Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Wiley eBooks

The Many‐worlds View of Quantum Mechanics

Lev Vaidman A

Published Nov 28, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Physics was completely changed by the two clouds that Kelvin was referring to, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. This chapter presents an example to demonstrating the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and action at a distance of a single-world interpretation. The principle of superposition is well established for microscopic objects like atoms. The Bohmian effective collapsed wavefunction is very similar to the original GRW-Pearle wavefunction. In relational approaches to quantum mechanics, quantum theory is a theory of information, where information is subjective to agents. A popular (frequently named Oxford) approach to the MWI is finding emerging worlds with their agents with particular experiences by analyzing decoherence in the universal wavefunction. So, it is an ontological approach like the Bohmian one which, however, leads to multiple worlds (instead of one) with agents whose experiences are explained by the theory.

DOI
10.1002/9781394427673.ch3

Related papers

Why the Many-Worlds Interpretation?

Lev Vaidman A

A brief (subjective) description of the state of the art of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is presented. It is argued that the MWI is the only interpretation which removes action at a distance and randomness from quantum theory. Limitations of the MWI regarding questions of probability which can be legitimately asked are specified. The ontological picture of the MWI as a theory of the universal wave function decomposed into a superposition of world wave functions, the important parts of which are defined in three-dimensional space, is presented from the point of view of our particular branch. Some speculations about misconceptions, which apparently prevent the MWI from being in the consensus, are mentioned.

arXiv:2208.04618•Quantum Reports•Aug 4, 2022•24 citations

The Quantum Many-Worlds Interpretation, Simply Told

Brian C. Odom

The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics poses a simple question. What would reality look like if everything evolved in time according to the same quantum equations? There is an attractive consistency to treating microscopic objects, measuring devices, and observers all on the same footing, but do the predictions match our observations? Here, we build a model for a bolometer detector making a which-path measurement in an atom interferometer. We discuss the MWI claim that, while both measurement outcomes occur in each experimental iteration, an observer will experience only one outcome or the other, with a probability consistent with experiment. Finally, we discuss how MWI does not have action at a distance. This article is written to be accessible to anyone with an undergraduate course in quantum mechanics.

quant-pharXiv:2602.09272•Feb 11, 2026•0 citations

Revolutionizing Quantum Mechanics: The Birth and Evolution of the Many-Worlds Interpretation

Arnub Ghosh

The Many-worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics has captivated physicists and philosophers alike since its inception in the mid-20th century. This paper explores the historical roots, evolution, and implications of the MWI within the context of quantum theory. Beginning with an overview of early developments in quantum mechanics and the emergence of foundational interpretations, we delve into the origins of the MWI through the groundbreaking work of physicist Hugh Everett III. Everett's doctoral thesis proposed a radical solution to the measurement problem, positing the existence of multiple branching universes to account for quantum phenomenon. We trace the evolution of the MWI, examining its refinement and elaboration by subsequent physicists such as John Wheeler. Furthermore, we discuss the MWI's impact on contemporary physics, including its connections to quantum information theory and ongoing experimental tests. By providing a comprehensive analysis of the MWI's historical development and current relevance, this paper offers insights into one of the most provocative interpretations of quantum mechanics and its implications for our understanding of the universe.

arXiv:2405.06924•May 11, 2024•2 citations

Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: A Paradoxical Picture

Amir Abbass Varshovi

The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics is studied from an unprecedented ontological perspective based on the reality of (semi-) deterministic parallel worlds in the interpretation. It is demonstrated that with thanks to the uncertainty principle there would be no consistent way to specify the correct ontology of the Universe, hence the MWI is subject to an inherent contradiction which claims that the world where we live in is unreal.

arXiv:2011.13928•Nov 27, 2020•0 citations

How the Many Worlds Interpretation brings Common Sense to Paradoxical Quantum Experiments

Kelvin J. McQueen, Lev Vaidman A

The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case that common sense in fact favors the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal "action at a distance". Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation.

arXiv:2202.01438•Feb 3, 2022•0 citations

The feasibility of many-worlds as the leading interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Martijn Hidding

This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.

•Aug 26, 2014•0 citations
Physics was completely changed by the two clouds that Kelvin was referring to, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. This chapter presents an example to demonstrating the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and action at a distance of a single-world interpretation. The principle of superposition is well established for microscopic objects like atoms. The Bohmian effective collapsed wavefunction is very similar to the original GRW-Pearle wavefunction. In relational approaches to quantum mechanics, quantum theory is a theory of information, where information is subjective to agents. A popular (frequently named Oxford) approach to the MWI is finding emerging worlds with their agents with particular experiences by analyzing decoherence in the universal wavefunction. So, it is an ontological approach like the Bohmian one which, however, leads to multiple worlds (instead of one) with agents whose experiences are explained by the theory.
A brief (subjective) description of the state of the art of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is presented. It is argued that the MWI is the only interpretation which removes action at a distance and randomness from quantum theory. Limitations of the MWI regarding questions of probability which can be legitimately asked are specified. The ontological picture of the MWI as a theory of the universal wave function decomposed into a superposition of world wave functions, the important parts of which are defined in three-dimensional space, is presented from the point of view of our particular branch. Some speculations about misconceptions, which apparently prevent the MWI from being in the consensus, are mentioned.
The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics poses a simple question. What would reality look like if everything evolved in time according to the same quantum equations? There is an attractive consistency to treating microscopic objects, measuring devices, and observers all on the same footing, but do the predictions match our observations? Here, we build a model for a bolometer detector making a which-path measurement in an atom interferometer. We discuss the MWI claim that, while both measurement outcomes occur in each experimental iteration, an observer will experience only one outcome or the other, with a probability consistent with experiment. Finally, we discuss how MWI does not have action at a distance. This article is written to be accessible to anyone with an undergraduate course in quantum mechanics.
The Many-worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics has captivated physicists and philosophers alike since its inception in the mid-20th century. This paper explores the historical roots, evolution, and implications of the MWI within the context of quantum theory. Beginning with an overview of early developments in quantum mechanics and the emergence of foundational interpretations, we delve into the origins of the MWI through the groundbreaking work of physicist Hugh Everett III. Everett's doctoral thesis proposed a radical solution to the measurement problem, positing the existence of multiple branching universes to account for quantum phenomenon. We trace the evolution of the MWI, examining its refinement and elaboration by subsequent physicists such as John Wheeler. Furthermore, we discuss the MWI's impact on contemporary physics, including its connections to quantum information theory and ongoing experimental tests. By providing a comprehensive analysis of the MWI's historical development and current relevance, this paper offers insights into one of the most provocative interpretations of quantum mechanics and its implications for our understanding of the universe.
The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case that common sense in fact favors the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal "action at a distance". Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation.
This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.