Digital certificate offers an efficient way to realize the access authentication which safeguards the first line of secure communication. In this paper, we propose an access authentication scheme with digital certificates based on post-quantum standards published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology for quantum communication networks. Specifically, we experimentally demonstrate the secure access authentication of the quantum channel by verifying the signatures encoded in quantum states in a quantum secure direct communication network. Only the post-quantum digital signature algorithm is needed in the experiment. Together with secure relays, we envision the establishment of a large-scale quantum-secure communication network in the future.
Digital certificate offers an efficient way to realize the access authentication which safeguards the first line of secure communication. In this paper, we propose an access authentication scheme with digital certificates based on post-quantum standards published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology for quantum communication networks. Specifically, we experimentally demonstrate the secure access authentication of the quantum channel by verifying the signatures encoded in quantum states in a quantum secure direct communication network. Only the post-quantum digital signature algorithm is needed in the experiment. Together with secure relays, we envision the establishment of a large-scale quantum-secure communication network in the future.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide information theoretically secure key exchange even in the era of quantum computers. However, QKD requires the classical channel to be authenticated, the current method for which is pre-sharing symmetric keys. For a QKD network of n users, this method requires Cn2=n(n−1)/2 C n 2 = n ( n − 1 ) / 2 pairs of symmetric keys to realize pairwise interconnection. In contrast, with the help of a mature public key infrastructure (PKI) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum-resistant security, each user only needs to apply for one digital certificate from a certificate authority (CA) to achieve efficient and secure authentication for QKD. We need to assume only the short-term security of the PQC algorithm to achieve long-term security of the distributed keys. Here, we experimentally verified the feasibility, efficiency, and stability of the PQC algorithm in QKD authentication, and demonstrated the advantages when new users join the QKD network. Using the PQC public-key infrastructure, the nodes need to mutually trust only the CA to authenticate each other. QKD combined with PQC authentication will greatly promote and extend the application prospects of quantum-safe communication.
Wireless Internet of Things (IoT) networks support mission-critical services such as smart healthcare, industrial automation, autonomous transportation, and intelligent infrastructure, where secure and lightweight authentication is essential. However, conventional digital signature mechanisms used in wireless environments are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks and often impose high computational and communication overhead on resource-constrained IoT devices. To address these challenges, this paper proposes an efficient quantum signature scheme designed specifically for secure wireless communications in IoT networks. The proposed scheme leverages GHZ-type entangled states and controlled quantum teleportation to achieve quantum security while maintaining low verification complexity. By binding a user’s classical identity directly to the public key, the scheme eliminates the need for complex quantum swap tests, thereby improving scalability and reducing communication latency in large-scale IoT deployments. The protocol ensures strong resistance against forgery, impersonation, and intercept resend attacks, while providing authentication, non-repudiation, and non-transferability of signatures. Security and performance analysis demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves robust quantum-resistant protection with reduced computational and communication costs compared with existing approaches. Consequently, the scheme is well-suited for decentralized, latency-sensitive, and energy-constrained wireless IoT environments envisioned in next-generation communication systems.
In mobile networking, specifically in 5G networking, embedded SIM (eSIM) does not rely on the hardware chips to deliver the core network’s public key as traditional SIM cards do. Instead, eSIM utilizes remote digital certificates enabled by Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In this research, we study the post-quantum transition of eSIM-based mobile networking by applying and incorporating the post-quantum ciphers to the digital certificates and authentication. While building on the existing mutual authentication between the user equipment and core network, we build quantum resistance in the digital signatures used for the digital certificate and authentication so that they are secure against quantum-computing attackers. We implement our scheme using the NIST-standardized post-quantum ciphers to evaluate the computing/time and battery/power overheads, which are important for resource-constrained mobile devices. We compare the post-quantum ciphers with the current quantum-vulnerable ciphers and show that the lattice-based schemes have comparable or even better overhead performances.
Abstract Cryptography promises four information security objectives, namely, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation, to support trillions of transactions annually in the digital economy. Efficient digital signatures, ensuring integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation of data with information-theoretical security are highly urgent and intractable open problems in cryptography. Here, we propose a high-efficiency quantum digital signature (QDS) protocol using asymmetric quantum keys acquired via secret sharing, one-time universal2 hashing and a one-time pad. We just need to use a 384-bit key to sign documents of lengths up to 264 with a security bound of 10−19. If a one-megabit document is signed, the signature efficiency is improved by more than 108 times compared with previous QDS protocols. Furthermore, we build the first all-in-one quantum secure network integrating information-theoretically secure communication, digital signatures, secret sharing and conference key agreement and experimentally demonstrate this signature efficiency advantage. Our work completes the cryptography toolbox of the four information security objectives.
Digital signature schemes play an important role in the security of communication systems, ensuring authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation of messages. Classical digital signature schemes are widely used in communication systems but are not secure against quantum attacks, thereby necessitating the use of post-quantum cryptographic techniques. Recently, lattice-based digital signatures were proposed as efficient and quantum-resistant digital signatures. However, the lattice-based digital signatures are not effective in detecting eavesdropping or interception of messages during transmission. Quantum authentication techniques, on the other hand, are effective in detecting eavesdropping or interception of messages during transmission by utilizing the measurement disturbance principle of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we propose a hybrid quantum-classical digital signature scheme that combines the post-quantum security of lattice-based digital signatures with the capability of detecting eavesdropping or interception of messages during transmission by utilizing the quantum authentication techniques based on the entanglement principle of quantum mechanics. We discuss the system model, protocol, security, and performance evaluation of the proposed scheme in terms of computational and communication complexities. The proposed scheme is effective in the context of future communication systems that require security guarantees, such as quantum communication networks, critical infrastructures, and blockchain-based authentication systems.
The emergence of quantum computing introduces unprecedented risks to classical cryptographic schemes, particularly digital signatures that safeguard authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity across digital ecosystems. To address these concerns, this paper investigates the adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) within Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) frameworks, emphasizing its role in strengthening electronic signature (eSign) systems against quantum threats. Traditional PKI implementations rely on algorithms such as RSA and ECC in combination with Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for secure key management; however, these methods are vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor's. We examine how quantum-resistant alternatives-including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based schemes standardized by NIST-can be integrated into PKI without compromising interoperability and compliance. A comparative evaluation highlights trade-offs in performance, storage, and computational complexity while demonstrating the feasibility of embedding PQC into existing eSign infrastructures. Our findings underscore the urgency of transitioning towards quantum-safe digital signatures to ensure resilience, regulatory alignment, and long-term trust in national-scale digital services.