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Oxford University Press eBooks

No Worse Off

Emily Adlam

Published Jun 12, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract The chapter considers how epistemic difficulties encountered in the Everett interpretation compares to epistemic difficulties encountered in some relevantly similar scientific scenarios. The discussion covers objective chance, Boltzmann brains, cosmological multiverses, and induction.
DOI
10.1093/9780197808887.003.0007

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