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Kluwer Academic Publishers eBooks

On quanta, mind and matter : Hans Primas in context

Hans Primas, Harald Atmanspacher A, Anton Amann, Ulrich Müller‐Herold

Published Jan 1, 1999• 11 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Preface -- Instead of a 'Festschrift' A. Amann, et al. The Primas Effect: On Quanta and Beyond U. Muller-Herold. Hans Primas and Nuclear Magnetic Resonance R.R. Ernst. Fragments of an Algebraic Quantum Mechanics Program for Theoretical Chemistry A. Amann, U. Muller-Herold. Matter. C*- and W*-Algebras of Observables, Their Interpretations, and the Problem of Measurement A. Amann, H. Atmanspacher. Temporal Nonlocality G. Mahler. Macroscopic Purification of States by Interactions H. Narnhofer, W. Thirring. Macroscopic Quantum Phenomena at the SQUID A. Rieckers. The Geometry of Quantum Probabilities K. Gustafson. Probability and Quantum Dynamics E.C.G. Sudarshan. Perspectives on the Molecular Microworld D.H. Rouvray. The Science of Matter: Fascination and Limits C.P. Enz. Mind. Holism A. Shimony. Concepts of Reality: Primas' Nonstandard Realism B. d'Espagnat. Relative Onticity H. Atmanspacher, F. Kronz. Rationalism, Determinism, Freedom V. Hosle. Cuts and Symbols W. Just. Reflections on the Foundations of Quantum Theory C.F. von Weizsacker. Appendices. Publications by Hans Primas (until 1998). List of Contributors. Index.

Related papers

On Quanta, Mind and Matter: Hans Primas in Context

Harald Atmanspacher A, Anton Amann, Ulrich Müller‐Herold

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1999•18 citations

Symposia on the foundations of modern physics 1992 : The Copenhagen Interpretation and Wolfgang Pauli, Helsinki, Finland, June-August 1992

Claus Montonen, Kalerve Vihtori Laurikainen

Open realism, B. d'Espagnat quantum mechanics and objectivity - an analysis of some paradoxes, A. Peres non-locality and wave-packet reduction in optical experiments - physical and philosophical issues in the Bohr-Einstein debate, A. Shimony actualization perception and reality - an epistemological approach based on psychological analysis - a draft, K. Rainio do we need an introvert physics?, E. Huhmar quantum theory of measurement - a review, P. Lahti the archetypal hypothesis of Wolfgang Pauli and C.G. Junge - origins, development and implications, C.R. Card Wolfgang Pauli between quantum reality and the royal path of dreams, C.P. Enz Einstein, Bohr, Pauli and the principle of individuation, H. van Erkelens the role of the Copenhagen interpretation today - quantum mechanics and realism, remarks on physics and the psyche, K.V. Laurikainen the Cartesian cut, the Heisenberg cut, dressed objects, and detached observers, H. Primas mind, matter, and Pauli, H. Stapp a possible explanation for the quantum structure, D. Aerts the observer in the age of man - from Laplace's demon to Wigner's friend, F. Borg universal gravitational interaction and the (non)-measurability of physical field quantities, on a new type of uncertainty relations in quantum general relativity, H-H. v. Borzeskowski non-detachability of language and the Pauli-Bohr dialogue, L. Lofgren quantum mechanics as a continuous theory of discrete processes, P. Sibelius.

•Jan 1, 1993•1 citation

Universitätsbibliothek Wien : Österreichische Zentralbibliothek für Physik & Fachbereichsbibliothek Chemie : Monatsausstellung Dezember 2016

A. Zartl

#150679 From chemistry to consciousness : the legacy of Hans Primas / Harald Atmanspacher, Ulrich Muller-Herold, editors. - [Cham]...

•Jan 3, 2017•0 citations

R. McWeeny: Quantum Mechanics, Principles and Formalism, The International Encyclopedia of Physical Chemistry and Chemical Physics, Topic 2: Classical and Quantum Mechanics. Vol. 1. Pergamon Press, Oxford 1972, 155 S., Preis: £ 3,50.

Werner Kutzelnigg

Berichte der Bunsengesellschaft für physikalische Chemie•Sep 1, 1972•0 citations

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

Bild Conception of Scientific Theory Structuring in Classical and Quantum Physics: From Hertz and Boltzmann to Schrödinger and De Broglie

Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

We start with a methodological analysis of the notion of scientific theory and its interrelation with reality. This analysis is based on the works of Helmholtz, Hertz, Boltzmann, and Schrödinger (and reviews of D'Agostino). Following Helmholtz, Hertz established the "Bild conception" for scientific theories. Here, "Bild" ("picture") carries the meaning "model" (mathematical). The main aim of natural sciences is construction of the causal theoretical models (CTMs) of natural phenomena. Hertz claimed that a CTM cannot be designed solely on the basis of observational data; it typically contains hidden quantities. Experimental data can be described by an observational model (OM), often based on the price of acausality. CTM-OM interrelation can be tricky. Schrödinger used the Bild concept to create a CTM for quantum mechanics (QM), and QM was treated as OM. We follow him and suggest a special CTM for QM, so-called prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT). QM can be considered as a PCSFT image, but not as straightforward as in Bell's model with hidden variables. The common interpretation of the violation of the Bell inequality is criticized from the perspective of the two-level structuring of scientific theories. Such critical analysis of von Neumann and Bell no-go theorems for hidden variables was performed already by De Broglie (and Lochak) in the 1970s. The Bild approach is applied to the two-level CTM-OM modeling of Brownian motion: the overdamped regime corresponds to OM. In classical mechanics, CTM=OM; on the one hand, this is very convenient; on the other hand, this exceptional coincidence blurred the general CTM-OM structuring of scientific theories. We briefly discuss ontic-epistemic structuring of scientific theories (Primas-Atmanspacher) and its relation to the Bild concept. Interestingly, Atmanspacher as well as Hertz claim that even classical physical theories should be presented on the basic of two-level structuring.

arXiv:2310.06954•Entropy•Nov 20, 2023•7 citations
Preface -- Instead of a 'Festschrift' A. Amann, et al. The Primas Effect: On Quanta and Beyond U. Muller-Herold. Hans Primas and Nuclear Magnetic Resonance R.R. Ernst. Fragments of an Algebraic Quantum Mechanics Program for Theoretical Chemistry A. Amann, U. Muller-Herold. Matter. C*- and W*-Algebras of Observables, Their Interpretations, and the Problem of Measurement A. Amann, H. Atmanspacher. Temporal Nonlocality G. Mahler. Macroscopic Purification of States by Interactions H. Narnhofer, W. Thirring. Macroscopic Quantum Phenomena at the SQUID A. Rieckers. The Geometry of Quantum Probabilities K. Gustafson. Probability and Quantum Dynamics E.C.G. Sudarshan. Perspectives on the Molecular Microworld D.H. Rouvray. The Science of Matter: Fascination and Limits C.P. Enz. Mind. Holism A. Shimony. Concepts of Reality: Primas' Nonstandard Realism B. d'Espagnat. Relative Onticity H. Atmanspacher, F. Kronz. Rationalism, Determinism, Freedom V. Hosle. Cuts and Symbols W. Just. Reflections on the Foundations of Quantum Theory C.F. von Weizsacker. Appendices. Publications by Hans Primas (until 1998). List of Contributors. Index.
Open realism, B. d'Espagnat quantum mechanics and objectivity - an analysis of some paradoxes, A. Peres non-locality and wave-packet reduction in optical experiments - physical and philosophical issues in the Bohr-Einstein debate, A. Shimony actualization perception and reality - an epistemological approach based on psychological analysis - a draft, K. Rainio do we need an introvert physics?, E. Huhmar quantum theory of measurement - a review, P. Lahti the archetypal hypothesis of Wolfgang Pauli and C.G. Junge - origins, development and implications, C.R. Card Wolfgang Pauli between quantum reality and the royal path of dreams, C.P. Enz Einstein, Bohr, Pauli and the principle of individuation, H. van Erkelens the role of the Copenhagen interpretation today - quantum mechanics and realism, remarks on physics and the psyche, K.V. Laurikainen the Cartesian cut, the Heisenberg cut, dressed objects, and detached observers, H. Primas mind, matter, and Pauli, H. Stapp a possible explanation for the quantum structure, D. Aerts the observer in the age of man - from Laplace's demon to Wigner's friend, F. Borg universal gravitational interaction and the (non)-measurability of physical field quantities, on a new type of uncertainty relations in quantum general relativity, H-H. v. Borzeskowski non-detachability of language and the Pauli-Bohr dialogue, L. Lofgren quantum mechanics as a continuous theory of discrete processes, P. Sibelius.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
We start with a methodological analysis of the notion of scientific theory and its interrelation with reality. This analysis is based on the works of Helmholtz, Hertz, Boltzmann, and Schrödinger (and reviews of D'Agostino). Following Helmholtz, Hertz established the "Bild conception" for scientific theories. Here, "Bild" ("picture") carries the meaning "model" (mathematical). The main aim of natural sciences is construction of the causal theoretical models (CTMs) of natural phenomena. Hertz claimed that a CTM cannot be designed solely on the basis of observational data; it typically contains hidden quantities. Experimental data can be described by an observational model (OM), often based on the price of acausality. CTM-OM interrelation can be tricky. Schrödinger used the Bild concept to create a CTM for quantum mechanics (QM), and QM was treated as OM. We follow him and suggest a special CTM for QM, so-called prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT). QM can be considered as a PCSFT image, but not as straightforward as in Bell's model with hidden variables. The common interpretation of the violation of the Bell inequality is criticized from the perspective of the two-level structuring of scientific theories. Such critical analysis of von Neumann and Bell no-go theorems for hidden variables was performed already by De Broglie (and Lochak) in the 1970s. The Bild approach is applied to the two-level CTM-OM modeling of Brownian motion: the overdamped regime corresponds to OM. In classical mechanics, CTM=OM; on the one hand, this is very convenient; on the other hand, this exceptional coincidence blurred the general CTM-OM structuring of scientific theories. We briefly discuss ontic-epistemic structuring of scientific theories (Primas-Atmanspacher) and its relation to the Bild concept. Interestingly, Atmanspacher as well as Hertz claim that even classical physical theories should be presented on the basic of two-level structuring.