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Feyerabend and Bohm: Scientific Pluralism to the Limits

Strien, M.E. van

Published Jan 1, 2025• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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Feyerabend and Bohm: Pluralism to the Limits

Strien, M.E. van

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In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett–Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straight-forwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science•Jul 17, 2024•3 citations
In this chapter, I offer a specific interpretation of how Feyerabend came from a Popperian critique of the Copenhagen interpretation to a detailed re-evaluation of Niels Bohr’s idea of complementarity. Engaging with this chapter of Feyerabend’s intellectual Werdegang is not only an interesting exercise in Feyerabendian exegesis; an explanation of this change of mind in a very narrow domain – or so it seems – gives the backdrop for Feyerabend’s thoroughgoing turn from methodological monism to methodological pluralism, for which he would became known to a wider audience with his publication of Against Method (Feyerabend 1975a). 1
The aim of this paper is to give an account of the change in Feyerabend's (meta)philosophy that made him abandon methodological monism and embrace methodological pluralism. In this paper I offer an explanation in terms of a simple model of 'change of belief through evidence'. My main claim is that the evidence triggering this belief revision can be identified in Feyerabend's technical work in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in particular his reevaluation of Bohr's contribution to it (1957-1964). This highlights an under-appreciated part of Feyerabend's early work and makes it central to an understanding of the dynamics in his overall philosophy of science.
In this paper I attempt to broaden Feyerabend scholarship by asking whether and how Feyerabend's philosophy of science, in particular his commitments to realism and pluralism about scientific theories as well as anarchism about scientific methods, is borne out in multidisciplinary research concerning the Leggett–Garg inequalities. These inequalities were derived explicitly to be a temporal analogue to Bell's inequalities: the viability of macroscopic realism is tested against the predictions of quantum mechanics by performing a series measurements on a macroscopic variable of one system at different time intervals, then evaluating correlations among resultant values. In the nearly forty years since Leggett and Garg's paper, questions continue to be raised whether common tests of these inequalities reveal genuine violations or merely experimental disturbances. There is also much debate about what genuine violations in fact signify, if (as most agree) they are not straight-forwardly analogous to Bell tests. Taking this fascinating and as yet largely unsettled episode from physics as a case study, I derive three Feyerabendian lessons that demonstrate the relevance of his views even today.