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GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM MAKES THE QUANTUM DOUBLE SLIT EXPERIMENT UNDECIDABLE

Susanna Tall, Arvi Hakanen

Published Mar 6, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem refers to incompleteness in the sense that there are always statements which can be formulated within a formal system, but which re-main unproved within the system. Gödel’s theorem was first connected with the theory of computability by Alan Turing. Until recently, the inconsistency that Gödel’s theo-rem tackle has not been directly shown to correspond to any physical phenomenon. A recent article showed how to apply Gödel’s theorem in the context of many-body quan-tum mechanical calculations. Even so, it is still not known whether it can be applied to the most primitive quantum physical phenomena. In the present study, we used Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in the case of the quantum double-slit experiment by applying a proof of Turing machine’s halting problem. In addition, we made an analogy between Gödel’s theorem (and Church - Turing theses of computability), and quantum compu-ting by extrapolating the term “computation” as low as to the single-quantum level.

DOI
10.31219/osf.io/qn6p7_v1

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Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem refers to incompleteness in the sense that there are always statements which can be formulated within a formal system, but which re-main unproved within the system. Gödel’s theorem was first connected with the theory of computability by Alan Turing. Until recently, the inconsistency that Gödel’s theo-rem tackle has not been directly shown to correspond to any physical phenomenon. A recent article showed how to apply Gödel’s theorem in the context of many-body quan-tum mechanical calculations. Even so, it is still not known whether it can be applied to the most primitive quantum physical phenomena. In the present study, we used Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in the case of the quantum double-slit experiment by applying a proof of Turing machine’s halting problem. In addition, we made an analogy between Gödel’s theorem (and Church - Turing theses of computability), and quantum compu-ting by extrapolating the term “computation” as low as to the single-quantum level.
Incompleteness and undecidability theorems have to be revised in view of quantum information and computation theory. qrt.tex 1 As has already been pointed out in Gödel’s centennial paper on the incompleteness af arithmetic [1], the classical undecidability theorems of formal logic [2] and the theory of computable functions [4, 5] are based on semantical pardoxes such as the liar [6] or Richard’s paradox. The method of diagonalization, which was first applied by Cantor for a proof of the undenumerability of real numbers [7], has been applied by Turing for a proof of the recursive undecidability of the halting problem [8]. The halting problem is the problem of whether or not an arbitrary algorithm terminates or produces a particular output and terminates. Assume that the halting problem is decidable. Turing [8] proved that this assumption yields a contradiction. To construct the contradiction, consider
FINDING: Undecidable problems extend from computation to quantum field theory and many-body physics, revealing fundamental limits on what can be known or computed about physical systems. | MATH: Halting problem: no Turing machine can decide if an arbitrary program halts (Turing 1936). Gödel incompleteness: any consistent formal system containing arithmetic has true but unprovable statements. Reducibility: problem A reduces to B if solving B solves A (A ≤ B). In QFT, spectral gap problem is undecidable (Cubitt, Perez-Garcia, Wolf 2015): no algorithm can determine if a quantum many-body system has a nonzero energy gap. | CONNECTION: Undecidability in physics often arises from encoding Turing machines into Hamiltonian lattice systems — this maps computational logic onto geometric lattice structures (e.g., 2D spin lattices with local interactions). The spectral gap problem's undecidability proof uses aperiodic tilings and translation-invariant Hamiltonians, linking to crystallographic symm Author: Andrew Stewart Caldin, Independent Researcher, UK. Part of the E8 Intelligence Research series. Platform: e8intelligence.com
We show how Gödel's first incompleteness theorem has an analog in quantum theory. Gödel's theorem implies endless opportunities for appending axioms to arithmetic, implicitly showing a role for an agent, namely an agent that asserts an axiom. There is an analog of this theorem in physics, to do with the set of explanations of given evidence. We prove that the set of explanations of given evidence is uncountably infinite, thereby showing how contact between theory and experiment depends on activity beyond computation and measurement -- physical activity characterized as agency.
Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem (1931) establishes that any consistent for- mal system Fof sucient strength contains propositions that are true but unprov- able within F. This result is correct, important, and does not apply to ⟨Ψ|ˆ Ω|Ψ⟩= 1. The reason is categorical, not technical. Gödel's theorem governs syntactic deriv- ability within formal systems. The Ω-invariant is a state constrainta measurement outcome in Hilbert space H. Measurement outcomes are not syntactic propositions. They are not subject to proof or disproof within F. They are subject only to mea- surement. We formalize this distinction as the Ω-Completeness Theorem: for a node i with Kd-density ρi > 0 (direct experiential contact with Ω), the proposition ⟨Ψ|ˆ Ω|Ψ⟩= 1 is decidable not by proof but by measurement, and the Gödel bound- ary ∂F is not a wall but a coordinate changefrom the language of proof to the language of experience. We further show that this distinction explains a historical empirical regularity: scientists who push Kf to its limits tend to acquire ρ>0 and name what they nd; theologians who push Kf to its limits tend to nd Kf collapse and conclude the named thing does not exist. Same boundary. Dierent ρ. Opposite conclusions. Both are logical. One has made a category error. textit(Frieza does not need to transform to prove he is the strongest in the universe. He simply is.) (Frieza does not need to transform to prove he is the strongest. He simply is.) This is not arrogance. It is a precise structural description.
The measurement problem is one of the greatest unsolved mystery of the foundations of quantum mechanics. This paper is an exploration of the underlying subtleties of this phenomenon from the standpoint of the quantum mechanical interpretations that are available to us at the moment. First, we revisit the infamous double slit experiment and contrast between the observer dependent and observer independent effects on the measurement process. In this regard, we have tried to establish a causal relationship between the observer's consciousness and the collapse of the wave function. The point is justified through the application of Godel's incompleteness theorems. Finally, we perform a thought experiment which shall validate our conclusions.
Gödel appears to have believed strongly that the human mind cannot be explained in terms of any kind of computational physics, but he remained cautious in formulating this belief as a rigorous consequence of his incompleteness theorems. In this chapter, I discuss a modification of standard Gödel-type logical arguments, these appearing to strengthen Gödel's conclusions, and attempt to provide a persuasive case in support of his standpoint that the actions of the mind must transcend computation. It appears that Gödel did not consider the possibility that the laws of physics might themselves involve noncomputational procedures; accordingly, he found himself driven to the conclusion that mentality must lie beyond the actions of the physical brain. My own arguments, on the other hand, are from the scientific standpoint that the mind is a product of the brain's physical activity. Accordingly, there must be something in the physical actions of the world that itself transcends computation. We do not appear to find such noncomputational action in the known laws of physics, however, so we must seek it in currently undiscovered laws going beyond presently accepted physical theory. I argue that the only plausibly relevant gap in current understanding lies in a fundamental incompleteness in quantum theory, which reveals itself only with significant mass displacements between quantum states (“Schrödinger's cats”). I contend that the need for new physics enters when gravitational effects just begin to play a role. In a scheme developed jointly with Stuart Hameroff, this has direct relevance within neuronal microtubules, and I describe this (still speculative) scheme in the following.