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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Is the Universe Fundamentally a Density Matrix?

Saakshi Dulani, Alyssa Ney

Published Jul 24, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This article examines the case for preferring density matrix realism over wave function realism, as an approach to the fundamental ontology of our world. To date, there are two arguments that have been used to motivate density matrix realism. One is that we get a simpler and more appealing metaphysics if we move from wave function realism to density matrix realism. The second is that density matrices are more general than wave functions. In both cases, a key purported advantage is that density matrix realists can allow that the universe could be in a mixed state. To be convincing, however, these arguments can’t simply assume that our universe could be in a mixed state, since standard definitions of mixedness seem to preclude such a possibility. Thus, to make density matrix realism plausible, one would need to appeal to some scientifically backed argument that standard definitions of mixedness need revision, that what seemed to be perplexing before represents a genuine way that our world could fundamentally be. Here, Hawking’s model of black hole evaporation seems poised to come to the rescue, and so, we develop a novel argument to this effect. Although we find this way of arguing for density matrix realism to be intriguing and worthy of investigation, we show that there is substantial reason to be cautious. Most physicists, including Hawking, believe that this model will be superseded by a more fundamental theory of quantum gravity. Despite a lack of agreement on the details of such a theory, the guiding principles that do enjoy some consensus point away from an interpretation of black hole evaporation in which the universe as a whole evolves into an (objectively) mixed state. We conclude that there do not seem to be compelling motivations coming from fundamental physics to favour a metaphysics in which the universe is fundamentally a density matrix rather than a wave function.

DOI
10.1086/737744

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This article examines the case for preferring density matrix realism over wave function realism, as an approach to the fundamental ontology of our world. To date, there are two arguments that have been used to motivate density matrix realism. One is that we get a simpler and more appealing metaphysics if we move from wave function realism to density matrix realism. The second is that density matrices are more general than wave functions. In both cases, a key purported advantage is that density matrix realists can allow that the universe could be in a mixed state. To be convincing, however, these arguments can’t simply assume that our universe could be in a mixed state, since standard definitions of mixedness seem to preclude such a possibility. Thus, to make density matrix realism plausible, one would need to appeal to some scientifically backed argument that standard definitions of mixedness need revision, that what seemed to be perplexing before represents a genuine way that our world could fundamentally be. Here, Hawking’s model of black hole evaporation seems poised to come to the rescue, and so, we develop a novel argument to this effect. Although we find this way of arguing for density matrix realism to be intriguing and worthy of investigation, we show that there is substantial reason to be cautious. Most physicists, including Hawking, believe that this model will be superseded by a more fundamental theory of quantum gravity. Despite a lack of agreement on the details of such a theory, the guiding principles that do enjoy some consensus point away from an interpretation of black hole evaporation in which the universe as a whole evolves into an (objectively) mixed state. We conclude that there do not seem to be compelling motivations coming from fundamental physics to favour a metaphysics in which the universe is fundamentally a density matrix rather than a wave function.
Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, if not contradictory. As such, it has been considered for a long time at odds with scientific realism, and thus a naturalized quantum metaphysics was deemed impossible. Luckily, now we have many quantum theories compatible with a realist interpretation. However, scientific realists assumed that the wave-function, regarded as the principal ingredient of quantum theories, had to represent a physical entity, and because of this they struggled with quantum superpositions. In this paper I discuss a particular approach which makes quantum mechanics compatible with scientific realism without doing that. In this approach, the wave-function does not represent matter which is instead represented by some spatio-temporal entity dubbed the primitive ontology: point-particles, continuous matter fields, space-time events. I argue how within this framework one develops a distinctive theory-construction schema, which allows to perform a more informed theory evaluation by analyzing the various ingredients of the approach and their inter-relations.
Abstract What are the ontological implications of quantum theories, that is, what do they tell us about the fundamental objects that make up our world? How should quantum theories make us reevaluate our classical conceptions of the basic constitution of material objects and ourselves? Is there fundamental quantum nonlocality? This book articulates several rival approaches to answering these questions, ultimately defending the wave function realist approach. Wave function realism is a way of interpreting quantum theories so that the central object they describe is the quantum wave function, interpreted as a field in an extremely high-dimensional space. According to this approach, the nonseparability and nonlocality we seem to find in quantum mechanics are ultimately manifestations of a more intuitive, separable, and local picture in higher dimensions.
Abstract Realism about quantum theory naturally leads to realism about the quantum state of the universe. It leaves open whether it is a pure state represented by a wave function, or an impure one represented by a density matrix. I characterise and elaborate on Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the universal quantum state is objective but can be impure. To clarify the thesis, I compare it with Wave Function Realism, explain the conditions under which they are empirically equivalent, consider two generalisations of Density Matrix Realism, and answer some frequently asked questions. I end by highlighting an implication for scientific realism.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
What is the quantum state of the universe? Although there have been several interesting suggestions, the question remains open. In this paper, I consider a natural choice for the universal quantum state arising from the Past Hypothesis, a boundary condition that accounts for the time-asymmetry of the universe. The natural choice is given not by a wave function (representing a pure state) but by a density matrix (representing a mixed state). I begin by classifying quantum theories into two types: theories with a fundamental wave function and theories with a fundamental density matrix. The Past Hypothesis is compatible with infinitely many initial wave functions, none of which seems to be particularly natural. However, once we turn to density matrices, the Past Hypothesis provides a natural choice---the normalized projection onto the Past Hypothesis subspace in the Hilbert space. Nevertheless, the two types of theories can be empirically equivalent. To provide a concrete understanding of the empirical equivalence, I provide a novel subsystem analysis in the context of Bohmian theories. Given the empirical equivalence, it seems empirically underdetermined whether the universe is in a pure state or a mixed state. Finally, I discuss some theoretical payoffs of the density-matrix theories and present some open problems for future research.
Thirty years ago, John Preskill concluded "that the information loss paradox may well presage a revolution in fundamental physics" and mused that "Conceivably, the puzzle of black hole evaporation portends a scientific revolution as sweeping as that that led to the formulation of quantum theory in the early 20th century." Many still agree with this assessment. On the other hand, it seems to me the "paradox" has little to do with the physical world but rather, at best, simply points out the possible inconsistency of two, already disparate, theories (mathematical models) of nature, general relativity and quantum mechanics, with virtually no conceivable observational consequences. The information paradox hinges on the concepts of a pure quantum state, the unitarity of quantum mechanics, and Hawking's semi-classical calculation of black hole evaporation. I used the qualifier "at best" above because, for me, the concept of a quantum state is far more restrictive than required by the paradox while unitarity is not a property of nature but rather of a mathematical model and is already violated by the process of making a measurement. Furthermore, the semi-classical calculation of Hawking is surely of limited applicability.