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Quantum probability in the logic of quantum mechanics

Pitsri Atisoontornkul, Preedeeporn Limcharoeri

Published Jan 1, 1989• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Several attempts have been made to establish the logical structure of quantum mechanics on an axiomatic foundation. It has been shown that, whereas the logical structure of the propositional calculus of classical mechanics is that of a Boolean lattice, the logical structure of the propositional calculus of quantum mechanics is non-Boolean. Moreover, a probability model of a quantum system, namely, the quantum probability model, has a mathematical structure completely different from that of the Kolmogorovian probability model, which is the standard probability model of a classical system. These results, which are still controversial, are analysed and put in critical perspective.

DOI
10.58837/chula.the.1989.797

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•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations
Several attempts have been made to establish the logical structure of quantum mechanics on an axiomatic foundation. It has been shown that, whereas the logical structure of the propositional calculus of classical mechanics is that of a Boolean lattice, the logical structure of the propositional calculus of quantum mechanics is non-Boolean. Moreover, a probability model of a quantum system, namely, the quantum probability model, has a mathematical structure completely different from that of the Kolmogorovian probability model, which is the standard probability model of a classical system. These results, which are still controversial, are analysed and put in critical perspective.
Quantum mechanics is usually described in the terminology of probability theory even though the properties of the probability spaces associated with it are fundamentally different from the standard ones of probability theory. For example, Kolmogorov's axioms are not general enough to encompass the non-commutative situations that arise in quantum theory. There have been many attempts to generalise these axioms to meet the needs of quantum mechanics. The focus of these attempts has been the observation, first made by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), that the propositions associated with a quantum-mechanical system do not form a Boolean σ-algebra. There is almost universal agreement that the probability space associated with a quantum-mechanical system is given by the set of subspaces of a separable Hilbert space, but there is disagreement over the algebraic structure that this set represents. In the most popular model for the probability space of quantum mechanics the propositions are assumed to form an orthocomplemented lattice (Mackey (1963), Jauch (1968)). The fundamental concept here is that of a partial order, that is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive but not symmetric. The partial order is interpreted as embodying the logical concept of implication in the set of propositions associated with the physical system. Although this model provides an acceptable mathematical expression of the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics in that the subspaces of a separable Hilbert space give a representation of an ortho-complemented lattice, it has several deficiencies which will be discussed later.
Statistical physical theories are frequently formulated in terms of probabilistic structures founded on a ’’logic of experimentally verifiable propositions.’’ It is argued that to each experimentally verifiable proposition there corresponds an experimental procedure which, in general, alters the state of the system, and is completely characterized by a ’’measurement transformation’’ or ’’operation.’’ An analysis of the relations among these experimental procedures leads us to a ’’logic of operations’’ which is quite different from the ’’lattice theoretic logics’’ that are often considered (albeit inadequate empirical justification), as models for the calculus of experimentally verifiable propositions of quantum theory. It is seen that the quantum probability theory based on the logic of operations provides the proper mathematical framework for discussing the statistics of successive observations in quantum theory. We also indicate how a theory of quantum stochastic processes can be formulated in a way similar to the Kolmogorov formulation of the classical theory.
Abstract The paper, summarizing the results of recent papers of the author, is devoted to a detailed analysis of postulates of nonrelativistic quantum theory appearing within two classical axiomatic frameworks the “quantum logic” and the “algebraic approach” respectively, which are presently the two main alternatives for quantum axiomatics. The first part of the paper concerns the structure of two important sets, the set of questions (propositional logic) and the set of pure states. It is shown how the quantum logic axiomatic scheme can be modified and improved in order to overcome the well known troubles connected with the lack of satisfactory physical justification for some postulates of this approach. In particular, an axiom system is developed, related closely to the quantum logic axiomatic scheme, in which the questions of the complete lattice structure, the atomisticity, and the validity of the covering law in the propositional logic do not appear so problematic. The particular attention is directed to the covering law, which is here obtained as a consequence of physically clear properties of the experimental procedures (“filters”) associated with the quantum‐mechanical propositions. In Section 1.5 we formulate an axiom system for quantum mechanics based exclusively on the concepts of pure state, transition probability, and pure filter. In the second part of the paper the axiomatic scheme presented in Part 1 is developed with the aim to analyse the algebraic structure of some subspaces of the set of simple observables. The quantum logic axiomatic framework is here shown closely connected with the Jordan‐Banach algebraic scheme. In the third part of the paper, similarly as it was done in Parts 1 and 2, the correspondence between the propositions and the experimental (measuring) procedures verifying these propositions is put as the basic assumption of the axiomatization of quantum mechanics. As a consequence of this assumption, there is established the structure of a real Jordan‐Banach algebra in the set Ob of the bounded observables associated with a physical system, so that we can apply the GNS representation theorem proved recently for such algebras by Alfsen et al. (1978) to obtain the Hilbert space (or, to be more precise, the C*‐algebraic) representation for Ob.
Classical probability theory, as axiomatized in 1933 by Andrey Kolmogorov, has provided a useful and almost universally accepted theory for describing and quantifying uncertainty in scientific applications outside quantum mechanics. Recently, cognitive psychologists and mathematical economists have provided examples where classical probability theory appears inadequate but the probability theory underlying quantum mechanics appears effective. Formally, quantum probability theory is a generalization of classical probability. This article explores relationships between generalized probability theories, in particular quantum-like probability theories and those that do not have full complementation operators (e.g. event spaces based on intuitionistic logic), and discusses how these generalizations bear on important issues in the foundations of probability and the development of non-classical probability theories for the behavioural sciences.
The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating properties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with every sentence of L(x). The set PfP^{f}Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered and contains a subset PTfP^{f}_{T}PTf​ of testable physical propositions whose order structure depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particular, PTfP^{f}_{T}PTf​ turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language LTQ(x)L_{TQ}(x)LTQ​(x), and the structure of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.
Summary Foundational studies in quantum theory have consisted in large part of attempts to avoid paradoxical situations in describing properties of a physical system. Quantum logic addresses some of the perplexing problems that plague interpretations of quantum theory by invoking a non-classical propositional calculus for the set of propositions of a quantum system. Historically, quantum logic derives from von Neumann’s observation that the set of projection operators on a Hilbert space constitute a ‘logic’ of experimental propositions. More than two decades passed from the pioneering work of Birkho and von Neumann before interest in quantum logic was re-ignited by Mackey’s probabilistic analysis of quantum theory. Piron’s axiomatization provided a signicant