographic system.
Quantum technology, and especially quantum computing, is advancing rapidly. Our every-day secure communication infrastructure relies heavily on public key cryptography; unfortunately, many public key schemes are in fact insecure against quantum algorithms. Furthermore, adversaries who, today, capture information encrypted using classical key distribution systems, can wait and, as soon as quantum computers of sufficient power become available, they may decipher all previously captured information. While some new “post-quantum” public key systems are assumed to be secure against quantum computers, this is only an assumption and, even if the assumption remains valid, still results in systems that are less efficient for end-users than the more commonly used public key systems employed today. While the advent of quantum technology may seem detrimental to security, in fact, one may harness the power of quantum through quantum key distribution (QKD) for stronger security guarantees. Such QKD protocols allow two (or more) parties to establish a shared secret key, secure against an all-powerful adversary. Perhaps surprising is that QKD technology is already here both experimentally and commercially. This tutorial serves as an introduction to basic QKD along with QKD technology from a practical perspective. Quantum communication is a highly interdisciplinary field of research and one of the goals of this article is to introduce a larger set of researchers and practitioners to its study in the hopes of furthering its progress and eventual wide-scale adoption.
IntroductionSecurity is an increasingly growing concern for network communications and video is an emerging segment of network traffic that uses large amounts of bandwidth.Streaming video, vs. downloading a video for later viewing, requires a continuous, high data rate.The data rate will vary depending on the quality of the video.Video surveillance is a streaming video application that in addition may require securing the data stream to prevent others from viewing it as well as prevent any tampering of that video stream.There are two parts to secure communication, key distribution and ciphers.A cipher requires a secret key that is used to encrypt data (plaintext), transforming it into an unreadable form (ciphertext) and then to decrypt it back into its original form.Key distribution is the method used to exchange the secret key between the desired end users and no one else.Current block ciphers are relatively slow compared to existing bandwidth because they require a substantial amount of processing that must compete for CPU cycles with the video encoding and compression processing.Frequently changing keys is thought to increase security, but the public key exchange method requires even more processing than the cipher.Cipher and key exchange processing can be off-loaded from the CPU, when the communication end point is the other end of the link, by using dedicated hardware called a link encryptor.Current classical security algorithms are based on the perceived computational complexity of certain mathematical functions and have not been proved secure.The public key algorithm is at risk from future quantum computers, whereas block ciphers are only weakened and an easy fix is to double the length of the key.Both are constantly at risk from a potential break through algorithm.Communications channels that exploit properties unique to quantum systems have been shown to enable functionality that cannot be achieved by classical means.If a high level of security is deemed necessary for the video stream, one might consider the use of a One-Time-Pad cipher [Wikipedia 2010], the only provably secure cipher, along with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), also a provably secure method of exchanging the secret keys used by a cipher.QKD is a protocol based on the quantum laws of physics and is provably information theoretically secure to accomplish key distribution [Gisin, et al., 2002].QKD keys, when used with a One-Time-Pad cipher, can provide secure communications.A One-Time-Pad cipher algorithm performs an Exclusive OR (XOR) on a random secret key and the message.This is a simple operation that incurs little overhead compared to the more common www.intechopen.comVideo Surveillance 74 computationally intensive ciphers, but it requires the key to be the same length as the message and discarded once used.For video, that requires a continuous stream of random secret keys, which is one of the features of QKD.Because of that feature, QKD is considered to have a long-term security perspective because of its "perfect forward security" attribute.The term perfect forward security means that any compromised keys cannot be used to determine other keys, either past or future.Since QKD keys are random strings and are not produced by a mathematical function, any compromised keys cannot be used to determine other keys.QKD is still a technology under development even though a few commercial systems are available [Ouellette, 2004].Some of the limitations of QKD are speed, distance and cost.Distance is a major concern, since without a break-through in developing a quantum repeater the quantum signal is limited to a few 100 km at best.Amplification is not possible since the quantum "no cloning law" specifies that a quantum state cannot be copied.If trusted, intermediate nodes are acceptable, then longer distances are possible via a multihop propagation of the key over multiple QKD links.This is not always acceptable and for these situations a quantum repeater would be required.It is currently under development, but none have yet been demonstrated.Speed, the ability to produce secure keys at a high rate is important to cope with the large amount of communication traffic over high-speed connections and hardware implementations that off-load the CPU have been demonstrated.Cost is an ever-present constraint and designs that use lower cost components and share rather than replicate components reduce the cost.In some cases, designs that share rather than duplicate components help to reduce concerns of side channel attacks upon engineered components (vs theoretical ones), but usually at the detriment of speed.This chapter includes a short summary of the BB84 QKD protocol and its various stages.We then present a section on the configuration of a QKD system targeted for short distances and how a number of innovations lowered the cost and evolved that core design for longer distance communication and current infrastructure use.Another section will discuss hardware support for the data handling necessary to implement high-speed QKD.Extending QKD point-to-point systems to form QKD networks makes it even more attractive for applications such as video surveillance and we will discuss early networking demonstrations.In closing, we will discuss initial QKD standards efforts currently being conducted How to referenceIn order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following: