Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Oxford University Press eBooks

Explanations of and in Worlds

Alastair Wilson

Published Aug 26, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Scientific explanations should have a character that matches their subject matter: if a fact is not apt for causal explanation, it should not be explained causally. In this chapter, the author first reviews some cases where causal explanation has been extended beyond its proper limits, identifying a pattern of error termed the problem of causal overreach. The discussion then relates these considerations to the debate over causal locality in Everettian (many-worlds) quantum mechanics (EQM), in the context of three metaphysical distinctions central to recent discussions of locality: event causation vs. worldshaping causation, local branching vs. global branching, and overlapping worlds vs. diverging worlds. The author argues that worlds in EQM are not properly regarded as themselves subject to causal explanation; instead, causation should be understood as a wholly in-world matter. This approach avoids any nonlocal causal explanation; quantum entanglement instead supports a new category of noncausal worldshaping explanations. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of worldbound causation for principles of causal inference, in particular for the Causal Markov condition, and recommends the use of quantum causal models as a foundation for in-world causal inference.

DOI
10.1093/9780197792766.003.0008

Related papers

Causation

Peter J. Lewis

Abstract What are the consequences of quantum mechanics for the structure of causal explanation? It depends on the interpretation you choose. According to a hidden variable theory like Bohm’s, a measurement on one particle can have instantaneous effects on another, no matter how distant. This nonlocality is in prima facie conflict with special relativity. The prospects for constructing a local hidden variable theory are assessed, in particular by invoking backward-in-time causation. Many-worlds theories do not invoke nonlocal causation. However, they do entail that microcausal explanations are in terms of waves, not particles, and they inject consideration of the observer’s location among the worlds into causal explanations. Spontaneous collapse theories like GRW do invoke nonlocal causation; the prospects for a local spontaneous collapse theory are investigated. All of the major interpretations of quantum mechanics modify the structure of causal explanation from the received classical ideal.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Aug 18, 2016•0 citations

How the Many Worlds Interpretation Brings Common Sense to Paradoxical Quantum Experiments

Kelvin J. McQueen, Lev Vaidman A

This chapter argues that locality is a necessary condition for causal explanations to be commonsensical. It takes it as a requirement on an adequate physical theory that it be able to offer local causal explanations of all experimental outcomes. The chapter discusses how the demand for local causal explanation shaped classical physics. It introduces quantum physics in the context of a simple experiment, which although strange, can be explained locally. It specifies three refined common sense principles of locality. These principles are satisfied by classical physics and by the simple quantum experiment. The chapter also presents several quantum experiments that do seem to violate the principles and therefore defy common sense. It shows that common sense can be restored to quantum theory if we adopt the many worlds interpretation. The chapter also discusses the significance of our results to debates over the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Routledge eBooks•May 27, 2020•7 citations

Causality and Non-Locality in Quantum Mechanics: An argument for retrocausation

Jørn Kløvfjell Mjelva

It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.

•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations

Causation and Locality

Richard Healey

By moving to the context of relativistic space-time structure, this chapter completes the argument of Chapter 4 that we can use quantum theory locally to explain correlations that violate Bell inequalities with no instantaneous action at a distance. Chance here must be relativized not just to time but to a space-time point, so that an event may have more than one chance at the same time—it may even be certain relative to one space-time point but ‘at the same time’ completely uncertain relative to another. This renders Bell’s principle of Local Causality either inapplicable or intuitively unmotivated. Counterfactual dependence between the outcomes of measurements on systems assigned an entangled state is not causal since neither outcome is subject to intervention: but it may still be appealed to in a non-causal explanation of one in terms of the other.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Jul 20, 2017•0 citations

Diverging Everettian Quantum Mechanics

Alastair Wilson

Abstract This chapter sets out the version of quantum mechanics—diverging EQM—that constitutes the physics component of quantum modal realism. After a potted history of Everettian quantum mechanics, and an introduction to recent decoherence-based versions of the approach, I sketch a distinctive metaphysical understanding of Everettian quantum mechanics that involves diverging ‘parallel worlds’ instead of overlapping ‘splitting worlds’. I argue that the choice between divergence and overlap is underdetermined by the physics itself; I then adapt an argument of David Lewis’s that supports divergence over overlap, emphasizing the need to make room for objective probabilities in the Everettian picture. The chapter concludes by rejecting some unpersuasive motivations for overlap.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 11, 2020•0 citations

Branching (Almost) Everywhere And All at Once

Alyssa Ney

It is sometimes said that a reason to prefer Everettian quantum mechanics is that it allows one to avoid the kind of spooky action at a distance that is a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. There is a straightforward argument to show EQM has this virtue, however some advocates argue that this requires we see branching as a local causal process. I explain this reasoning and then show why, given the way Everettians standardly conceive of worlds and branching as emergent phenomena, branching need not be viewed as a causal process for EQM to be relativistically local. Forthcoming in Local Quantum Mechanics, OUP 2026.

quant-pharXiv:2608.18644•Aug 20, 2026
Abstract Scientific explanations should have a character that matches their subject matter: if a fact is not apt for causal explanation, it should not be explained causally. In this chapter, the author first reviews some cases where causal explanation has been extended beyond its proper limits, identifying a pattern of error termed the problem of causal overreach. The discussion then relates these considerations to the debate over causal locality in Everettian (many-worlds) quantum mechanics (EQM), in the context of three metaphysical distinctions central to recent discussions of locality: event causation vs. worldshaping causation, local branching vs. global branching, and overlapping worlds vs. diverging worlds. The author argues that worlds in EQM are not properly regarded as themselves subject to causal explanation; instead, causation should be understood as a wholly in-world matter. This approach avoids any nonlocal causal explanation; quantum entanglement instead supports a new category of noncausal worldshaping explanations. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of worldbound causation for principles of causal inference, in particular for the Causal Markov condition, and recommends the use of quantum causal models as a foundation for in-world causal inference.
Abstract What are the consequences of quantum mechanics for the structure of causal explanation? It depends on the interpretation you choose. According to a hidden variable theory like Bohm’s, a measurement on one particle can have instantaneous effects on another, no matter how distant. This nonlocality is in prima facie conflict with special relativity. The prospects for constructing a local hidden variable theory are assessed, in particular by invoking backward-in-time causation. Many-worlds theories do not invoke nonlocal causation. However, they do entail that microcausal explanations are in terms of waves, not particles, and they inject consideration of the observer’s location among the worlds into causal explanations. Spontaneous collapse theories like GRW do invoke nonlocal causation; the prospects for a local spontaneous collapse theory are investigated. All of the major interpretations of quantum mechanics modify the structure of causal explanation from the received classical ideal.
This chapter argues that locality is a necessary condition for causal explanations to be commonsensical. It takes it as a requirement on an adequate physical theory that it be able to offer local causal explanations of all experimental outcomes. The chapter discusses how the demand for local causal explanation shaped classical physics. It introduces quantum physics in the context of a simple experiment, which although strange, can be explained locally. It specifies three refined common sense principles of locality. These principles are satisfied by classical physics and by the simple quantum experiment. The chapter also presents several quantum experiments that do seem to violate the principles and therefore defy common sense. It shows that common sense can be restored to quantum theory if we adopt the many worlds interpretation. The chapter also discusses the significance of our results to debates over the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.
By moving to the context of relativistic space-time structure, this chapter completes the argument of Chapter 4 that we can use quantum theory locally to explain correlations that violate Bell inequalities with no instantaneous action at a distance. Chance here must be relativized not just to time but to a space-time point, so that an event may have more than one chance at the same time—it may even be certain relative to one space-time point but ‘at the same time’ completely uncertain relative to another. This renders Bell’s principle of Local Causality either inapplicable or intuitively unmotivated. Counterfactual dependence between the outcomes of measurements on systems assigned an entangled state is not causal since neither outcome is subject to intervention: but it may still be appealed to in a non-causal explanation of one in terms of the other.
Abstract This chapter sets out the version of quantum mechanics—diverging EQM—that constitutes the physics component of quantum modal realism. After a potted history of Everettian quantum mechanics, and an introduction to recent decoherence-based versions of the approach, I sketch a distinctive metaphysical understanding of Everettian quantum mechanics that involves diverging ‘parallel worlds’ instead of overlapping ‘splitting worlds’. I argue that the choice between divergence and overlap is underdetermined by the physics itself; I then adapt an argument of David Lewis’s that supports divergence over overlap, emphasizing the need to make room for objective probabilities in the Everettian picture. The chapter concludes by rejecting some unpersuasive motivations for overlap.
It is sometimes said that a reason to prefer Everettian quantum mechanics is that it allows one to avoid the kind of spooky action at a distance that is a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. There is a straightforward argument to show EQM has this virtue, however some advocates argue that this requires we see branching as a local causal process. I explain this reasoning and then show why, given the way Everettians standardly conceive of worlds and branching as emergent phenomena, branching need not be viewed as a causal process for EQM to be relativistically local. Forthcoming in Local Quantum Mechanics, OUP 2026.