This paper presents the design and implementation of an Internet-based instant messaging application that leverages post-quantum cryptographic algorithms founded on isogenies of elliptic curves. The system employs the CSIDH cryptosystem for key exchange and SeaSign for digital signatures, integrating these with the X3DH and Double-Ratchet protocols to enable end-to-end encryption for both text messages and binary file transfers. Key generation is supported for new users upon registration, ensuring robust cryptographic foundations from the outset. The performance of the CSIDH and SeaSign algorithms is evaluated at various security levels using a Python-based prototype, providing practical benchmarks. By combining isogeny-based cryptographic schemes with widely adopted secure messaging protocols, this work presents an illustration of a selected quantum-resistant communication solution and offers insights into the feasibility and practicality of deploying such protocols in real-world applications.
This paper presents the design and implementation of an Internet-based instant messaging application that leverages post-quantum cryptographic algorithms founded on isogenies of elliptic curves. The system employs the CSIDH cryptosystem for key exchange and SeaSign for digital signatures, integrating these with the X3DH and Double-Ratchet protocols to enable end-to-end encryption for both text messages and binary file transfers. Key generation is supported for new users upon registration, ensuring robust cryptographic foundations from the outset. The performance of the CSIDH and SeaSign algorithms is evaluated at various security levels using a Python-based prototype, providing practical benchmarks. By combining isogeny-based cryptographic schemes with widely adopted secure messaging protocols, this work presents an illustration of a selected quantum-resistant communication solution and offers insights into the feasibility and practicality of deploying such protocols in real-world applications.
Preserving the confidentiality of information exchanges relies fundamentally on an end-to-end encryption system, involving the use of a secret key to secure the entire communication. However, with the imminent emergence of quantum computing, threats to traditional encryption systems are multiplying. This is where post-quantum key sharing, in particular the Commutative Super Isogenies Diffie Hellman (CSIDH) algorithm, comes in. The CSIDH uses the ideal of some class number to a morphism of elliptic curve for calculating the shared key. It offers an innovative solution for secure key generation between two users, while providing a robust defense against potential attacks from quantum computers, whose computing power is redefining the limits of cryptographic security, based on the mathematical foundations of elliptic curves and isogeny. This technological advance represents an essential pillar in preserving the confidentiality of communications, in a context where security challenges are constantly evolving. Combining with Fujisaki-Okamoto transform, socket, and Linux; a chat application over python could be created for transmitting secure messages.
We propose and develop new schemes for post-quantum cryptography based on isogenies over elliptic curves. First we show that ordinary elliptic curves are have less than exponential security against quantum computers. These results were used as the motivation for De Feo, Jao and Pl\\^ut's construction of public key cryptosystems using supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. We extend their construction and show that isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves can be used as the underlying hard mathematical problem for other quantum-resistant schemes. For our second contribution, we propose is an undeniable signature scheme based on elliptic curve isogenies. We prove its security under certain reasonable number-theoretic computational assumptions for which no efficient quantum algorithms are known. This proposal represents only the second known quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme, and the first such scheme secure under a number-theoretic complexity assumption. Finally, we also propose a security model for evaluating the security of authenticated encryption schemes in the post-quantum setting. Our model is based on a combination of the classical Bellare-Namprempre security model for authenticated encryption together with modifications from Boneh and Zhandry to handle message authentication against quantum adversaries. We give a generic construction based on Bellare-Namprempre for producing an authenticated encryption protocol from any quantum-resistant symmetric-key encryption scheme together with any digital signature scheme or MAC admitting any classical security reduction to a quantum-computationally hard problem. We apply the results and show how we can explicitly construct authenticated encryption schemes based on isogenies.
Due to development in quantum computing, we need to create and implement new cryptographic protocols, which are resistant to attacks using a quantum computer, in all practical cases. Last years humans became using messengers to transfer far more important information than earlier, so it is necessary to create new post-quantum secure messaging protocols for peer-to-peer and group communications. In this article, we describe needed security properties, existing ways for the creation of group chats, and our suggestions. We described ways and needed primitives for the creation of a group key establishment scheme based on isogenies of elliptic curves. We describe such protocol as an extended Double Ratchet protocol.
Widely used communication and messaging protocols, e.g., TLS 1.3 and Signal, are insecure against an adversary with a quantum computer. We expect that post-quantum security will become mandatory for a new generation of cryptographic protocols in the nearest 10-15 years. The analysis of existing post-quantum secure cryptographic tools for key exchange, encryption and message authentication based on hard problems in codes, lattices, ring learning with errors and elliptic curve isogenies revealed their advantages and drawbacks. In particular, we conclude, that the main threat to communication and messaging protocols is only pre-quantum security of currently used Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols. We summarize efficiency and safety results for each class of post-quantum cryptographic schemes and present an experimental implementation of isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol as an illustration of their applicability.
The fast progress of quantum computing is a serious threat to classical cryptographic schemes like RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, and it is time to come up with safe postquantum schemes.One of the new solutions is isogeny-based cryptography which has attracted attention because of its good-security basis and comparatively small key sizes.Nevertheless, currently used post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) designs, such as lattice-based and codebased ones, are typically characterized by the high key sizes, high computational costs, or scaling issues, with the necessity to have a well-balanced and efficient cryptographic design.This paper presents a powerful isogeny-based cryptosystem, which can allow safe communication in the post-quantum context.The mathematical complexity of isogenies over supersingular elliptic curves forms the foundation of the proposed framework and it has a structured architecture comprising of parameterization, key generation, encryption/decryption and communication layers.The design of the optimization of algorithms to generate keys, exchange keys securely and encrypt messages using shared secret derivation mechanisms is part of the methodology.Security analysis is also carried out to assess the resistance to quantum attacks and against known cryptanalytic vulnerabilities.The metrics used to conduct performance evaluation are computed cost, key size, and latency, and the results are compared to typical PQC schemes, like lattice-based (Kyber) and code-based (McEliece) systems.The results show that the model proposed has much smaller key sizes (330 bytes public key) with moderate computational efficiency although a little bit more latency than lattice-based methods.
The existing public-key cryptographic mechanisms, in particular those relying only on the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem, are threatened by largescale quantum computing. Quantum-resilient schemes like latticebased key accounting mechanisms and digital signature schemes have been introduced by post-quantum cryptography. However, deploying in practice entails harsh compatibility, performance and migration requirements. The proposed system suggests a hybrid secure messaging protocol that combines the NIST standardised ML-KEM-768 post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism and the classical Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). Our cryptographic solution leverages a key derivation scheme based on SHAKE-256 that combines shared secrets from both domains. It delivers key establishment, which is resistant to quantum attacks and is interoperable. When evaluated on a browser-based environment, the experimental results indicate that our proposed system takes about 3.1 ms for key establishment. The public key size is found to be 1249 bytes and the ciphertext of size 1153 bytes. The performance seen is still acceptable for real-time communication application. Evidence shows that a standardised postquantum cryptographic mechanism can be efficiently integrated with classical cryptographic mechanisms. This offers a pragmatic solution for secure messaging in the move to the post-quantum world.