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THE BRAIN AND QUANTUM DIFFUSION

JUAN JOSE ESPINOSA

Published Nov 24, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

If you're reading this book, you probably enjoy asking yourself uncomfortable questions: What, at its core, is reality? Why does the universe have structure and not just noise? How can a bunch of neurons produce something as strange as a conscious experience? And what does that thing we call "information" really mean? Quantum Diffusion was born from that intriguing intersection of curiosity, physics, and tenacity. It's not an "official" theory; it doesn't appear in textbooks or established papers . It's a speculative hypothesis , a way of looking at the universe that is still under construction. Precisely for that reason, it needs a popular science book: not to impose anything, but to invite reflection . The idea that runs through these pages can be summarized as follows: At the deepest level, reality could behave as a process of information diffusion in a subspace larger than the space and time we know. To put it simply: just as the aroma of coffee permeates a house, or heat spreads through metal, quantum information —the possibilities, the correlations, the "who is connected to whom"—could be diffusing in a hidden layer of reality. A kind of " underlayer " where what moves is not matter itself, but the information patterns that matter can adopt. Just as the smell of coffee diffuses throughout the house , quantum information diffuses through the subspace or subplate .

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.17715528

Related papers

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics

Jonathan Simon

This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.

The Philosophical Review•Jul 1, 2024•0 citations

Quantum Magic and Quantum Mystery

Roger Penrose, Martin R. Gardner

In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Oct 5, 1989•14 citations

Quantum Foundations

David Tong

The universe we live in is both strange and interesting. This strangeness comes about because, at the most fundamental level, the universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. This is the most spectacularly accurate and powerful theory ever devised, one that has given us insights into many aspects of the world, from the structure of matter to the meaning of information. This textbook provides a comprehensive account of all things quantum. It starts by introducing the wavefunction and its interpretation as an ephemeral wave of complex probability, before delving into the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and exploring its diverse applications, from atomic physics and scattering, to quantum computing. Designed to be accessible, this volume is suitable for both students and researchers, beginning with the basics before progressing to more advanced topics.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 19, 2025•0 citations

On the Origin of Reality: How We Create Our Own World

Peter Verheyen

Consider the following: A scientist studying atoms, is a group of atoms studying themselves. A strange way of looking at reality. To understand, we have to travel through the world of the infinitesimal, governed by rules and laws, different from the ones we know from our classical world. We have to enter the world of information. Max Born created the measurement problem with his statistical interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave-function: the strange connection between the collapse of a quantum mechanical wavefunction and measurement, observation, interaction with the environment, with projection into a single concrete reality in a classical world. Where a measurement or observation creates the relevant past history, John Wheeler’s eye. The universe urges for an increase in entropy and information processing. This increase makes the universe a bustling place where life such as ours can arise. The biochemistry of all life we know, has an essential basic property as the sole islands in the known universe succeeding in keeping its own entropy low: life is capable of violating the second law of thermodynamics. Life manages to prevent equally distribution of matter and energy in which case all biochemical processes stop and life ends. Growing old and dying, for every solely living thing on Earth, means being not able anymore to keep its entropy low, leading to a malfunction in the biochemical machinery, failing fundamental processes, wear and ultimately death. Keeping its entropy low, is a basic property of life. Entropy describes a system on a microscopic level and is closely related to information, the Shannon entropy, combined to as Infotropy. They are 2 parts of the same coin, closely connected with the statistics governing the rules of the universe. An average human body contains about 7 octillion (a 7 with 27 zeros) atoms and they all ‘know’ exactly what to do and how to interact. Hidden webs of information guide the atoms and molecules in their biochemical reactions, while obeying the strange laws of quantum physics: every chemical and biochemical reaction depends on the interplay of electrons. This all is guided by communication between and information streams and exchange in the subsystems of the cellular machinery. The universe produced brains, so why can’t the universe itself be a giant super brain. All we call real is made up out of things which cannot be considered as real. Our senses are biochemical measuring instruments in our interaction with the environment. They don’t serve to reveal us reality but to help us to survive. Their information is interpreted in the brain as a ‘reality vital to life.’ The brain holds a mask in front of reality behind which the real world, the world of information and quanta lies concealed. The qubits, the quantum information that makes up the universe, do not signify anything concrete, but are transformed by biochemical projection and neural interpretation into apparent reality, as electrical circuits and software do in creating a 3D virtual reality. The deepest layer of reality consists out of information. Information is the building block of the universe, although a qubit is not a physical object but contains information about the physical object. Information is real and has to obey physical laws. Consciousness, emerging from the exchange of information via chemical and electrical signals, allowing life to have a notion or awareness of its environment, is the appearance of a world trough biochemical information projection and neural interpretation. The brain, the most complex piece of matter in the known universe, creates reality. Which brings us to the question: How can we possibly know what there is out there, if we ourselves, are locked up in complete darkness in a small box. Graphical Abstract: Saldesign.

Book Publisher International (a part of SCIENCEDOMAIN International)•Sep 29, 2023•0 citations

Local Born geometry and the Tsirelson bound: registered consistency checks, checkerboard interference and a retrocausal singlet model

Ugo Lanciano

Common introduction to all the records of this series. Already read it? Skip to the content of this record ↓ Mathematical Materiality (MM) in brief. Why are the laws of physics the same everywhere and at every instant, even though nothing forces matter to obey them? MM proposes an answer: the laws are not rules imposed on matter from the outside; rather, matter itself is made of mathematical relations. And mathematics cannot change: a relation binds two distinct terms everywhere and always. In logic, nothing exists on its own: to exist means to be in relation to another logical entity, and outside this web of relations nothing can exist, not even other universes. This reading is already compared with experimental measurements at two points. First, the ratio of dark to ordinary matter is read as 3√3 = 5.196; when left free in the fits, Planck and DESI DR2 data give 5.21–5.22 (as registered in record 2.44, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23329080). Second, the acceleration scale of galaxies is read as a₀ = cH₀/6, the same scale that appears in Verlinde's emergent gravity: the computed value is 1.09–1.18 × 10⁻¹⁰ m/s² against the measured value of 1.20 × 10⁻¹⁰ m/s² (record 2.46.1, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23506655). Both readings were formulated with the measurements already known; the tests to check them against future data are registered in the same records. MM also changes the picture of the world. Reality is not made of separate objects, each complete in itself, in empty space: it is a material structure whose nature is a logical description. The observer does not look at it from outside: it is inside it, and always finds the logical mirror of its own position in front of itself. The objects it sees are, necessarily, diffractions of its point of view: the parts into which its description divides, like a unit into fractions. But each object in turn exists in its own logical mirror, exactly like its observer. This is why things do not exist only when someone looks at them, and yet none exists on its own: every property of a thing is a link with its observer. For MM, this is the only rational answer to the opening question: if everything is made of the relations that the laws describe, nothing can escape the laws and no one has to enforce them. For this reason the universe behaves like a simulation without really being one. It follows exact rules, made of counts, everywhere and at every instant, but no machine runs them and no programmer wrote them: a structure of mathematical relations does not need to be computed in order to exist. Tegmark (2008) had already noted that such a simulation need not be run, while Vazza (2025) estimated that running it physically on a machine would require resources that the very laws of the universe do not allow. In the first logical nexus between space and time — which relativity describes together as a single spacetime — there is a non-local phase, made only of a pure logical distinction: space is not time. In this phase, between space and time there is no relation of quantitative calculation, only the logical entity they have in common, which is needed to make them exist with respect to each other: we shall call this entity their greatest common divisor (GCD), just as the numbers 3 and 5 have only 1 in common. "Non-local" here does not mean that something is confined far away or acts at a distance: it means that the non-local phase is in no place and at no instant, while being present in every phase of reality, in every place and at every instant (MM 2.72). This non-local phase manifests itself in entanglement: two distant systems, without anything physically travelling from one to the other, remain correlated more strongly than any explanation based on separate properties and on the absence of faster-than-light influences allows: this is the violation of Bell's inequalities. The local world arises when a relation is counted through this GCD: its multiples and its fractions form a matrix. Seen by an observer inside the system like us, the multiples, which follow one another in a chain that never reverses, appear as time; the fractions, which stand side by side, appear as space. When that same multiple is directly contained in the matrix of the point of observation, it turns into mass — that is, into concrete matter as we usually understand it. There is therefore a close link between time and mass, which physics also recognizes: every mass has its own rhythm, its Compton frequency mc²/h (MM 2.64.1). The observed objects, while being logically autonomous entities in their local relations, enter into relation with the observer through the logical diffraction of the observer's matrix. This reading also gives a reason for the limit of the speed of light, which in Einstein's relativity is instead taken as a starting principle. The speed of light is the fixed exchange rate between the multiples and the fractions of the same GCD, meaning how much space a single step of time is worth: exceeding it would mean, for some observer, covering space without counting time, and thus leaving the local world. Logic always starts from a logical relative, and this exchange rate has nothing absolute in itself either: it is a necessary relative which, inside the system, becomes an absolute hypothesis, the same for everyone and impossible to exceed. Outside the system, by contrast, it has no justification at all, because outside there is only non-existence: justifying something requires another term to relate it to, and out there there is none. Asking for a reason from outside is like asking what lies north of the North Pole. The same theoretical framework that reads space, time, mass and the observed objects also admits quantum mechanics. The non-local phase and the mirror-like logical reciprocity between the two ends of the nexus give a reason for the probabilistic behaviour of matter. When the mass of the observed object is large enough compared with that of the point of observation, it fixes the object in the matrix of the latter: for this reason we see it in one precise place and at one precise instant. When instead this ratio falls below a certain threshold, the principal GCD (that of the point of observation) and the GCD of the diffraction that generates the object are forced to become equal, and they reflect each other as in a mirror. At that point the object no longer occupies a single point of the spacetime generated by the observer, but spreads over several possible positions, and we observe it as probability. It is like having to describe the number 10 using only the number 1: the only way is to distribute the 1 into ten copies, one for each unit of the 10. The probability here is not that of a die: these copies add up like waves and can also cancel each other out. This adding up and cancelling out is called interference. It can be seen in the double-slit experiment: where the waves arrive in step the screen lights up, and where they arrive out of step they cancel each other and leave dark stripes, the "dark fringes". This is what separates quantum probability from the probability of someone who simply does not know: the possibilities of a hidden die only add up, they never cancel. In quantum mechanics the probability of finding the object at a point is given by the Born rule: it is the squared modulus of the amplitude of the wave at that point, and the larger the amplitude there, the more likely it is to find the object there. In MM this rule follows from counting the copies, under three stated hypotheses (MM 2.48.2). And the cancellations appear only if the copies carry a wave phase, that is, if, like waves, they can be at a crest or a trough and so cancel each other out. In MM, if what is observed at each place follows the Born rule, entanglement too has a ceiling, the same as in quantum mechanics. The correlations between two distant systems exceed those that any classical explanation allows, but not by as much as one likes: in the quantity measured in these experiments (CHSH), classical explanations reach at most 2, quantum mechanics 2√2, about 2.83 (Tsirelson's bound). Measurements so far are compatible with this ceiling (MM 2.48.2). It remains to be understood how far all this goes. Today we know that even objects made of thousands of atoms spread over several positions, and no experiment has yet found a mass beyond which an object stops doing so and returns to a single place. That the transition depends on mass is an idea close to that of the physicists Roger Penrose and Lajos Diósi, for whom, however, the time within which an object stops being in several positions depends only on the object itself, on its mass and on how that mass is distributed. In MM, by contrast, probabilistic behaviour arises from a ratio. The threshold is the point at which the two GCDs, the principal one and that of the local diffraction, become equal: it is not a fixed value of mass but a ratio between the mass of the observed object and that of the point of observation, that is, of the physical system observing it, which changes from one experiment to another. For this reason MM indirectly gives a reason why experiments find no definite mass boundary: there is no single value to find, and in no experiment so far has the object come close to the mass of its own point of observation. The predictions, to be tested by experiments by 2035, are registered in MM 2.66.1. This record develops one aspect of the theoretical framework. The work is shared openly so that it can be judged by as many readers as possible: anyone who knows someone interested can pass on this single link, valid for the whole framework (with an overview in English and Italian): https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23535916. The entry page, with the complete list of all records, is https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22667516. An overview of all works, with entry pages in nine languages (English, Italian, Spanish, French, German, Portugue

•Oct 14, 2026•6 citations
If you're reading this book, you probably enjoy asking yourself uncomfortable questions: What, at its core, is reality? Why does the universe have structure and not just noise? How can a bunch of neurons produce something as strange as a conscious experience? And what does that thing we call "information" really mean? Quantum Diffusion was born from that intriguing intersection of curiosity, physics, and tenacity. It's not an "official" theory; it doesn't appear in textbooks or established papers . It's a speculative hypothesis , a way of looking at the universe that is still under construction. Precisely for that reason, it needs a popular science book: not to impose anything, but to invite reflection . The idea that runs through these pages can be summarized as follows: At the deepest level, reality could behave as a process of information diffusion in a subspace larger than the space and time we know. To put it simply: just as the aroma of coffee permeates a house, or heat spreads through metal, quantum information —the possibilities, the correlations, the "who is connected to whom"—could be diffusing in a hidden layer of reality. A kind of " underlayer " where what moves is not matter itself, but the information patterns that matter can adopt. Just as the smell of coffee diffuses throughout the house , quantum information diffuses through the subspace or subplate .
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.
In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.
The universe we live in is both strange and interesting. This strangeness comes about because, at the most fundamental level, the universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. This is the most spectacularly accurate and powerful theory ever devised, one that has given us insights into many aspects of the world, from the structure of matter to the meaning of information. This textbook provides a comprehensive account of all things quantum. It starts by introducing the wavefunction and its interpretation as an ephemeral wave of complex probability, before delving into the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and exploring its diverse applications, from atomic physics and scattering, to quantum computing. Designed to be accessible, this volume is suitable for both students and researchers, beginning with the basics before progressing to more advanced topics.
Consider the following: A scientist studying atoms, is a group of atoms studying themselves. A strange way of looking at reality. To understand, we have to travel through the world of the infinitesimal, governed by rules and laws, different from the ones we know from our classical world. We have to enter the world of information. Max Born created the measurement problem with his statistical interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave-function: the strange connection between the collapse of a quantum mechanical wavefunction and measurement, observation, interaction with the environment, with projection into a single concrete reality in a classical world. Where a measurement or observation creates the relevant past history, John Wheeler’s eye. The universe urges for an increase in entropy and information processing. This increase makes the universe a bustling place where life such as ours can arise. The biochemistry of all life we know, has an essential basic property as the sole islands in the known universe succeeding in keeping its own entropy low: life is capable of violating the second law of thermodynamics. Life manages to prevent equally distribution of matter and energy in which case all biochemical processes stop and life ends. Growing old and dying, for every solely living thing on Earth, means being not able anymore to keep its entropy low, leading to a malfunction in the biochemical machinery, failing fundamental processes, wear and ultimately death. Keeping its entropy low, is a basic property of life. Entropy describes a system on a microscopic level and is closely related to information, the Shannon entropy, combined to as Infotropy. They are 2 parts of the same coin, closely connected with the statistics governing the rules of the universe. An average human body contains about 7 octillion (a 7 with 27 zeros) atoms and they all ‘know’ exactly what to do and how to interact. Hidden webs of information guide the atoms and molecules in their biochemical reactions, while obeying the strange laws of quantum physics: every chemical and biochemical reaction depends on the interplay of electrons. This all is guided by communication between and information streams and exchange in the subsystems of the cellular machinery. The universe produced brains, so why can’t the universe itself be a giant super brain. All we call real is made up out of things which cannot be considered as real. Our senses are biochemical measuring instruments in our interaction with the environment. They don’t serve to reveal us reality but to help us to survive. Their information is interpreted in the brain as a ‘reality vital to life.’ The brain holds a mask in front of reality behind which the real world, the world of information and quanta lies concealed. The qubits, the quantum information that makes up the universe, do not signify anything concrete, but are transformed by biochemical projection and neural interpretation into apparent reality, as electrical circuits and software do in creating a 3D virtual reality. The deepest layer of reality consists out of information. Information is the building block of the universe, although a qubit is not a physical object but contains information about the physical object. Information is real and has to obey physical laws. Consciousness, emerging from the exchange of information via chemical and electrical signals, allowing life to have a notion or awareness of its environment, is the appearance of a world trough biochemical information projection and neural interpretation. The brain, the most complex piece of matter in the known universe, creates reality. Which brings us to the question: How can we possibly know what there is out there, if we ourselves, are locked up in complete darkness in a small box. Graphical Abstract: Saldesign.
Common introduction to all the records of this series. Already read it? Skip to the content of this record ↓ Mathematical Materiality (MM) in brief. Why are the laws of physics the same everywhere and at every instant, even though nothing forces matter to obey them? MM proposes an answer: the laws are not rules imposed on matter from the outside; rather, matter itself is made of mathematical relations. And mathematics cannot change: a relation binds two distinct terms everywhere and always. In logic, nothing exists on its own: to exist means to be in relation to another logical entity, and outside this web of relations nothing can exist, not even other universes. This reading is already compared with experimental measurements at two points. First, the ratio of dark to ordinary matter is read as 3√3 = 5.196; when left free in the fits, Planck and DESI DR2 data give 5.21–5.22 (as registered in record 2.44, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23329080). Second, the acceleration scale of galaxies is read as a₀ = cH₀/6, the same scale that appears in Verlinde's emergent gravity: the computed value is 1.09–1.18 × 10⁻¹⁰ m/s² against the measured value of 1.20 × 10⁻¹⁰ m/s² (record 2.46.1, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23506655). Both readings were formulated with the measurements already known; the tests to check them against future data are registered in the same records. MM also changes the picture of the world. Reality is not made of separate objects, each complete in itself, in empty space: it is a material structure whose nature is a logical description. The observer does not look at it from outside: it is inside it, and always finds the logical mirror of its own position in front of itself. The objects it sees are, necessarily, diffractions of its point of view: the parts into which its description divides, like a unit into fractions. But each object in turn exists in its own logical mirror, exactly like its observer. This is why things do not exist only when someone looks at them, and yet none exists on its own: every property of a thing is a link with its observer. For MM, this is the only rational answer to the opening question: if everything is made of the relations that the laws describe, nothing can escape the laws and no one has to enforce them. For this reason the universe behaves like a simulation without really being one. It follows exact rules, made of counts, everywhere and at every instant, but no machine runs them and no programmer wrote them: a structure of mathematical relations does not need to be computed in order to exist. Tegmark (2008) had already noted that such a simulation need not be run, while Vazza (2025) estimated that running it physically on a machine would require resources that the very laws of the universe do not allow. In the first logical nexus between space and time — which relativity describes together as a single spacetime — there is a non-local phase, made only of a pure logical distinction: space is not time. In this phase, between space and time there is no relation of quantitative calculation, only the logical entity they have in common, which is needed to make them exist with respect to each other: we shall call this entity their greatest common divisor (GCD), just as the numbers 3 and 5 have only 1 in common. "Non-local" here does not mean that something is confined far away or acts at a distance: it means that the non-local phase is in no place and at no instant, while being present in every phase of reality, in every place and at every instant (MM 2.72). This non-local phase manifests itself in entanglement: two distant systems, without anything physically travelling from one to the other, remain correlated more strongly than any explanation based on separate properties and on the absence of faster-than-light influences allows: this is the violation of Bell's inequalities. The local world arises when a relation is counted through this GCD: its multiples and its fractions form a matrix. Seen by an observer inside the system like us, the multiples, which follow one another in a chain that never reverses, appear as time; the fractions, which stand side by side, appear as space. When that same multiple is directly contained in the matrix of the point of observation, it turns into mass — that is, into concrete matter as we usually understand it. There is therefore a close link between time and mass, which physics also recognizes: every mass has its own rhythm, its Compton frequency mc²/h (MM 2.64.1). The observed objects, while being logically autonomous entities in their local relations, enter into relation with the observer through the logical diffraction of the observer's matrix. This reading also gives a reason for the limit of the speed of light, which in Einstein's relativity is instead taken as a starting principle. The speed of light is the fixed exchange rate between the multiples and the fractions of the same GCD, meaning how much space a single step of time is worth: exceeding it would mean, for some observer, covering space without counting time, and thus leaving the local world. Logic always starts from a logical relative, and this exchange rate has nothing absolute in itself either: it is a necessary relative which, inside the system, becomes an absolute hypothesis, the same for everyone and impossible to exceed. Outside the system, by contrast, it has no justification at all, because outside there is only non-existence: justifying something requires another term to relate it to, and out there there is none. Asking for a reason from outside is like asking what lies north of the North Pole. The same theoretical framework that reads space, time, mass and the observed objects also admits quantum mechanics. The non-local phase and the mirror-like logical reciprocity between the two ends of the nexus give a reason for the probabilistic behaviour of matter. When the mass of the observed object is large enough compared with that of the point of observation, it fixes the object in the matrix of the latter: for this reason we see it in one precise place and at one precise instant. When instead this ratio falls below a certain threshold, the principal GCD (that of the point of observation) and the GCD of the diffraction that generates the object are forced to become equal, and they reflect each other as in a mirror. At that point the object no longer occupies a single point of the spacetime generated by the observer, but spreads over several possible positions, and we observe it as probability. It is like having to describe the number 10 using only the number 1: the only way is to distribute the 1 into ten copies, one for each unit of the 10. The probability here is not that of a die: these copies add up like waves and can also cancel each other out. This adding up and cancelling out is called interference. It can be seen in the double-slit experiment: where the waves arrive in step the screen lights up, and where they arrive out of step they cancel each other and leave dark stripes, the "dark fringes". This is what separates quantum probability from the probability of someone who simply does not know: the possibilities of a hidden die only add up, they never cancel. In quantum mechanics the probability of finding the object at a point is given by the Born rule: it is the squared modulus of the amplitude of the wave at that point, and the larger the amplitude there, the more likely it is to find the object there. In MM this rule follows from counting the copies, under three stated hypotheses (MM 2.48.2). And the cancellations appear only if the copies carry a wave phase, that is, if, like waves, they can be at a crest or a trough and so cancel each other out. In MM, if what is observed at each place follows the Born rule, entanglement too has a ceiling, the same as in quantum mechanics. The correlations between two distant systems exceed those that any classical explanation allows, but not by as much as one likes: in the quantity measured in these experiments (CHSH), classical explanations reach at most 2, quantum mechanics 2√2, about 2.83 (Tsirelson's bound). Measurements so far are compatible with this ceiling (MM 2.48.2). It remains to be understood how far all this goes. Today we know that even objects made of thousands of atoms spread over several positions, and no experiment has yet found a mass beyond which an object stops doing so and returns to a single place. That the transition depends on mass is an idea close to that of the physicists Roger Penrose and Lajos Diósi, for whom, however, the time within which an object stops being in several positions depends only on the object itself, on its mass and on how that mass is distributed. In MM, by contrast, probabilistic behaviour arises from a ratio. The threshold is the point at which the two GCDs, the principal one and that of the local diffraction, become equal: it is not a fixed value of mass but a ratio between the mass of the observed object and that of the point of observation, that is, of the physical system observing it, which changes from one experiment to another. For this reason MM indirectly gives a reason why experiments find no definite mass boundary: there is no single value to find, and in no experiment so far has the object come close to the mass of its own point of observation. The predictions, to be tested by experiments by 2035, are registered in MM 2.66.1. This record develops one aspect of the theoretical framework. The work is shared openly so that it can be judged by as many readers as possible: anyone who knows someone interested can pass on this single link, valid for the whole framework (with an overview in English and Italian): https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23535916. The entry page, with the complete list of all records, is https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22667516. An overview of all works, with entry pages in nine languages (English, Italian, Spanish, French, German, Portugue