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Leibniz international proceedings in informatics

Toward the Impossibility of Perfect Complete Quantum PKE from OWFs

Li, Longcheng, Li, Qian, Li, Xingjian, Liu, Qipeng

Published Jan 1, 2025• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we study the impossibility of constructing perfect complete quantum public key encryption (QPKE) from quantumly secure one-way functions (OWFs) in a black-box manner. We show that this problem is connected to a fundamental conjecture about the roots of low-degree polynomials on the Boolean hypercube. Informally, the conjecture asserts that for every nonconstant low-degree polynomial, there exists a universal (randomized) way to modify a small number of input bits such that, for every input string, the polynomial evaluated on the modified input string avoids 0 with sufficiently large probability (over the choice of how the input string is modified). Assuming this conjecture, we demonstrate the impossibility of constructing QPKE from quantumly secure one-way functions in a black-box manner, by employing the information-theoretical approach recently developed by Li, Li, Li, and Liu (CRYPTO'24). Towards resolving this conjecture, we provide various pieces of evidence supporting it and prove some special cases. In particular, we fully rule out perfect QPKE from OWFs when the key generation algorithm only makes a logarithmic number of quantum queries, improving the previous work, which can only handle classical queries.

DOI
10.4230/lipics.itcs.2025.71

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In this paper, we study the impossibility of constructing perfect complete quantum public key encryption (QPKE) from quantumly secure one-way functions (OWFs) in a black-box manner. We show that this problem is connected to a fundamental conjecture about the roots of low-degree polynomials on the Boolean hypercube. Informally, the conjecture asserts that for every nonconstant low-degree polynomial, there exists a universal (randomized) way to modify a small number of input bits such that, for every input string, the polynomial evaluated on the modified input string avoids 0 with sufficiently large probability (over the choice of how the input string is modified). Assuming this conjecture, we demonstrate the impossibility of constructing QPKE from quantumly secure one-way functions in a black-box manner, by employing the information-theoretical approach recently developed by Li, Li, Li, and Liu (CRYPTO'24). Towards resolving this conjecture, we provide various pieces of evidence supporting it and prove some special cases. In particular, we fully rule out perfect QPKE from OWFs when the key generation algorithm only makes a logarithmic number of quantum queries, improving the previous work, which can only handle classical queries.
This paper proves that it is impossible to construct perfectly complete quantum key agreement protocols (QKA) from quantumly secure one-way functions (OWFs) in a black-box manner. Specifically, consider any protocol in which Alice and Bob exchange only classical messages, make at most qAq_{\mathsf{A}}qA​ and qBq_{\mathsf{B}}qB​ quantum queries, respectively, to a Boolean-valued random oracle, and agree on a shared key with certainty. This paper shows that there exists an eavesdropper, given the classical messages, that can recover the shared key with certainty using O((qA+qB)5)O((q_{\mathsf{A}}+q_{\mathsf{B}})^5)O((qA​+qB​)5) classical oracle queries. The bound is independent of the number of rounds, transcript length, key length, and oracle-domain size. Previous results only applies to two-round key agreement (Li et al. CRYPTO 26) or relies on unproven conjectures (Austrin et al. CRYPTO 22). GPT-5.6 Sol Ultra found this proof in a one-shot conversation and drafted a preliminary version of this paper. The authors are fully responsible for the correctness, writing and discussions of this paper.
In classical cryptography, one-way functions are necessary for most of cryptography. In the quantum world, however, Kretschmer at {TQC'21} and subsequent works have demonstrated that quantum versions of various primitives in minicrypt, such as signatures and private-key encryption, do not require quantum-computable one-way functions (\textsf{qOWF}s). However, the question of the necessity of \textsf{qOWF}s for primitives in Cryptomania like public-key encryption with classical public keys and ciphertexts (\textsf{qPKE}) has remained open. We provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between \textsf{qPKE} and \textsf{qOWF}. First, our main result is a black-box separation between \textsf{qOWF}s and \textsf{qPKE}. In particular, we show that relative to a unitary, real, and self-inverse oracle, there exists a \textsf{qPKE} scheme (with classical keys and ciphertexts), but \textsf{qOWF}s do not exist. Further, our oracles admit a point-function obfuscation construction, thus ruling out black-box construction of \textsf{qOWF} from point function obfuscations. On the positive side, we construct \textsf{qPKE} from quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits with classical obfuscated descriptions and efficiently verifiable one-way puzzles, which is known to be a potentially weaker assumption than \textsf{qOWF}s, due to an existing black-box separation. Our construction is the quantum analog of the classical construction of \textsf{PKE} from one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation in the quantum computation with classical communication (QCCC) setting.
There has been a recent interest in proposing quantum protocols whose security relies on weaker computational assumptions than their classical counterparts. Importantly to our work, it has been recently shown that public-key encryption (PKE) from one-way functions (OWF) is possible if we consider quantum public keys. Notice that we do not expect classical PKE from OWF given the impossibility results of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC'89). However, the distribution of quantum public keys is a challenging task. Therefore, the main question that motivates our work is if quantum PKE from OWF is possible if we have classical public keys. Such protocols are impossible if ciphertexts are also classical, given the impossibility result of Austrin et al.(CRYPTO'22) of quantum enhanced key-agreement (KA) with classical communication. In this paper, we focus on black-box separation for PKE with classical public key and quantum ciphertext from OWF under the polynomial compatibility conjecture, first introduced in Austrin et al.. More precisely, we show the separation when the decryption algorithm of the PKE does not query the OWF. We prove our result by extending the techniques of Austrin et al. and we show an attack for KA in an extended classical communication model where the last message in the protocol can be a quantum state.
It is an important question to find constructions of quantum cryptographic protocols which rely on weaker computational assumptions than classical protocols. Recently, it has been shown that oblivious transfer and multi-party computation can be constructed from one-way functions, whereas this is impossible in the classical setting in a black-box way. In this work, we study the question of building quantum public-key encryption schemes from one-way functions and even weaker assumptions. Firstly, we revisit the definition of IND-CPA security to this setting. Then, we propose three schemes for quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions, pseudorandom function-like states with proof of deletion and pseudorandom function-like states, respectively.
We make progress towards the impossibility of quantum-computation, classical-communication (QCCC) key agreement by giving the first unconditional polynomial-query attacks that tolerate imperfect completeness in the following settings. First, we give a quantum attack on protocols with arbitrarily many rounds in which both parties' oracle queries and communication are classical before the final round, while local computation may be quantum throughout, and the final round may involve quantum oracle queries and one quantum message. Second, we give a classical attack on constant-round QCCC protocols in which Alice has classical oracle access and Bob may make quantum queries throughout. In both settings, the attacker is computationally unbounded and makes poly(λ)poly(λ)poly(λ) queries to recover the key with nonnegligible probability whenever each party's total honest query bound is at most poly(λ)poly(λ)poly(λ) and the valid agreement probability is inverse-polynomial. As consequences, we rule out query-bounded IND-CPA security for quantum public-key encryption with classical public and secret keys and classical messages of polynomially bounded length in the QROM in either of two settings: (i) key generation has classical oracle access, while encryption, decryption, and the ciphertext may be quantum; or (ii) encryption has classical oracle access and ciphertexts are classical, while key generation and decryption may have quantum oracle access. Both results assume negligible correctness error and polynomial honest query complexity. Combining the constant-round attack with the constructions of Bartusek and Khurana (CRYPTO 2025), we also rule out constant-round oblivious state preparation with polynomial honest query complexity and negligible correctness error in the QROM against computationally unbounded quantum receivers making polynomially many oracle queries.
Encryption of data is fundamental to secure communication in the modern world. Beyond encryption of data lies obfuscation, i.e., encryption of functionality. It is well-known that the most powerful means of obfuscating classical programs, so-called ``black-box obfuscation',' is provably impossible [Barak et al '12]. However, several recent results have yielded candidate schemes that satisfy a definition weaker than black-box, and yet still have numerous applications. In this work, we initialize the rigorous study of obfuscating programs via quantum-mechanical means. We define notions of quantum obfuscation which encompass several natural variants. The input to the obfuscator can describe classical or quantum functionality, and the output can be a circuit description or a quantum state. The obfuscator can also satisfy one of a number of obfuscation conditions: black-box, information-theoretic black-box, indistinguishability, and best possible; the last two conditions come in three variants: perfect, statistical, and computational. We discuss many applications, including CPA-secure quantum encryption, quantum fully-homomorphic encryption, and public-key quantum money. We then prove several impossibility results, extending a number of foundational papers on classical obfuscation to the quantum setting. We prove that quantum black-box obfuscation is impossible in a setting where adversaries can possess more than one output of the obfuscator. In particular, generic transformation of quantum circuits into black-box-obfuscated quantum circuits is impossible. We also show that statistical indistinguishability obfuscation is impossible, up to an unlikely complexity-theoretic collapse. Our proofs involve a new tool: chosen-ciphertext-secure encryption of quantum data, which was recently shown to be possible assuming quantum-secure one-way functions exist [Alagic et al '16].