Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)

TetrisLock: Quantum Circuit Split Compilation with Interlocking Patterns

Qian Janice Wang, Jayden John, Ben Dong, Yuntao Liu

Published Jun 22, 2025• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In quantum computing, quantum circuits are fundamental representations of quantum algorithms, which are compiled into executable functions for quantum solutions. Quantum compilers transform algorithmic quantum circuits into one compatible with target quantum computers, bridging quantum software and hardware. However, untrusted quantum compilers pose significant risks. They can lead to the theft of quantum circuit designs and compromise sensitive intellectual property (IP). In this paper, we propose TetrisLock, a split compilation method for quantum circuit obfuscation that uses an interlocking splitting pattern to effectively protect IP with minimal resource overhead. Our approach divides the quantum circuit into two interdependent segments, ensuring that reconstructing the original circuit functionality is possible only by combining both segments and eliminating redundancies. This method makes reverse engineering by an untrusted compiler unrealizable, as the original circuit is never fully shared with any single entity. Also, our approach eliminates the need for a trusted compiler to process the inserted random circuit, thereby relaxing the security requirements. Additionally, it defends against colluding attackers with mismatched numbers of qubits, while maintaining low overhead by preserving the original depth of the quantum circuit. We demonstrate our method by using established RevLib benchmarks, showing that it achieves a minimal impact on functional accuracy (less than 1%) while significantly reducing the likelihood of IP inference.

DOI
10.1109/dac63849.2025.11132682

Related papers

Randomized Reversible Gate-Based Obfuscation for Secured Compilation of Quantum Circuit

Subrata K. Das, Swaroop Ghosh

The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. Quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers can pose severe security risks, such as the theft of sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation. To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) metric. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92 and performs at least 2X better than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity (~1% to ~3% on average).

arXiv:2305.01133•May 2, 2023•24 citations

Secure Quantum Circuit Compilation Methodology for Untrusted Compilers

Subrata K. Das, Swaroop Ghosh

The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. A circuit (that implements a given function) with a low gate count and short depth is more likely to give a correct solution than the circuit variant with a higher gate count and depth. As such, quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted/unreliable) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers, with their varying adversarial motives ranging from semi-honest to malicious can pose severe security risks such as counterfeiting the sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary (i.e., an untrusted compiler) may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation (even though highly optimized). To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) and Degree of Functional Corruption (DFC) metrics. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92, indicating substantial functional corruption, and performs at least$2 x$better than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also attained a DFC as low as −0.75, approaching the −1 score that represents maximal functional corruption, further ensuring the robustness of our proposed method against counterfeiting. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity ($\sim 1 \%$to$\sim 3 \%$on average).

IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)•Aug 30, 2025•8 citations

OPAQUE: Obfuscating Phase in Quantum Circuit Compilation for Efficient IP Protection

Anees Rehman, Vincent Langford, Jayden John +1 more

Quantum compilers play a crucial role in quantum computing by converting these algorithmic quantum circuits into forms compatible with specific quantum computer hardware. However, untrusted quantum compilers present considerable risks, including the potential theft of quantum circuit intellectual property (IP) and compromise of the functionality (e.g. Trojan insertion). Quantum circuit obfuscation techniques protect quantum IP by transforming a quantum circuit into a key-dependent version before compilation and restoring the compiled circuit's functionality with the correct key. This prevents the untrusted compiler from knowing the circuit's original functionality. Existing quantum circuit obfuscation techniques focus on inserting key qubits to control key gates. One added key gate can represent at most one Boolean key bit. In this paper, we propose OPAQUE, a phase-based quantum circuit obfuscation approach where we use the angle of rotation gates as the secret keys. The rotation angle is a continuous value, which makes it possible to represent multiple key bits. Moreover, phase gates are usually implemented as virtual gates in quantum hardware, diminishing their cost and impact on accuracy.

arXiv:2502.16605•International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED)•Apr 23, 2025•12 citations

E-LoQ: Enhanced Locking for Quantum Circuit IP Protection

Yuntao Liu, Jayden John, Qian Wang

In recent years, quantum computing has started to demonstrate superior efficiency to classical computing. In quantum computing, quantum circuits that implement specific quantum algorithms are usually not directly executable on quantum computer hardware. Quantum circuit compilers decompose high-level quantum gates into the hardware's native gates and optimize the circuits for accuracy and performance. However, untrusted quantum compilers risk stealing original quantum designs (quantum circuits), leading to the theft of sensitive intellectual property (IP). In classical computing, logic locking is a family of techniques to secure integrated circuit (ICs) designs against reverse engineering and IP piracy. This technique involves inserting a keyed value into the circuit, ensuring the correct output is achieved only with the correct key. To address similar issues in quantum circuit protection, we propose an enhanced locking technique for quantum circuits (E-LoQ) where multiple key bits can be condensed into one key qubit. Compared to previous work that used one qubit for each key bit, our approach achieves higher security levels. We have demonstrated the practicality of our method through experiments on a set of benchmark quantum circuits. The effectiveness of E-LoQ was measured by assessing the divergence distance from the original circuit. Our results demonstrate that E-LoQ effectively conceals the function of the original quantum circuit, with an average fidelity degradation of less than 1 %.

arXiv:2412.17101•IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)•May 5, 2025•14 citations

Protecting Quantum Circuits Through Compiler-Resistant Obfuscation

Pradyun Parayil, Amal Raj, Vivek Balachandran

Quantum circuit obfuscation is becoming increasingly important to prevent theft and reverse engineering of quantum algorithms. As quantum computing advances, the need to protect the intellectual property contained in quantum circuits continues to grow. Existing methods often provide limited defense against structural and statistical analysis or introduce considerable overhead. In this paper, we propose a novel quantum obfuscation method that uses randomized U3 transformations to conceal circuit structure while preserving functionality. We implement and assess our approach on QASM circuits using Qiskit AER, achieving over 93\% semantic accuracy with minimal runtime overhead. The method demonstrates strong resistance to reverse engineering and structural inference, making it a practical and effective approach for quantum software protection.

cs.CRCross-listedarXiv:2512.19314•Dec 23, 2025•0 citations

Split Compilation for Security of Quantum Circuits

Abdullah Ash Saki, Aakarshitha Suresh, Rasit Onur Topaloglu +1 more

An efficient quantum circuit (program) compiler aims to minimize the gate-count - through efficient instruction translation, routing, gate, and cancellation - to improve run-time and noise. Therefore, a high-efficiency compiler is paramount to enable the game-changing promises of quantum computers. To date, the quantum computing hardware providers are offering a software stack supporting their hardware. However, several third-party software toolchains, including compilers, are emerging. They support hardware from different vendors and potentially offer better efficiency. As the quantum computing ecosystem becomes more popular and practical, it is only prudent to assume that more companies will start offering software-as-a-service for quantum computers, including high-performance compilers. With the emergence of third-party compilers, the security and privacy issues of quantum intellectual properties (IPs) will follow. A quantum circuit can include sensitive information such as critical financial analysis and proprietary algorithms. Therefore, submitting quantum circuits to untrusted compilers creates opportunities for adversaries to steal IPs. In this paper, we present a split compilation methodology to secure IPs from untrusted compilers while taking advantage of their optimizations. In this methodology, a quantum circuit is split into multiple parts that are sent to a single compiler at different times or to multiple compilers. In this way, the adversary has access to partial information. With analysis of over 152 circuits on three IBM hardware architectures, we demonstrate the split compilation methodology can completely secure IPs (when multiple compilers are used) or can introduce factorial time reconstruction complexity while incurring a modest overhead (~ 3% to ~ 6% on average).

International Conference on Computer Aided Design•Nov 1, 2021•39 citations
In quantum computing, quantum circuits are fundamental representations of quantum algorithms, which are compiled into executable functions for quantum solutions. Quantum compilers transform algorithmic quantum circuits into one compatible with target quantum computers, bridging quantum software and hardware. However, untrusted quantum compilers pose significant risks. They can lead to the theft of quantum circuit designs and compromise sensitive intellectual property (IP). In this paper, we propose TetrisLock, a split compilation method for quantum circuit obfuscation that uses an interlocking splitting pattern to effectively protect IP with minimal resource overhead. Our approach divides the quantum circuit into two interdependent segments, ensuring that reconstructing the original circuit functionality is possible only by combining both segments and eliminating redundancies. This method makes reverse engineering by an untrusted compiler unrealizable, as the original circuit is never fully shared with any single entity. Also, our approach eliminates the need for a trusted compiler to process the inserted random circuit, thereby relaxing the security requirements. Additionally, it defends against colluding attackers with mismatched numbers of qubits, while maintaining low overhead by preserving the original depth of the quantum circuit. We demonstrate our method by using established RevLib benchmarks, showing that it achieves a minimal impact on functional accuracy (less than 1%) while significantly reducing the likelihood of IP inference.
The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. Quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers can pose severe security risks, such as the theft of sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation. To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) metric. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92 and performs at least 2X better than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity (~1% to ~3% on average).
The success of quantum circuits in providing reliable outcomes for a given problem depends on the gate count and depth in near-term noisy quantum computers. A circuit (that implements a given function) with a low gate count and short depth is more likely to give a correct solution than the circuit variant with a higher gate count and depth. As such, quantum circuit compilers that decompose high-level gates to native gates of the hardware and optimize the circuit play a key role in quantum computing. However, the quality and time complexity of the optimization process can vary significantly especially for practically relevant large-scale quantum circuits. As a result, third-party (often less-trusted/untrusted/unreliable) compilers have emerged, claiming to provide better and faster optimization of complex quantum circuits than so-called trusted compilers. However, untrusted compilers, with their varying adversarial motives ranging from semi-honest to malicious can pose severe security risks such as counterfeiting the sensitive intellectual property (IP) embedded within the quantum circuit. We propose an obfuscation technique for quantum circuits using randomized reversible gates to protect them from such attacks during compilation. The idea is to insert a small random circuit into the original circuit and send it to the untrusted compiler. Since the circuit function is corrupted, the adversary (i.e., an untrusted compiler) may get incorrect IP. However, the user may also get incorrect output post-compilation (even though highly optimized). To circumvent this issue, we concatenate the inverse of the random circuit in the compiled circuit to recover the original functionality. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by conducting exhaustive experiments on a set of benchmark circuits and measuring the quality of obfuscation by calculating the Total Variation Distance (TVD) and Degree of Functional Corruption (DFC) metrics. Our method achieves TVD of up to 1.92, indicating substantial functional corruption, and performs at least2x2 x2xbetter than a previously reported obfuscation method. We also attained a DFC as low as −0.75, approaching the −1 score that represents maximal functional corruption, further ensuring the robustness of our proposed method against counterfeiting. We also propose a novel adversarial reverse engineering (RE) approach and show that the proposed obfuscation is resilient against RE attacks. The proposed technique introduces minimal degradation in fidelity (∼1%\sim 1 \%∼1%to∼3%\sim 3 \%∼3%on average).
Quantum compilers play a crucial role in quantum computing by converting these algorithmic quantum circuits into forms compatible with specific quantum computer hardware. However, untrusted quantum compilers present considerable risks, including the potential theft of quantum circuit intellectual property (IP) and compromise of the functionality (e.g. Trojan insertion). Quantum circuit obfuscation techniques protect quantum IP by transforming a quantum circuit into a key-dependent version before compilation and restoring the compiled circuit's functionality with the correct key. This prevents the untrusted compiler from knowing the circuit's original functionality. Existing quantum circuit obfuscation techniques focus on inserting key qubits to control key gates. One added key gate can represent at most one Boolean key bit. In this paper, we propose OPAQUE, a phase-based quantum circuit obfuscation approach where we use the angle of rotation gates as the secret keys. The rotation angle is a continuous value, which makes it possible to represent multiple key bits. Moreover, phase gates are usually implemented as virtual gates in quantum hardware, diminishing their cost and impact on accuracy.
In recent years, quantum computing has started to demonstrate superior efficiency to classical computing. In quantum computing, quantum circuits that implement specific quantum algorithms are usually not directly executable on quantum computer hardware. Quantum circuit compilers decompose high-level quantum gates into the hardware's native gates and optimize the circuits for accuracy and performance. However, untrusted quantum compilers risk stealing original quantum designs (quantum circuits), leading to the theft of sensitive intellectual property (IP). In classical computing, logic locking is a family of techniques to secure integrated circuit (ICs) designs against reverse engineering and IP piracy. This technique involves inserting a keyed value into the circuit, ensuring the correct output is achieved only with the correct key. To address similar issues in quantum circuit protection, we propose an enhanced locking technique for quantum circuits (E-LoQ) where multiple key bits can be condensed into one key qubit. Compared to previous work that used one qubit for each key bit, our approach achieves higher security levels. We have demonstrated the practicality of our method through experiments on a set of benchmark quantum circuits. The effectiveness of E-LoQ was measured by assessing the divergence distance from the original circuit. Our results demonstrate that E-LoQ effectively conceals the function of the original quantum circuit, with an average fidelity degradation of less than 1 %.
Quantum circuit obfuscation is becoming increasingly important to prevent theft and reverse engineering of quantum algorithms. As quantum computing advances, the need to protect the intellectual property contained in quantum circuits continues to grow. Existing methods often provide limited defense against structural and statistical analysis or introduce considerable overhead. In this paper, we propose a novel quantum obfuscation method that uses randomized U3 transformations to conceal circuit structure while preserving functionality. We implement and assess our approach on QASM circuits using Qiskit AER, achieving over 93\% semantic accuracy with minimal runtime overhead. The method demonstrates strong resistance to reverse engineering and structural inference, making it a practical and effective approach for quantum software protection.
An efficient quantum circuit (program) compiler aims to minimize the gate-count - through efficient instruction translation, routing, gate, and cancellation - to improve run-time and noise. Therefore, a high-efficiency compiler is paramount to enable the game-changing promises of quantum computers. To date, the quantum computing hardware providers are offering a software stack supporting their hardware. However, several third-party software toolchains, including compilers, are emerging. They support hardware from different vendors and potentially offer better efficiency. As the quantum computing ecosystem becomes more popular and practical, it is only prudent to assume that more companies will start offering software-as-a-service for quantum computers, including high-performance compilers. With the emergence of third-party compilers, the security and privacy issues of quantum intellectual properties (IPs) will follow. A quantum circuit can include sensitive information such as critical financial analysis and proprietary algorithms. Therefore, submitting quantum circuits to untrusted compilers creates opportunities for adversaries to steal IPs. In this paper, we present a split compilation methodology to secure IPs from untrusted compilers while taking advantage of their optimizations. In this methodology, a quantum circuit is split into multiple parts that are sent to a single compiler at different times or to multiple compilers. In this way, the adversary has access to partial information. With analysis of over 152 circuits on three IBM hardware architectures, we demonstrate the split compilation methodology can completely secure IPs (when multiple compilers are used) or can introduce factorial time reconstruction complexity while incurring a modest overhead (~ 3% to ~ 6% on average).