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Review of "Epistemic-Pragmatist Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: A Comparative Assessment", by Ali Barzegar and Daniele Oriti

Read, James

Published Feb 10, 2025• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

I review the following article: "Epistemic-Pragmatist Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: A Comparative Assessment", by Ali Barzegar and Daniele Oriti (Foundations of Physics 54:66, pp. 1-34, 2024)

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The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been discussed since this theme first was brought up by Einstein and Bohr. This article describes a proposal for a new foundation of quantum theory, partly drawing upon ideas from statistical inference theory. The approach can be said to have an intuitive basis: The quantum states of a physical system are under certain conditions in one-to-one correspondence with the following: 1. Focus on a concrete question to nature and then 2. Give a definite answer to this question. This foundation implies an epistemic interpretation, depending upon the observer, but the objective world is restored when all observers agree on their observations on some variables. The article contains a survey of parts of the authors books on epistemic processes, which give more details about the theory. At the same time, the article extends some of the discussion in the books, and at places makes it more precise.
Richard Healey and Simon Friederich have each advocated a pragmatist interpretation of quantum mechanics as a way to dissolve its foundational problems. The idea is that if the way quantum claims are used are concentrated on, the foundational problems of quantum mechanics cannot be formulated, and so do not require solution. Their central contention is that the content of quantum claims differs from the content of non-quantum claims, in that the former is prescriptive whereas the latter is descriptive. Healey also argues that claims about non-decoherent systems are largely devoid of content. Chapter 9 considers various objections to these claims, noting in particular the ways in which the application of pragmatism to quantum mechanics differs from previous examples of pragmatist ‘therapy.’ It concludes that a pragmatist dissolution of the foundational difficulties of quantum mechanics is promising, but requires fairly radical changes to our understanding of the content of propositions and the extent of physical explanation.