In this part we will consider recent attempts to get a relativistic CSL theory. The problem of getting such a generalization, or at least of making plausible that it exists, is of great interest. J. Bell (1990), after having expressed his dissatisfaction with the fundamental lack of precision of the standard formulation of quantum mechanics and the opinion that the only available acceptable alternatives are the Pilot Wave and the Spontaneous Localization schemes has stated: The big question, in my opinion, is which, if either, of these two precise pictures can be redeveloped in a Lorentz invariant way. The point of view of this paper is that what is most interesting is not a detailed exposition of the formal aspects of the generalization, but some crucial conceptual points which have come into focus in this attempt.
In this part we will consider recent attempts to get a relativistic CSL theory. The problem of getting such a generalization, or at least of making plausible that it exists, is of great interest. J. Bell (1990), after having expressed his dissatisfaction with the fundamental lack of precision of the standard formulation of quantum mechanics and the opinion that the only available acceptable alternatives are the Pilot Wave and the Spontaneous Localization schemes has stated: The big question, in my opinion, is which, if either, of these two precise pictures can be redeveloped in a Lorentz invariant way. The point of view of this paper is that what is most interesting is not a detailed exposition of the formal aspects of the generalization, but some crucial conceptual points which have come into focus in this attempt.
In this paper I will present conceptions of state reduction and particle and/or system localization which render these subjects fully compatible with the general requirements of a relativistic, i.e. Lorentz invariant, quantum theory. In the case of state reduction, the concept presented has, in it's main features, been advanced by several investigators in recent years, (Giovannini 1983), (Aharonov and Albert 1984), (Malin 1984), (Dieks 1985). My own contribution to this topic has been to elaborate the concept in question and examine, in some detail, the often counterintuitive but never causally anomalous or internally inconsistent consequences that emerge from taking the concept seriously (Fleming 1985,1986). In the case of particle and system localization, the concepts are more nearly my own and have been pursued by me for some time (Fleming 1964, 1965, 1966) as a way of freeing the subject of localization in relativistic quantum systems from the conceptual problems pointed out by Newton and Wigner (1949) myself (Fleming 1965) and extensively studied by Hegerfeldt et. al. (1974, 1980) and Ruijsenaars (1981).
Several experiments have suggested that the complete indistinguishability of quantum systems is to be considered a real phenomenon. Experiments such as the HOM effect, the existence of BECs, the path identity cases, and many others are physical realities of today. Physicists `explain’ these phenomena using different models, such as Bohmian mechanics, relational quantum mechanics or the QBism approach. Most of these models are constructed within a standard mathematical framework, meaning standard mathematics, where all things can, even if only in principle, be distinguished from one another, so complete indistinguishability can only be mimicked. These approaches may work for physical purposes but are debatable regarding logical and metaphysical questions. If we accept that such questions are at least part of the philosophical aspect of quantum physics, then we are authorised to analyse them and try to offer an alternative. Looking for an alternative, we consider Alain Aspect’s and Anton Zeilinger’s views about quantum realism, opting for Aspect’s acceptance of some kind of reality behind the wave-function, while Zeilinger suggests that everything comes from information. In our opinion, the case is the opposite: it is information that comes from the existence of things. The aim of this paper is to justify why we think that the underlying reality (in Aspect’s sense) can be seen as a quantum ontology of non-individuals.
The measurement of nonlocal properties of relativistic quantum-mechanical systems, the compatibility (or lack of it) of two or more such measurements, and various other of their characteristics are considered; and with these notions in hand an old problem (which is to produce a covariant description of the state reduction associated with the measuring process) is attacked, and succumbs. The solution requires us to depart (not as we did in part I of the present work, but in an entirely different direction) from the usual picture of the time evolution of quantum states.
A Lorentz invariant model for gravity-induced quantum state reduction is presented, which is mainly developed from Penrose's argument that the time translation operator in a superposition of macroscopic states is ill-defined. The problem to define a Lorentz invariant stochastic dynamics for the wave-function is solved by assuming that the stochastic time flow is running orthogonal to the deterministic, unitary time evolution inside the four-dimensional space-time, which makes the direction of causality independent from the chosen reference frame. This new view allows to accept Bell's position on the implication of quantum non-locality on relativity, without having to give up the Lorentz invariance of the specified dynamics. It is shown that it is possible to formulate on the basis of this new view a meaningful physical model. The model is also checked for possible higher order effects, which provide new starting points for experimental research.
Lorentz invariance is considered a fundamental property of relativistic quantum theory. However, in standard quantum theory this invariance is only partially realized: while relativistic wave equations like the Dirac equation are Lorentz invariant, the collapse postulate is not. In the non-relativistic domain, alternative theories have been formulated, like Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories, which dispense with the problematic collapse postulate. Extending these theories to the relativistic domain appears challenging, particularly with respect to implementing Lorentz invariance, mainly due to the unavoidable non-locality implied by Bell’s theorem. However, space-time theories can also trivially be formulated in a Lorentz-invariant way. If Lorentz invariance is to impose a genuine constraint on the content of a physical theory, one should aim for what can be called substantive Lorentz invariance. However, articulating a precise definition of this notion is notoriously difficult. This paper investigates two candidate criteria: Anderson’s criterion based on the identification of absolute objects, and a relativity principle for isolated subsystems. These criteria are applied to evaluate several Lorentz-invariant Bohmian models, a spontaneous collapse model, and a version of the Many-Worlds theory. With the exception of two Bohmian approaches, these models satisfy both criteria. Nevertheless, some Bohmian models that meet these conditions still do not appear to be substantively Lorentz-invariant, suggesting that the proposed criteria may not fully capture the intended concept. Nevertheless, they help clarify what aspects of relativity theory may need to be given up in passing from classical to quantum theory.