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Designs Codes and Cryptography

On security notions for encryption in a quantum world

Céline Chevalier, Ehsan Ebrahimi, Quoc-Huy Vu

Published Jul 6, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10623-025-01664-2

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arXiv:2003.00578•Mar 1, 2020•3 citations
We have developed an ideal functionality for security requirement of functional encryption schemes. The functionality is needed when we want to show the security of a functional encryption scheme in universal composable (UC) framework. A functionality FfeF_{fe}Ffe​ was developed to represent ideal respond of a functional encryption scheme against any polynomial time active attacker. We show that UC security notion of functional encryption scheme FfeF_{fe}Ffe​ is as strong as fully secure functional encryption in an indistinguishable game with chosen cipher text attack. The proof used a method that showing for any environment algorithm, it can not distinguish ideal world where the attacker play with ideal functionality FfeF_{fe}Ffe​ and real world where the attacker play a fully secure functional encryption scheme.
In this work we study the quantum security of public key encryption schemes (PKE). Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13) initiated this research area for PKE and symmetric key encryption (SKE), albeit restricted to a classical indistinguishability phase. Gagliardoni et al. (CRYPTO'16) advanced the study of quantum security by giving, for SKE, the first definition with a quantum indistinguishability phase. For PKE, on the other hand, no notion of quantum security with a quantum indistinguishability phase exists. Our main result is a novel quantum security notion (qIND-qCPA) for PKE with a quantum indistinguishability phase, which closes the aforementioned gap. We show a distinguishing attack against code-based schemes and against LWE-based schemes with certain parameters. We also show that the canonical hybrid PKE-SKE encryption construction is qIND-qCPA-secure, even if the underlying PKE scheme by itself is not. Finally, we classify quantum-resistant PKE schemes based on the applicability of our security notion. Our core idea follows the approach of Gagliardoni et al. by using so-called type-2 operators for encrypting the challenge message. At first glance, type-2 operators appear unnatural for PKE, as the canonical way of building them requires both the secret and the public key. However, we identify a class of PKE schemes - which we call recoverable - and show that for this class type-2 operators require merely the public key. Moreover, recoverable schemes allow to realise type-2 operators even if they suffer from decryption failures, which in general thwarts the reversibility mandated by type-2 operators. Our work reveals that many real-world quantum-resistant PKE schemes, including most NIST PQC candidates and the canonical hybrid construction, are indeed recoverable.