Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Triple Ratchet: A Bandwidth Efficient Hybrid-Secure Signal Protocol

Yevgeniy Dodis, Daniel Jost, Shuichi Katsumata, Thomas Prest, Rolfe Schmidt

Published Jan 1, 2025• 14 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-91101-9_11

Related papers

The Double Ratchet: Security Notions, Proofs, and Modularization for the Signal Protocol

Joël Alwen, Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2019•146 citations

Efficient Ratcheting: Almost-Optimal Guarantees for Secure Messaging

Daniel Jost, Ueli M. Maurer, Marta Mularczyk

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2019•79 citations

Beyond Security and Efficiency: On-Demand Ratcheting with Security Awareness

Andrea Caforio, F. Betül Durak, Serge Vaudenay B

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2021•15 citations

Efficient Post-Quantum-Secure Optimization of the Signal Protocol

Yiyang Guo, Kerun Wang, Lifan Wang

The Signal protocol provides end-to-end security even when service providers are only partially trusted; however, it still lacks deniable authentication and does not resist quantum attacks in the messaging phase. This paper therefore presents a post-quantum enhancement of Signal that is efficient in both communication cost and end-to-end message latency. In the key-agreement phase, a lattice-based Gandalf ring signature is combined with the Kyber-1024 KEM to construct a pre-key mechanism that provides both post-quantum security and deniable authentication. In the messaging phase, a pair of post-quantum ratchets is layered on top of the classical Double Ratchet to form a classical-post-quantum hybrid ratchet, while the Skye key-derivation function and erasure-code-based block encapsulation reduce communication overhead. Experimental and analytical results show that the scheme preserves Signal’s end-to- end, forward, and post-compromise security, achieves practical post-quantum security and deniable authentication, and keeps the additional cryptographic delay negligible compared with typical network latency.

IEEE International Conference on Frontiers Technology of Information and Computer (ICFTIC)•Dec 5, 2025•0 citations

A Formal Analysis of Signal's Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet Protocol and its Implementation

Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Maxime Buyse, Graeme Connell +2 more

In 2025, Signal deployed the Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet (SPQR), an MLKEM-based post-quantum secure messaging protocol that was combined with the widely used Double Ratchet protocol to attain hybrid Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS): FS and PCS hold unless both the classic Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman and the post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism constructions are broken. This paper presents the verification-driven process used to design SPQR and the first formal specification and security analysis of SPQR, along with formal guarantees for its implementation. We detail the modular design of the SPQR protocol in terms of a core Sparse Continuous Key Agreement (SCKA) component (as defined in [4] ). We evaluate a series of candidate protocols, including the deployed protocol, in various fine-grained compromise scenarios, using the ProVerif symbolic analyzer. Beyond design-time verification, we integrate the hax toolchain into Signal's continuous integration pipeline to prove runtime safety of the production implementation and to prove that the implementation meets the security goals of the protocol. The results of this work are now deployed in Signal Messenger and relied upon by millions of users.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Nov 12, 2026•0 citations

A Post-Quantum Secure Autonomous Key-Ratcheting Protocol with State-Bypass Recovery for Dual-Channel Wireless Networks

Joseph Bénichou

This paper introduces a post-quantum secure cryptographic protocol tailored for low-power, tactical, or lossy wireless networks. By decoupling signaling from payload data across two independent radio channels—a robust BPSK control channel for key synchronization and a high-bandwidth 64-QAM main channel for encrypted payloads—the protocol achieves autonomous, unilateral root-key ratcheting without interactive handshakes. Relying strictly on symmetric primitives (HKDF, HMAC, ChaCha20-Poly1305), it provides 128-bit post-quantum security resilience against Grover’s algorithm while featuring an out-of-band state-bypass mechanism ($TAG_{recover}$) to handle packet loss instantly.

•Jul 21, 2026•0 citations
The Signal protocol provides end-to-end security even when service providers are only partially trusted; however, it still lacks deniable authentication and does not resist quantum attacks in the messaging phase. This paper therefore presents a post-quantum enhancement of Signal that is efficient in both communication cost and end-to-end message latency. In the key-agreement phase, a lattice-based Gandalf ring signature is combined with the Kyber-1024 KEM to construct a pre-key mechanism that provides both post-quantum security and deniable authentication. In the messaging phase, a pair of post-quantum ratchets is layered on top of the classical Double Ratchet to form a classical-post-quantum hybrid ratchet, while the Skye key-derivation function and erasure-code-based block encapsulation reduce communication overhead. Experimental and analytical results show that the scheme preserves Signal’s end-to- end, forward, and post-compromise security, achieves practical post-quantum security and deniable authentication, and keeps the additional cryptographic delay negligible compared with typical network latency.
In 2025, Signal deployed the Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet (SPQR), an MLKEM-based post-quantum secure messaging protocol that was combined with the widely used Double Ratchet protocol to attain hybrid Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS): FS and PCS hold unless both the classic Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman and the post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism constructions are broken. This paper presents the verification-driven process used to design SPQR and the first formal specification and security analysis of SPQR, along with formal guarantees for its implementation. We detail the modular design of the SPQR protocol in terms of a core Sparse Continuous Key Agreement (SCKA) component (as defined in [4] ). We evaluate a series of candidate protocols, including the deployed protocol, in various fine-grained compromise scenarios, using the ProVerif symbolic analyzer. Beyond design-time verification, we integrate the hax toolchain into Signal's continuous integration pipeline to prove runtime safety of the production implementation and to prove that the implementation meets the security goals of the protocol. The results of this work are now deployed in Signal Messenger and relied upon by millions of users.
This paper introduces a post-quantum secure cryptographic protocol tailored for low-power, tactical, or lossy wireless networks. By decoupling signaling from payload data across two independent radio channels—a robust BPSK control channel for key synchronization and a high-bandwidth 64-QAM main channel for encrypted payloads—the protocol achieves autonomous, unilateral root-key ratcheting without interactive handshakes. Relying strictly on symmetric primitives (HKDF, HMAC, ChaCha20-Poly1305), it provides 128-bit post-quantum security resilience against Grover’s algorithm while featuring an out-of-band state-bypass mechanism (TAGrecoverTAG_{recover}TAGrecover​) to handle packet loss instantly.