One-way functions are essential tools for cryptography. However, the existence of one-way functions is still an open conjecture. By constructing a function with classical bits as input and quantum states as output, we prove the existence of quantum one-way functions more rigorously. It provides theoretical guarantees for the security of many quantum cryptographic protocols.
One-way functions are essential tools for cryptography. However, the existence of one-way functions is still an open conjecture. By constructing a function with classical bits as input and quantum states as output, we prove the existence of quantum one-way functions more rigorously. It provides theoretical guarantees for the security of many quantum cryptographic protocols.
One-way functions are fundamental tools for cryptography. Until now, quantum one-way functions have several input-output categories such as “classical-to-classical,” “classical-to-quantum,” and “quantum-to-classical,” which are used for postquantum cryptography or quantum cryptography. However, there are still no intrinsic “quantum-to-quantum” quantum one-way functions. In this article, we propose the full quantum one-way function to design full quantum cryptographic schemes. By concatenating the “quantum-classical” one-way function and the rotation operation of single qubit, the full quantum one-way function has the input and output of quantum states. We prove its one-way property from “easy computation” and “computationally difficult to invert.” Then we apply the full quantum one-way function to quantum identity authentication. Security analysis shows that the proposed quantum identity authentication scheme based on the full quantum one-way function is secure even under active attacks.
Quantum cryptographic primitives beyond key distribution remain a less well understood area of research. In classical cryptography, one-way functions underpin nearly all standard cryptographic protocols, motivating the search for meaningful quantum analogues and for a clear understanding of the physical and computational mechanisms that could enforce one-wayness. In this article, we review quantum one-way functions and a range of closely related quantum-state primitives, including one-way state generators, pseudorandom quantum states, and efficiently indistinguishable pairs of states. We discuss both computational and information-theoretic notions of quantum one-wayness, emphasizing the different adversarial models and security assumptions that underlie these constructions. We compare and contrast the various proposed primitives, and clarify their conceptual relationships. Particular emphasis is placed on questions of physical realizability, experimental feasibility, and robustness to noise. Finally, we outline open problems and future directions toward the development of practical quantum cryptographic primitives beyond key distribution, and the emergence of a broader quantum-cryptographic ecosystem.
One-way functions are central to classical cryptography. They are necessary for the existence of non-trivial classical cryptosystems, and also sufficient to realize meaningful primitives including commitments, pseudorandom generators and digital signatures. At the same time, a mounting body of evidence suggests that assumptions even weaker than one-way functions may suffice for many cryptographic tasks of interest in a quantum world, including bit commitments and secure multi-party computation. This work studies one-way state generators [Morimae-Yamakawa, CRYPTO 2022], a natural quantum relaxation of one-way functions. Given a secret key, a one-way state generator outputs a hard to invert quantum state. A fundamental question is whether this type of quantum one-wayness suffices to realize quantum cryptography. We obtain an affirmative answer to this question, by proving that one-way state generators with pure state outputs imply quantum bit commitments and secure multiparty computation. Along the way, we use efficient shadow tomography [Huang et. al., Nature Physics 2020] to build an intermediate primitive with classical outputs, which we call a (quantum) one-way puzzle. Our main technical contribution is a proof that one-way puzzles imply quantum bit commitments. This proof develops new techniques for pseudoentropy generation [Hastad et. al., SICOMP 1999] from arbitrary distributions, which may be of independent interest.
One-way functions (OWF) are one of the most essential cryptographic primitives, the existence of which results in wide-ranging ramifications such as private-key encryption and proving P=NP. These OWFs are often thought of as having classical input and output (i.e. binary strings), however, recent work proposes OWF constructions where the input and/or the output can be quantum. In this paper, we demonstrate that quantum-classical (i.e. quantum input, classical output) OWFs can be used to produce classical-classical (i.e. classical input, classical output) OWFs that retain the one-wayness property against any quantum polynomial adversary (i.e. quantum-resistant). We demonstrate this in two ways. Firstly, we propose a definition of quantum-classical OWFs and show that the existence of such a quantum-classical OWF would imply the existence of a classical-classical OWF. Secondly, we take a proposed quantum-classical OWF and demonstrate how to turn it into a classical-classical OWF. In summary, this paper showcases another possible route into proving the existence of classical-classical OWFs (assuming intermediate quantum computations are allowed) using a "domain-shifting" technique between classical and quantum information, with the added bonus that such OWFs are also going to be quantum-resistant.
Most interesting cryptography happens in the computational realm where all parties can only perform efficient computations. On one hand, without this constraint many practically relevant cryptographic tasks are infeasible; on the other, this constraint still captures the power of any physical attacker with limited resources. Classically, if the task of attacking almost any interesting computational cryptography is provably hard, then we would also derive from it the existence of one-way functions, and thus P ≠ NP as well. Quantum mechanics offers a more complete model of physical information in the real world. Recent works have proved oracle separations (Kretschmer’21; Kretschmer, Qian, Sinha, Tal’23; Lombardi, Ma, Wright’23) suggesting that computationally secure quantum cryptography could exist even if P = NP, or in other words, that classical cryptography is infeasible. This hints at the possibility of constructing a quantum cryptosystem and establishing its security without unproven assumptions, liberating cryptographers from the perpetual cat-and-mousegame. In this dissertation, we make initial progress towards this goal by developing a theory of quantum computational cryptography without assuming the existence ofone-way functions. More specifically, we establish the following results: • We introduce a simple and natural quantum cryptographic primitive called EFI pairs, and prove its existential equivalence to various other quantum cryptographic primitives, including commitment schemes, oblivious transfer, and zero knowledge.• We establish the “minimality” of EFI pairs by showing that their existence is implied by many natural cryptographic primitives. EFI pairs thus appear easier to construct than other primitives. • We show that the existence of EFI pairs (and the existentially equivalent primitives) is robust by showing how to upgrade various notions of “weak” security to standard security without any additional assumption. • We finally construct commitment schemes, oblivious transfer, and zero knowledge unconditionally if a piece of quantum advice is allowed. In contrast, classical analogues of these are impossible without first settling P ≠ NP even if we allow randomized advice.
In classical cryptography, one-way functions are necessary for most of cryptography. In the quantum world, however, Kretschmer at {TQC'21} and subsequent works have demonstrated that quantum versions of various primitives in minicrypt, such as signatures and private-key encryption, do not require quantum-computable one-way functions (\textsf{qOWF}s). However, the question of the necessity of \textsf{qOWF}s for primitives in Cryptomania like public-key encryption with classical public keys and ciphertexts (\textsf{qPKE}) has remained open.
We provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between \textsf{qPKE} and \textsf{qOWF}. First, our main result is a black-box separation between \textsf{qOWF}s and \textsf{qPKE}. In particular, we show that relative to a unitary, real, and self-inverse oracle, there exists a \textsf{qPKE} scheme (with classical keys and ciphertexts), but \textsf{qOWF}s do not exist. Further, our oracles admit a point-function obfuscation construction, thus ruling out black-box construction of \textsf{qOWF} from point function obfuscations.
On the positive side, we construct \textsf{qPKE} from quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits with classical obfuscated descriptions and efficiently verifiable one-way puzzles, which is known to be a potentially weaker assumption than \textsf{qOWF}s, due to an existing black-box separation. Our construction is the quantum analog of the classical construction of \textsf{PKE} from one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation in the quantum computation with classical communication (QCCC) setting.