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Quantum Resistant Public Key Exchange-The Supersingular Isogenous Diffie-Hellman Protocol

Mayer, Hartwig

Published Jan 1, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.13140/rg.2.2.24880.21768

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The Signal protocol can be considered state-of-the-art when it comes to secure messaging, but advances in quantum computing stress the importance of finding post-quantum resistant alternatives to its asymmetric cryptographic primitives. The aim is to determine whether existing post-quantum cryptography can be used as a drop-in replacement for the public-key cryptography currently used in the Signal protocol and what the performance trade-offs may be. An implementation of the Signal protocol using commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) key exchange operations in place of elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is proposed. The benchmark results on a Samsung Galaxy Note 8 mobile device equipped with a 64-bit Samsung Exynos 9 (8895) octa-core CPU shows that it takes roughly 8 seconds to initialize a session using CSIDH-512 and over 40 seconds using CSIDH-1024, without platform specific optimization. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed implementation is the first post-quantum resistant Signal protocol implementation and the first evaluation of using CSIDH as a drop-in replacement for ECDH in a communication protocol.

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DualSecure Key Exchange (DSKE): A Hybrid ECDH-SIDH Protocol for Post-Quantum Cryptography

Veera Reddy Dasari, Padmaja Madugula

Quantum computing threatens classical key exchange protocols such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH). Post-quantum schemes like Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) offer quantum resistance but at notable computational and communication costs. We propose DualSecure Key Exchange (DSKE), a hybrid protocol that integrates the classical security of ECDH with the quantum resistance of SIDH. Methodology: DSKE jointly derives two shared secrets -KECDH via elliptic-curve scalar multiplication over a 256-bit prime field and KSIDHvia supersingular isogeny mappings—then fuses them using a secure KDF (e.g., SHA-3): K=KDF(KECDH || KSIDH). We formalize core operations and asymptotics (ECDH O(n3); SIDH O(mlog m)), specify key materials, and fix parameter choices aligned with established baselines (e.g., Curve25519 for ECDH and standard SIKE/SIDH parameter sets) to ensure reproducibility. Experimental settings: Evaluations were conducted on an Intel Core i7 with 16 GB RAM using Python-based cryptographic libraries, with repeated trials for timing stability. Results: DSKE achieves runtime = 6.6 ms versus ECDH = 1.2 ms and SIDH = 5.4 ms; communication = 512 bytes versus ECDH = 128 bytes and SIDH = 384 bytes; and key size 1024 bits (hybrid) versus 256 bits (ECDH) and 768 bits (SIDH). Comparative analysis against SIKE further contextualizes DSKE’s efficiency–security trade-off. Security strength follows the minimum of the constituent levels; with a 256-bit prime for ECDH (=128-bit classical) and standard SIDH/SIKE parameters (targeting =128-bit quantum), the fused key maintains an effective 128-bit level under the stated assumptions and KDF construction. These results indicate that DSKE offers a balanced pathway toward post-quantum readiness, particularly for long-lived, security-critical deployments that can tolerate modest overheads for dual-layer protection.

Informatica•Feb 2, 2026•0 citations

Masked torsion point supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman : A technique for preventing Castryck-Decru attack against SIDH

R. Krishnaprabha

Collision-resistant hashing and key exchange are two significant Post Quantum cryptography challenges based on isogeny. The challenge in isogeny-based encryption is to identify an isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2, between two given supersingular elliptic curves defined over a finite field Fq. Finding End(E1) and End(E2) is the analogous problem to this one. Supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH) key exchange is designed to be quantum secure. In this instance, we take advantage of the endomorphism ring’s non-commutative property. In SIDH, both the initiator and the response contribute equally to the shared secret. Here, we create both public and private keys and send them through an unsecured channel. Finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves is the fundamentally challenging problem. The needed isogeny is calculated using the torsion point information and the degree of the secret isogeny.In July 2022, Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru devised a successful key recovery attack on SIDH/ SIKE. The attack heavily depends on the torsion point images that Alice and Bob communicate during the protocol and is based on Kani’s “reducibility criterion” for isogenies from products of elliptic curves. We shall present a successful technique to prevent the aforementioned attack in this paper.

AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2025•0 citations
The Signal protocol can be considered state-of-the-art when it comes to secure messaging, but advances in quantum computing stress the importance of finding post-quantum resistant alternatives to its asymmetric cryptographic primitives. The aim is to determine whether existing post-quantum cryptography can be used as a drop-in replacement for the public-key cryptography currently used in the Signal protocol and what the performance trade-offs may be. An implementation of the Signal protocol using commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) key exchange operations in place of elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is proposed. The benchmark results on a Samsung Galaxy Note 8 mobile device equipped with a 64-bit Samsung Exynos 9 (8895) octa-core CPU shows that it takes roughly 8 seconds to initialize a session using CSIDH-512 and over 40 seconds using CSIDH-1024, without platform specific optimization. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed implementation is the first post-quantum resistant Signal protocol implementation and the first evaluation of using CSIDH as a drop-in replacement for ECDH in a communication protocol.
Quantum computing threatens classical key exchange protocols such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH). Post-quantum schemes like Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) offer quantum resistance but at notable computational and communication costs. We propose DualSecure Key Exchange (DSKE), a hybrid protocol that integrates the classical security of ECDH with the quantum resistance of SIDH. Methodology: DSKE jointly derives two shared secrets -KECDH via elliptic-curve scalar multiplication over a 256-bit prime field and KSIDHvia supersingular isogeny mappings—then fuses them using a secure KDF (e.g., SHA-3): K=KDF(KECDH || KSIDH). We formalize core operations and asymptotics (ECDH O(n3); SIDH O(mlog m)), specify key materials, and fix parameter choices aligned with established baselines (e.g., Curve25519 for ECDH and standard SIKE/SIDH parameter sets) to ensure reproducibility. Experimental settings: Evaluations were conducted on an Intel Core i7 with 16 GB RAM using Python-based cryptographic libraries, with repeated trials for timing stability. Results: DSKE achieves runtime = 6.6 ms versus ECDH = 1.2 ms and SIDH = 5.4 ms; communication = 512 bytes versus ECDH = 128 bytes and SIDH = 384 bytes; and key size 1024 bits (hybrid) versus 256 bits (ECDH) and 768 bits (SIDH). Comparative analysis against SIKE further contextualizes DSKE’s efficiency–security trade-off. Security strength follows the minimum of the constituent levels; with a 256-bit prime for ECDH (=128-bit classical) and standard SIDH/SIKE parameters (targeting =128-bit quantum), the fused key maintains an effective 128-bit level under the stated assumptions and KDF construction. These results indicate that DSKE offers a balanced pathway toward post-quantum readiness, particularly for long-lived, security-critical deployments that can tolerate modest overheads for dual-layer protection.
Collision-resistant hashing and key exchange are two significant Post Quantum cryptography challenges based on isogeny. The challenge in isogeny-based encryption is to identify an isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2, between two given supersingular elliptic curves defined over a finite field Fq. Finding End(E1) and End(E2) is the analogous problem to this one. Supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH) key exchange is designed to be quantum secure. In this instance, we take advantage of the endomorphism ring’s non-commutative property. In SIDH, both the initiator and the response contribute equally to the shared secret. Here, we create both public and private keys and send them through an unsecured channel. Finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves is the fundamentally challenging problem. The needed isogeny is calculated using the torsion point information and the degree of the secret isogeny.In July 2022, Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru devised a successful key recovery attack on SIDH/ SIKE. The attack heavily depends on the torsion point images that Alice and Bob communicate during the protocol and is based on Kani’s “reducibility criterion” for isogenies from products of elliptic curves. We shall present a successful technique to prevent the aforementioned attack in this paper.