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SPIE Quantum Information Science, Sensing, and Computation

Integrating post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum key distribution (QKD): performance, security, and practical challenges

Reza Azarderakhsh, Maryam Sadat Amiri Tehrani Zadeh

Published May 30, 2025• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1117/12.3055954

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As quantum computing technology advances, our traditional methods of securing information are becoming vulnerable to new types of attacks. To counter these threats, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) methods like the BB84 protocol offer a way to create extremely secure keys. However, QKD alone can have practical limitations and might still be exposed to certain types of attacks. On the other hand, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) provides a robust defense against quantum attacks through complex mathematical algorithms. This research aims to combine the best of both worlds: using the BB84 QKD protocol to generate secure keys and then using these keys with PQC algorithms for encrypting information. By integrating QKD for key generation and Lattice based (Kyber) PQC for encryption, we hope to create a cryptographic system that is both incredibly secure and practical for real-world use. This project will involve designing the hybrid system, testing it through simulations, and evaluating its performance and security against traditional methods.
Quantum resistance is vital for emerging cryptographic systems as quantum technologies continue to advance towards large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers. Resistance may be offered by quantum key distribution (QKD), which ideally provides information-theoretic security (ITS) using quantum states of photons, but is limited in practice due to device-dependent loopholes and the reliance on classical channel authentication. An alternative approach uses classical means and is conjectured to be resistant to quantum attacks—so-called post-quantum cryptography (PQC)—but its security relies on the unproven assumption of the hardness of mathematical problems. To address the security and performance challenges present in each, here we introduce a key merging framework to combine QKD and PQC key material based on linear-code secret sharing schemes. In particular, we design joint QKD-PQC key distribution schemes based on Reed-Solomon codes, which achieve high performance while ensuring a high security level. Compared to naive XOR-type schemes, our schemes can achieve a security enhancement ofΘ(n)\Theta (n)Θ(n)wherennnis the number of parallel key distribution links when the key distribution performance is similar. Furthermore, we develop schemes where the attacker needs to break both QKD and PQC links to learn the key bit information. Our hybrid approach paves the way for joint quantum-classical communication networks, which leverage the advantages of both QKD and PQC and can be tailored to the requirements of various practical networks.
The emergence of highly developed quantum computing is threatening the current established public key cryptography systems like Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA, and it enables attackers to perpetrate harvest now, decrypt later attacks on the current encrypted communications. Quantum resistant security has provided shedding light on quantum threats by introducing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) project and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). QKD offers a no-d efficiency protection with respect to quantum mechanics, though PQC provides protection against quantum attacks of comparable scalability via classical methods of cryptography that are standardized by the NIST. Nevertheless, these two approaches have practical constraints in the field of application in isolation, especially distance, cost, scaling, and infrastructure overhead. This paper suggests a hybrid secure communication system integrating QKD based key generation following the BB84 protocol through the quantum channel and PQC based authentication and integrity schemes following the classical channel and a bulk data transmission scheme utilizing the symmetric encryption. System level performance measures are as well evaluated by simulation to analyse classical cryptography, PQC alone, QKD alone and hybridQKD−PQC\text{QKD}-\text{PQC}QKD−PQCschemes, comparing the systems throughput and performance impact amid various network conditions. According to the outcomes of the experiment, the proposed hybrid approach injects a throughput overhead of less than 0.1 percent compared to the traditional cryptographic systems, and thus, strong quantum-resilient security is computable with insignificantly low performance costs. This justifies the practicability of hybrid QKD-PQC topologies to prospective quantum safe communication networks encompassing next generation and large-scale distributed communication systems.