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Journal of Quantum Information Science

A Note on Special Nash Equilibria of Quantum Games

Yoshitaka Sakagami

Published Jan 1, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This note revisits Sakagami in [1] and studies whether quantum 2 × 2 games with full SU (2) strategy space admit Nash equilibria whose payoff curves do not intersect the classical (no entanglement) payoffs. By allowing duplicate payoffs in each player’s table, we construct an example that yields such “special” equilibria for any entanglement and describe a further equilibrium when there is no entanglement. We also relate the example to strong isomorphism results by Frackiewicz in [2].

DOI
10.4236/jqis.2025.153007

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This note revisits Sakagami in [1] and studies whether quantum 2 × 2 games with full SU (2) strategy space admit Nash equilibria whose payoff curves do not intersect the classical (no entanglement) payoffs. By allowing duplicate payoffs in each player’s table, we construct an example that yields such “special” equilibria for any entanglement and describe a further equilibrium when there is no entanglement. We also relate the example to strong isomorphism results by Frackiewicz in [2].
The aim of the paper is to examine pure Nash equilibria in a quantum game that extends the classical bimatrix game of dimension 2. The strategies of quantum players are specific types of two-parameter unitary operations such that the resulting quantum game is invariant under isomorphic transformations of the input classical game. We formulate general statements for the existence and form of Nash equilibria and discuss their Pareto efficiency. We prove that, depending on the payoffs of a classical game, the corresponding quantum game may or may not have Nash equilibria in the set of unitary strategies under study. Some of the equilibria cease to be equilibria if the players’ strategy set is the three-parameter special unitary group.
The two-players N strategies games quantized according to the Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens scheme [1] are considered. It is shown that in the case of maximal entanglement no nontrivial pure Nash equilibrium exists. The proof relies on simple geometric properties of "chiral" group SU(N)×SU(N)SU (N)\times SU(N)SU(N)×SU(N) and is based on considering the stability subgroup of the initial state of the game. The explicit forms of neither the gate operator nor the payoff matrix are necessary.
We study a quantum game played by two players with restricted multiple strategies. It is found that in this restricted quantum game Nash equilibrium does not always exist when the initial state is entangled. At the same time, we find that when Nash equilibrium exists the payoff function is usually different from that in the classical counterpart except in some special cases. This presents an explicit example showing quantum game and classical game may differ. When designing a quantum game with limited strategies, the allowed strategy should be carefully chosen according to the type of initial state.
This work, based on the author's MA thesis, concentrates on simultaneous move quantum games of two players. A numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in quantum games is constructed. It is then used show that there is a critical degree of entanglement above which a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium does not exist. The behavior of the two payoffs approach the cooperative classical ones. Bayesian quantum games are defined, and it is shown that under certain conditions, there {\it is} a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such games even when entanglement is maximal. The basic ingredients of a quantum game based on a two-players {\it three} decisions classical games are presented. This requires the definition of trits (instead of bits) and quantum trits (instead of quantum bits). It is shown that in this quantum game, there is no classical commensurability in the sense that the classical strategies are not obtained as a special case of the quantum strategies. An entanglement operator transforming a pure two qutrit state into a maximally entangled one is explicitly constructed.
Abstract Quantum strategies can alter the equilibrium structure of classical games, but apparent improvements may depend on arbitrary strategy labels or on the particular quantum operations admitted. Here, we characterize payoff improvement across all permissible three-strategy extensions of renaming-symmetric 2×22 \times 22×2 games within the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein framework. We preserve the classical game as a subgame and add one fixed unitary strategy, restricting attention to the three extension classes that remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. Across six canonical payoff orderings, including coordination, anti-coordination, and dominant-strategy dilemmas, we derive the conditions under which the extended games admit pure Nash equilibria whose payoffs are no lower than those of the corresponding symmetric classical equilibrium. The classical-type A0A_0A0​ extension produces no strict improvement, while B0B_0B0​ does so only in restricted regions and generally asymmetrically. By contrast, the genuinely quantum C0C_0C0​ extension supports non-inferior equilibria across all six classes and yields strict, mutually beneficial improvements in identifiable payoff regions. These results move beyond isolated game examples by showing precisely when representation-invariant quantum extensions can improve equilibrium payoffs and when they cannot. These conditions provide a design map for quantum-enabled multi-agent protocols by identifying the payoff structures under which an added quantum strategy can improve equilibrium outcomes without altering the players' underlying preferences.