This article examines quantum physics’ interpretive challenges through philosophical hermeneutics, arguing that the persistent confusion in understanding quantum phenomena stems not only from theoretical complexity, but from a hermeneutic deficit – a gap in how meaning is constructed, communicated, and contested within and beyond the scientific community. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (2004) notion of a crisis of intelligibility, we suggest that quantum theory has entered a phase where its formal success is undercut by interpretative fragmentation. This deficit manifests in two interconnected domains. First, in scientific communication, where metaphors like “particles that decide” or “observers creating reality” promote anthropomorphized misunderstandings. Second, and more fundamentally, within scientific practice itself, where the plurality of interpretations – Copenhagen, Bohmian, QBism – reveals that meaning in quantum physics is not derived from equations alone, but from contextual, socially embedded epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999).Rather than treating interpretations as deviations from an ideal objectivity, we propose a hermeneutic reframing: interpretations are dynamic constructs, shaped by experimental systems, disciplinary norms, and institutional choices. To unpack this, the first section draws on Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1977) and Knorr-Cetina (1999) to outline how quantum theory evolves not through isolated theorizing but through materially grounded practices. In doing so, we aim to move beyond the “interpretive regress” (Collins, 2010) toward a productive hermeneutic model of quantum meaning-making.
This article examines quantum physics’ interpretive challenges through philosophical hermeneutics, arguing that the persistent confusion in understanding quantum phenomena stems not only from theoretical complexity, but from a hermeneutic deficit – a gap in how meaning is constructed, communicated, and contested within and beyond the scientific community. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (2004) notion of a crisis of intelligibility, we suggest that quantum theory has entered a phase where its formal success is undercut by interpretative fragmentation. This deficit manifests in two interconnected domains. First, in scientific communication, where metaphors like “particles that decide” or “observers creating reality” promote anthropomorphized misunderstandings. Second, and more fundamentally, within scientific practice itself, where the plurality of interpretations – Copenhagen, Bohmian, QBism – reveals that meaning in quantum physics is not derived from equations alone, but from contextual, socially embedded epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999).Rather than treating interpretations as deviations from an ideal objectivity, we propose a hermeneutic reframing: interpretations are dynamic constructs, shaped by experimental systems, disciplinary norms, and institutional choices. To unpack this, the first section draws on Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1977) and Knorr-Cetina (1999) to outline how quantum theory evolves not through isolated theorizing but through materially grounded practices. In doing so, we aim to move beyond the “interpretive regress” (Collins, 2010) toward a productive hermeneutic model of quantum meaning-making.
This article presents the introductory architecture of a doctoral investigation into the hermeneutical interpretation of twentieth-century theoretical physics. Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics are treated first according to their physical structures and then through Neo-Kantianism, Logical Empiricism, Scientific Realism, and the comparatively neglected alternative of Aristotelian-Thomistic Classical Realism. The central hypothesis is that these interpretative horizons can be examined according to predominant tendencies toward univocity, equivocity, and analogy, and that analogy may preserve realist reference without collapsing scientific representation into ontology. The investigation distinguishes physical description, philosophical interpretation, hermeneutical comparison, and ontological evaluation. Its principal constructive test is the Bell-Bohm-Modal-Thomistic (BBMT) model: Bell secures the realist demand for a physical referent; Bohmian mechanics specifies effective physical determination; Modal Interpretation distinguishes dynamical and value states; contextual Boolean algebra may supplement M as a formal control but is not a constitutive fifth component; and the decisive passage from M to T is mediated through Fregean sense/reference, formal abstraction, participation, and a combined analogy of proper proportionality and intrinsic attribution. The broader thesis is that these levels form a tripartite hermeneutical circle whose final evaluation bears on scientific interpretation, ontology, and the existential horizon of the reader1.
This paper examines the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics through the lens of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, particularly the concept of “language games” and rule-following. The discourse surrounding quantum mechanics – characterized by terms like superposition, measurement, observer and entanglement – is deeply metaphoric and often stretches the bounds of classical language-use. This creates interpretative confusions not just in science, but in the metaphysical and epistemological debates that follow. Building on Philosophical Investigations, this paper argues that many foundational problems in quantum mechanics (e.g., the measurement problem, wave-function collapse, observer effect) are not exclusively ontological or physical but are entangled in language-use anomalies. The paper proposes that interpretative divergence among schools (Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, QBism, etc.) can be partly understood as conflicts between distinct language games with different rule-sets about what counts as a “measurement”, “reality”, or “causality”. By reading quantum discourse through Wittgensteinian criteria of meaning-as-use, the paper shows how the scientific community performs tacit normativity in deploying quantum terms – frequently without shared agreement on referents. Quantum mechanics, then, becomes a philosophical case study in the fragility and productivity of linguistic scaffolds in scientific theory. Finally, this paper makes a case for a deflationary yet clarifying approach: instead of seeking a “true” interpretation of quantum mechanics, we may better understand the philosophical stakes by analyzing the discursive rules, contextual boundaries, and pragmatic criteria that underlie quantum speech acts.
Quantum physics can be understood as an epistemological rupture that transforms the foundations of modern scientific rationality. In contrast to the Newtonian mechanistic worldview that underpinned universalist notions of progress, objectivity, and control, quantum mechanics introduces uncertainty, contextuality, non-locality, and the constitutive role of observation into scientific knowledge. These features destabilize the image of reality as a unified, hierarchically structured, and fully transparent domain, thereby challenging the epistemic premises of Western universalism. At the cultural level, this rupture finds expression in forms of scientific magical realism, where the quantum world appears as strange, paradoxical, elusive and fundamentally ungraspable. Such representations allow the quantum revolution to be interpreted not only as a theoretical breakthrough in physics but as an internal epistemological transformation of modern rationality itself. The issue is not the abandonment of rationality, but the reconfiguration of its foundations: the acknowledgment of uncertainty, contextuality, and the participatory role of the observer as structural features of knowledge. This shift is comparable to the epistemological tensions identified by postcolonial theory in situations where hegemonic discourses encounter forms of knowledge that cannot be reduced to their universalist logic. In this sense, quantum physics emerges as a form of internal epistemological alterity within Western science: while remaining part of its canon, it simultaneously rearticulates its ontological assumptions and limits its claim to constitute the sole normative regime of rationality. Extending quantum logic into social theory enables a shift from mechanistic social ontology toward a quantum social ontology, in which relationality, co-constitution, and process take precedence over fixed entities and linear causality. This transformation unfolds as a form of passive revolution, in the Gramscian sense: a profound ontological reorientation achieved not through the destruction of disciplinary institutions, but through their gradual conceptual reconfiguration. The epistemological outcome of this shift is the pluralization of knowledge and the emergence of a pluriversal onto-epistemological horizon, where scientific rationality becomes compatible with multiple cosmologies and situated ways of knowing. In this sense, the quantum turn opens a pathway toward the decolonization of knowledge and the rethinking of global order beyond universalist epistemic hierarchies.
For more than eighty years, quantum theory (QT) has dominated physical science. This domination remains unchallenged to this day. Some physicists celebrate this remarkable stability. Others lament this fact and argue that QT inhibits our understanding of physical reality. They feel that numerous problems that have accumulated in physical science require stepping beyond the horizon outlined by QT. The article offers a critical examination of the foundational assumptions of QT that shape its practice. It uses two interpretations of QT as case studies—Copenhagen interpretation and the theoretical perspective advanced by American physicist David Bohm—to explain one major problem that continues to plague our study of physics. The article sketches a path to a possible solution and outlines a new science practice that this solution will require.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
This paper presents a philosophical analysis of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem, the observer problem, decoherence, and quantum interpretation. It argues that the central difficulty in quantum mechanics is not only technical but interpretive: the theory has extraordinary predictive power without a single settled account of what is happening physically or ontologically. The paper frames this as an answerability problem, asking how interpretations should be judged when formal success outruns explanatory closure. It separates several meanings of observation—interaction, coupling, record formation, information update, and conscious awareness—and shows how collapsing these layers creates confusion in both physics and philosophy. It then compares major interpretations including Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, Bohmian mechanics, objective collapse, QBism, relational quantum mechanics, and consistent histories, treating them as different ways of stabilizing explanatory burden around an underconstrained formal core. The paper also argues that decoherence is crucial for understanding record stability and the appearance of classicality, but does not by itself solve the single-outcome problem. Overall, the paper offers a clear framework for thinking about quantum foundations, scientific explanation, ontology, observation, and philosophy of science without overstating what current theory can responsibly claim.