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Electronics

Towards a Unified Quantum Risk Assessment

Šarūnas Grigaliūnas, Rasa Brūzgienė

Published Aug 22, 2025• 15 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum computing poses an unprecedented threat to classical cryptography, requiring new risk assessment paradigms. This paper proposes a Quantum-Adjusted Risk Score (QARS) model, a theoretical and methodological innovation within the EU’s PAREK framework (Post-quantum asset and algorithm inventory, risk assessment, road mapping, execution, key governance). QARS extends Mosca’s inequality—which defines a quantum threat timeline threshold—into a multi-factor risk scoring formula. We formalise QARS with mathematical expressions incorporating timeline, sensitivity, and exposure dimensions, each calibrated by factor weights and scaling functions. The design motivations for including these dimensions are discussed in depth. We present method for model calibration (including sector-specific weight adjustments) and outline validation strategies combining quantitative analysis and expert judgement. The proposed QARS model is situated in the context of the EU’s coordinated roadmap for post-quantum cryptography and cybersecurity regulations, illustrating how QARS supports compliance and strategic migration prioritisation. A prototype tool implementing QARS model is also provided to demonstrate practical applicability. Our contributions provide a unified approach to quantum risk assessment, marrying theoretical rigour with policy-relevant risk management needs to help organizations proactively address the quantum threat.

DOI
10.3390/electronics14173338

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Quantum computing poses an unprecedented threat to classical cryptography, requiring new risk assessment paradigms. This paper proposes a Quantum-Adjusted Risk Score (QARS) model, a theoretical and methodological innovation within the EU’s PAREK framework (Post-quantum asset and algorithm inventory, risk assessment, road mapping, execution, key governance). QARS extends Mosca’s inequality—which defines a quantum threat timeline threshold—into a multi-factor risk scoring formula. We formalise QARS with mathematical expressions incorporating timeline, sensitivity, and exposure dimensions, each calibrated by factor weights and scaling functions. The design motivations for including these dimensions are discussed in depth. We present method for model calibration (including sector-specific weight adjustments) and outline validation strategies combining quantitative analysis and expert judgement. The proposed QARS model is situated in the context of the EU’s coordinated roadmap for post-quantum cryptography and cybersecurity regulations, illustrating how QARS supports compliance and strategic migration prioritisation. A prototype tool implementing QARS model is also provided to demonstrate practical applicability. Our contributions provide a unified approach to quantum risk assessment, marrying theoretical rigour with policy-relevant risk management needs to help organizations proactively address the quantum threat.
In the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) era, assessing quantum risk is essential for informing decisions such as prioritising system migration. Emerging identity and authorisation systems, including Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs), introduce new challenges due to long-lived assets and multi-actor lifecycle interactions.In this paper, we propose a threat modelling framework and a lifecycle-aware extension to an existing quantum risk assessment methodology. We present a taxonomy of quantum-related threats tailored to DID/VC systems, categorising them by target asset: data (e.g., credentials and DID documents), services (e.g., issuance and verification), and resources (e.g., computation and storage at wallets and verifiers). Building on this, we derive an extended quantum risk formulation that incorporates aggregation risk, sharing exposure, and verified destruction, enabling more informed and context-aware prioritisation of PQC migration strategies.
Enterprise infrastructure operators face a critical challenge in prioritizing post-quantum migration, as quantum-related risk is not uniformly distributed across data in transit, in use, and at rest. Existing assessments rely on system-level evaluations or protocol-specific analyses, which do not capture the heterogeneity of exposure across infrastructure layers. This paper extends the Quantum-Adjusted Risk Scoring (QARS) model introduced in into an evidence-based, layer-specific framework that evaluates in-transit, in-use, and at-rest data separately. QARS applies a unified five-factor scoring framework separately to each data state and introduces a quantum-vulnerability attenuation mechanism grounded in Grover-bounded residual security that prevents overstating urgency for non-Shor-vulnerable symmetric protection. Observable host-level evidence determines the binary and ratio descriptors used by the model, while the fixed affine mapping coefficients are treated as transparent semi-quantitative calibration parameters. These coefficients are documented separately and subjected to coefficient-level sensitivity analysis to evaluate whether the reported layer ordering depends on their nominal values. The model is demonstrated through an illustrative controlled experiment using real infrastructure observations. Strengthening storage protection reduces the aggregate system risk from 0.707 (high) to 0.414 (moderate), a 41.5% reduction. However, the maximum-layer score remains high (0.657), indicating that the transport layer continues to dominate migration urgency. Sensitivity analysis confirms that the dominance of the transport layer is stable under wide perturbations of the calibration parameters. These findings demonstrate that risk reduction in one layer does not eliminate overall exposure but shifts the dominant vulnerability. By distinguishing between overall system posture and the most critical remediation priority, QARS supports infrastructure operators in identifying high-risk components and planning structured, evidence-based post-quantum migration.
The rapid development of quantum computing is reshaping the cybersecurity threat landscape by undermining classical cryptographic assumptions and introducing new technical, operational, and organizational vulnerabilities. Existing cybersecurity threat frameworks insufficiently address quantumenabled risks, particularly those related to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration, hybrid infrastructures, and long-horizon threats such as store-now-decrypt-later attacks. This paper aims to develop a unified classification model for quantum-enabled cyberattacks that integrates cryptanalytic, protocol-level, operational, and human-factor dimensions into a structured analytical framework. The proposed model formalizes attack characterization through multidimensional parameters including attack vector, required quantum capability, exploited weakness, impact level, and temporal horizon, enabling systematic risk assessment. Experimental evaluation using simulated network traffic datasets demonstrated the model’s applicability for threat classification, risk scoring, and prioritization of PQC migration efforts. Results indicate that cryptanalytic and data-harvesting attacks present the highest long-term risk, while operational and human-factor vulnerabilities remain critical in the near term, highlighting the need for a comprehensive, multilayered approach to quantum cybersecurity readiness.
Quantum computing creates a governance problem before it creates a cryptanalytic event. Information collected today may remain sensitive after a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available, while long-lived operational technology and spacecraft may be unable to adopt new cryptography within conventional replacement cycles.This paper examines how operators of long-lived cyber-physical systems should prioritize post-quantum migration under uncertainty. It distinguishes the present confidentiality risk of harvest-now, decrypt-later collection from the prospective integrity and authentication risks that could follow scalable attacks against public-key cryptography.Building on Mosca's migration inequality, the paper introduces the Quantum Migration Priority Score, a transparent decision framework combining timing pressure, consequence, adversary exposure, and cryptographic agility. Illustrative applications to municipal water systems and proliferated low-Earth-orbit architectures demonstrate how migration priority depends on mission consequences, protocol boundaries, key management, supply-chain dependencies, and compensating controls.The paper concludes with a staged governance strategy centered on cryptographic inventories, crypto-agile procurement, testable migration pathways, accountable risk ownership, and explicit management of residual risk.
The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computing presents a strategic governance challenge for national security because contemporary digital infrastructures depend extensively on public-key cryptographic mechanisms whose long-term security may be threatened by sufficiently capable quantum computers. This research examines post-quantum cryptographic governance as a policy, risk-management, interoperability, and implementation problem rather than solely as a cryptographic algorithm-selection exercise. The study adopts a conceptual research-and-review methodology based exclusively on the supplied literature, using insights from security and privacy, interoperability, digital transformation, standards-based architectures, and emerging technology governance to construct an integrated post-quantum governance framework. Particular attention is given to cryptographic inventory, risk prioritization, migration governance, interoperability, institutional accountability, lifecycle management, and national-security continuity. The analysis indicates that post-quantum readiness requires coordinated governance across technical and organizational layers, with migration decisions guided by asset criticality, data longevity, dependency relationships, and operational constraints. The study further argues that interoperability principles are central to post-quantum migration because cryptographic transitions must coexist with heterogeneous legacy systems and distributed information environments. The proposed framework therefore combines risk assessment, policy development, technical migration, validation, monitoring, and institutional oversight. The research contributes a governance-oriented perspective in which cryptographic agility and standards-based interoperability become strategic national-security capabilities rather than isolated technical controls.
The rapid progress of quantum computing poses substantial risks to classical cryptographic mechanisms widely deployed in Big Data processing systems, whose distributed architectures, high computational intensity, and exposure to diverse attack vectors impose stringent requirements on long-term security and reliability. Accordingly, this study aims to develop a risk-oriented framework for assessing post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms in large-scale data environments. The proposed methodology integrates cryptographic reliability and computational efficiency within a unified multi-criteria decision-making model, incorporating formalised threat modelling, probabilistic analysis of resistance to classical and quantum attacks, robustness evaluation under high computational loads, and quantitative performance metrics, including latency, throughput, resource consumption, and scalability in distributed infrastructures. Based on this framework, a comparative analysis of representative classes of PQC algorithms is conducted in typical Big Data processing scenarios. The results indicate that different PQC families exhibit distinct security–performance trade-offs and that no single algorithm is universally optimal across all operational conditions. The study concludes that a risk-oriented, multi-criteria selection of post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms enhances the overall resilience and operational efficiency of secure Big Data systems, providing a practical foundation for their design, modernisation, and cybersecurity governance in the post-quantum era.