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Journal of Electronic Research and Application

Quantum-Secure OTN Framework Integrating QKDPQC Technologies

Wenliang Zhang, Jiao Zhao, Bao Tang, Wei Huang, Binbin Xu, Li Miao, Linfeng Wang, Bo Liu, Gongchong Zhong

Published Oct 17, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The Optical Transport Network (OTN) is a protocol for sending network messaging over optical fiber networks. Intelligent optical networks provide an ideal solution for high-bandwidth services. Currently, data encryption schemes for OTN typically rely on mathematical problems such as elliptic curve cryptography or discrete logarithms, which are vulnerable to attacks by quantum computers. This paper investigates a quantum-secure OTN Framework that integrates Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) technologies, enabling OTN leased lines to resist quantum attacks. This framework can provide users with highly secure quantum-encrypted OTN leased lines services.

DOI
10.26689/jera.v9i5.12329

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The Optical Transport Network (OTN) is a protocol for sending network messaging over optical fiber networks. Intelligent optical networks provide an ideal solution for high-bandwidth services. Currently, data encryption schemes for OTN typically rely on mathematical problems such as elliptic curve cryptography or discrete logarithms, which are vulnerable to attacks by quantum computers. This paper investigates a quantum-secure OTN Framework that integrates Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) technologies, enabling OTN leased lines to resist quantum attacks. This framework can provide users with highly secure quantum-encrypted OTN leased lines services.
The development of quantum computers poses a new security threat to network infrastructures and services, as they will be powerful enough to break the most common forms of digital encryption. Existing encryption services based on Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman (DH), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and so on are vulnerable to attacks by quantum computers. Although the gap between today’s quantum computers and the threats they pose to current public-key cryptography is large, the telecommunications landscape should begin planning for the transition to the post-quantum era as early as possible. In this paper, we examine recent advances in Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms from the perspective of the networking and telecommunications industries. The efforts are categorized at three levels, namely communication, computation (consisting of design, implementation and Public Key System (PKS)), and network. Some of the existing challenges and future recommendations for securing communication networks in the post-quantum era are also listed at the end of the paper.
Quantum computing presents significant issues to the current cryptographic landscape, especially with the upcoming deployment of 6G networks. Traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), are vulnerable to quantum-based attacks, leading to the need for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), and Satellite-based QKD solutions. This paper offers a comprehensive review of these quantum-safe technologies, discussing their integration within the context of 6G networks. Key performance indicators (KPIs), scalability issues, and hybrid cryptographic solutions are analyzed, along with the potential of Satellite-based QKD in securing global communications. The paper also explores use cases in healthcare, financial services, defense, and autonomous systems, evaluating future research directions and issues in scaling these quantum-safe technologies across industries.
This research introduces a novel physical-layer encryption technique for metropolitan-optimized optical transport networks (M-OTNs) that integrates real-time optical signal time-domain scrambling/descrambling with decoy-state quantum key distribution (DS-QKD). The method processes real-time optical data from the optical service unit (OSU) using a series of tunable Fabry–Perot cavities (FPCs), synchronized and updated with a running key. Experimental validation demonstrates secure communication within the optical network’s physical layer during standard OTU2 data transmission (10.709 Gbps), achieving an online transmission distance exceeding 100 km over typical single-mode fiber with a power loss of approximately 1.77 dB. The results indicate that this integrated approach significantly enhances the security of the optical physical layer in M-OTNs.
Quantum computing advancements create threat to encryption systems which protect modern digital communication networks. The integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems which RSA and ECC algorithms depend on become vulnerable to Shor's algorithm when large-scale quantum computers achieve operational status. Billions of small IoT devices operating in resource-constrained environments face a major security risk because their lightweight encryption methods lack protection against quantum-level attacks. The research investigates Post-Quantum Cryptography(PQC) as a new cryptographic framework which protects against both quantum and classical attacks. The proposed system integrates three advanced elements that work together to provide lattice-based encryption for mathematical security and hash-based signature schemes for authentication and an intelligent threat detection system. The hybrid framework provides complete security protection while maintaining high performance and low processing requirements which makes it suitable for protecting IoT networks.
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The potential of the swift development of quantum computing is an extreme danger to the traditional cryptographic programs, and they are the foundation of the modern communication infrastructure. RSA and ECC are classical public-key algorithms that can be successfully quantum-attacked, in particular, Shor's algorithm can easily factor large integers and calculate discrete logarithms (Bernstein et al., 2017). The Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has become the key to secure the next-generation communication networks against these threats, which relies on lattice problem-based algorithms, hash-based based algorithms, multivariate polynomials-based algorithms, and code-based cryptography. The paper examines the concepts, design, and implementation issues of PQC within current network infrastructure focusing on the secure transmission of data, authentication, and key management in the upcoming 5G and 6G networks. The approach will include the survey of existing algorithms of PQC, model the integration of protocol in the communication systems and test computational efficiency, security strength, and scalability. It has been found that PQC is suitable to protect network communications against quantum attackers, and achieves reasonable performance, though trade-offs can be seen in terms of computation overhead, key size, and latency. The research offers understanding to the researcher, network engineers and policy makers in order to adopt quantum resistant cryptography protocols to secure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information in the future communication networks.