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Approximations that matter: virtual particles as carriers of interactions

Nicolò Cangiotti, Gianni Arioli, Giovanni Valente

Published Jan 17, 2025• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In this paper we aim to develop an indispensability argument in support of the existence of virtual particles in scattering processes. In order to avoid the Paradox of Infinite Limits, which allegedly poses a challenge to scientific realism, one needs to de-idealize the fictitious systems introduced by the two limiting procedures employed in the perturbation scheme, namely the infinite expansion in Dyson series and the limits for negative and positive infinite times associated with the assumption of free particles. We show that these limits do not introduce essential idealizations, in agreement with scientific realism. What is more, according to our argument, unobservable virtual particles arise as essential approximations and they should be interpreted as propagators of the interaction responsible for subatomic scattering. As such, their existence is based on the use of approximations that matter.

DOI
10.1007/s11229-024-04881-9

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Abstract In this paper we aim to develop an indispensability argument in support of the existence of virtual particles in scattering processes. In order to avoid the Paradox of Infinite Limits, which allegedly poses a challenge to scientific realism, one needs to de-idealize the fictitious systems introduced by the two limiting procedures employed in the perturbation scheme, namely the infinite expansion in Dyson series and the limits for negative and positive infinite times associated with the assumption of free particles. We show that these limits do not introduce essential idealizations, in agreement with scientific realism. What is more, according to our argument, unobservable virtual particles arise as essential approximations and they should be interpreted as propagators of the interaction responsible for subatomic scattering. As such, their existence is based on the use of approximations that matter.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
Particle physics studies highly complex processes which cannot be directly observed. Scientific realism claims that we are nevertheless warranted in believing that these processes really occur and that the objects involved in them really exist. This book defends a version of scientific realism, called causal realism, in the context of particle physics. The first part of the book introduces the central theses and arguments in the recent philosophical debate on scientific realism and discusses entity realism, which is the most important precursor of causal realism. It also argues against the view that the very debate on scientific realism is not worth pursuing at all. In the second part, causal realism is developed and the key distinction between two kinds of warrant for scientific claims is clarified. This distinction proves its usefulness in a case study analyzing the discovery of the neutrino. It is also shown to be effective against an influential kind of pessimism, according to which even our best present theories are likely to be replaced some day by radically distinct alternatives. The final part discusses some specific challenges posed to realism by quantum physics, such as non-locality, delayed choice and the absence of particles in relativistic quantum theories.
The question of whether virtual quantum particles exist is considered here in light of previous critical analysis and under the assumption that there are particles in the world as described by quantum field theory. The relationship of the classification of particles to quantum-field-theoretic calculations and the diagrammatic aids that are often used in them is clarified. It is pointed out that the distinction between virtual particles and others and, therefore, judgments regarding their reality have been made on basis of these methods rather than on their physical characteristics. As such, it has obscured the question of their existence. It is here argued that the most influential arguments against the existence of virtual particles but not other particles fail because they either are arguments against the existence of particles in general rather than virtual particles per se, or are dependent on the imposition of classical intuitions on quantum systems, or are simply beside the point. Several reasons are then provided for considering virtual particles real, such as their descriptive, explanatory, and predictive value, and a clearer characterization of virtuality—one in terms of intermediate states—that also applies beyond perturbation theory is provided. It is also pointed out that in the role of force mediators, they serve to preclude action-at-a-distance between interacting particles. For these reasons, it is concluded that virtual particles are as real as other quantum particles.
The idea that the world is made of particles — little discrete, interacting objects that compose the material bodies of everyday experience — is a durable one. Following the advent of quantum theory, the idea was revised but not abandoned. It remains manifest in the explanatory language of physics, chemistry, and molecular biology. Aside from its durability, there is good reason for the scientific realist to embrace the particle interpretation: such a view can account for the prominent epistemic fact that only limited knowledge of a portion of the material universe is needed in order to make reliable predictions about that portion. Thus, particle interpretations can support an abductive argument from the epistemic facts in favor of a realist reading of physical theory. However, any particle interpretation with this property is untenable. The empirical adequacy of modern particle theories requires adoption of a postulate known as permutation invariance (PI) — the claim that interchanging the role of two particles of the same kind in a dynamical state description results in a description of the identical state. It is the central claim of this essay that PI is incompatible with any particle interpretation strong enough to account for the epistemic facts. This incompatibility extends across all physical theories. To frame and motivate the inconsistency argument, I begin by fixing the relevant notion of particle. To single out those accounts of greatest appeal to the realist, I develop the logically weakest particle ontology that entails the epistemic fact that the world is piecewise predictable, an ontology I call ‘minimal atomism’ (MA). The entire series of scientific conceptions of the particle, from Newton’s mechanically interacting corpuscles to the ‘centers of force’ in classical field theories, all comport with MA. As long as PI is left out, even quantum mechanics can be viewed this way. To assess the impact of PI on this picture, I present a framework for rigorously connecting interpretations to physical theories. In particular, I represent MA as a set of formal conditions on the models of physical theories, the mathematical structures taken to represent states of the world. I also formulate PI — originally introduced as a postulate of non-relativistic quantum mechanics — in theory independent terms. With all of these pieces in hand, I am then able to present a proof of the inconsistency of PI and MA. In the second part of the essay, I survey responses to the inconsistency result open to the scientific realist. The two most plausible approaches involve abandoning particles in one way or another. The first alternative interpretation considered takes the property bearing objects of the world to be regions of space rather than particles. In this view, the properties once attributed to particles in quantum states are attributed instead to one or more regions of space. PI no longer obtains in this case, at least not as a statement about the permutation symmetry of property bearers. Rather, the new interpretation naturally imposes an analogous constraint on quantum states. The second major approach to evading the inconsistency result is to dispense with objects altogether. This is the recommendation of so-called ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ (OSR). The central OSR thesis is that structure rather than entities are the basic ontological components of the world. OSR is intended to embrace the ‘miracle’ argument in favor of scientific realism (it would be a miracle if a scientific theory were predictively successful unless it were also approximately true with regard to its description of reality) while avoiding the pessimistic meta-induction (most predictively successful theories along with their associated ontologies have been overturned, so we should expect the same of our current theories). I demonstrate that one principal motivation for OSR based on the under-determination of interpretations in QM is actually dissolved by the incompatibility result. At the same time, I suggest reasons to think that OSR fares no better with respect to the pessimistic meta-induction than traditional realism does. Thus, while PI and MA may be incompatible, object ontologies remain the best option for the realist.
Given two Hamiltonians H0,H1=H0+VH_0,H_1=H_0+VH0​,H1​=H0​+V corresponding respectively to a free particle Hamiltonian and the free particle Hamiltonian plus its interaction energy with a scattering centre, we can compute the S-matrix, i.e., the matrix that determines the quantum mechanical amplitude of the process involving a particle coming from a free particle state at an infinite distance from the scattering centre at time t=−∞t=-\inftyt=−∞, entering into an initial scattered state, interacting with the scattering centre, entering into a final scattered state, and then escaping away to infinity at time t→∞t\rightarrow\inftyt→∞ to a final free particle state. Such amplitudes were first studied by Lippmann and Schwinger (Steven Weinberg, The Quantum Theory of Fields, Vol. 1, W.O. Amrein, Hilbert Space Methods in Quantum Mechanics) and then analyzed in a mathematically precise way by [T. Kato], [W. Amrein], and [K.B. Sinha]. In this paper, we first derive the Lippmann-Schwinger equation for the input and output scattered states in terms of the input and output free particle states using intuitive arguments originally due to Lippmann and Schwinger, and then, using rigorous operator theoretic arguments revolving around the spectral theorem for unbounded self-adjoint operators in a Hilbert space, we obtain an elegant formula for the scattering matrix elements in terms of the interaction potential and the free particle Hamiltonian between two free particle states corresponding to the same measure. We then discuss a computationally more efficient method based on the Dyson series expansion (Steven Weinberg, The Quantum Theory of Fields, Vol. 1), which works even in the case when the interaction Hamiltonian is time varying, in contrast to the Lippmann-Schwinger method, for calculating the S-matrix. We assume that the scattering potential, which can be time varying, can be controlled by incorporating control parameters and explain how the resulting unitary S-matrix can be made to approximate a given unitary gate in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space by optimizing the Hilbert-Schmidt/Frobenius norm distance between the given gate and the S-matrix gate, in which the latter is approximated by a truncated Dyson series. Of course, the S-matrix given by the Dyson series is a Taylor series functional expansion in the interaction potential and hence is a highly nonlinear function of the control parameters, and hence we propose numerical methods for such optimization. We then observe that if the control parameters are taken as random variables with joint moments, then the TPCP map involving statistical averaging of the adjoint action of the S-matrix acting on an initial mixed state w.r.t. the probability distribution of the control parameters will result in a final mixed state that is linear in the statistical moments of the control parameters, and hence optimization w.r.t. these moments can be easily carried out. Our method of TPCP map design is to optimize the sum of Frobenius distance squares between a sequence of desired output mixed states and the S-matrix based formula for the TPCP map acting on the corresponding input mixed states w.r.t. the statistical moments of the control parameters. We then generalize this method to include the case of TPCP maps obtained from the Hudson-Parthasarathy quantum noisy Schrödinger equation. In summary, we simulate the S-matrix gate for independent realizations of the control parameters having a probability distribution defined by their joint moments obtained by the above optimization procedure and apply the adjoint action of these independent S-matrices on a given input state, and take their ensemble average to obtain a good approximation to the action of the desired TPCP map on any given input state. This suggests that TPCP maps of arbitrarily large size can be realized using scattering experiments in the laboratory.