As the quantum research community continues to grow and new algorithms are designed, developed, and implemented, it is crucial to start thinking about security aspects and potential threats that could result in misuse of the algorithms, or jeopardize the information processed with these quantum algorithms. This work focuses on exploration of two types of potential attacks that could be deployed on a cloud-based quantum computer by an attacker circuit trying to interfere with victim circuit. The two attacks, called Improper Initialization Attack (IIA) and Higher Energy Attack (HEA), are for the first time applied to a well-known and widely used quantum algorithm: HHL. The HHL algorithm is used in the field of machine learning and big data for solving systems of linear equations. This work evaluates the effect of the attacks on different qubits within the HHL algorithm: ancilla qubit, clock qubit, and b qubit. This work demonstrates that the two attacks are able to cause incorrect results, even when only one of the qubits in the victim algorithm is attacked. Having discovered the vulnerabilities, the work motivates the need for future work to develop defense strategies for each of these attack scenarios.
As the quantum research community continues to grow and new algorithms are designed, developed, and implemented, it is crucial to start thinking about security aspects and potential threats that could result in misuse of the algorithms, or jeopardize the information processed with these quantum algorithms. This work focuses on exploration of two types of potential attacks that could be deployed on a cloud-based quantum computer by an attacker circuit trying to interfere with victim circuit. The two attacks, called Improper Initialization Attack (IIA) and Higher Energy Attack (HEA), are for the first time applied to a well-known and widely used quantum algorithm: HHL. The HHL algorithm is used in the field of machine learning and big data for solving systems of linear equations. This work evaluates the effect of the attacks on different qubits within the HHL algorithm: ancilla qubit, clock qubit, and b qubit. This work demonstrates that the two attacks are able to cause incorrect results, even when only one of the qubits in the victim algorithm is attacked. Having discovered the vulnerabilities, the work motivates the need for future work to develop defense strategies for each of these attack scenarios.
As the quantum research community expands and new quantum algorithms are created and implemented, it is essential to consider the security implications and potential threats that could lead to the compromise the information processed by them. This work focuses on securing the HHL quantum algorithm against attacks while it executes on a quantum computer. Specifically, two types of potential attacks could be deployed on a cloud-based quantum computer by an attacker circuit attempting to interfere with the victim HHL circuit: the Improper Initialization Attack (IIA) and the Higher Energy Attack (HEA). To protect the HHL algorithm from IIA and HEA, this work proposes first-of-a-kind defense strategies against these attacks on the HHL quantum algorithm. Next, this work demonstrates an implementation of a new quantum circuit for the HHL quantum algorithm that incorporates these defenses. The redesigned quantum circuit is necessary to successfully apply and realize all proposed defense strategies. Finally, this work illustrates how these defense strategies function in practice in the redesigned circuit, specifically how they can protect the HHL quantum algorithm from both IIA and HEA across multiple qubits involving all three types of qubits used in the HHL algorithms: ancilla, clock, and b. The defense requires minimal modification to the circuit, and has only a very small effect on the fidelity of the circuits. The circuits have been tested and validated in both simulation, and also on real IBM quantum computer hardware. The work further analyzes how the modified HHL circuit with the defenses is affected by noise during quantum computation. This work in the end demonstrates that it is practical to add protections to quantum circuits so that they not only perform correct computation, but also self-detect if an attack has occured during the execution.
This work presents the first evaluation of timing and higher-energy attacks on Quantum Random Access Memory (QRAM) circuits. By leveraging quantum principles, QRAM can efficiently store and manipulate both quantum and classical data, leading to potential significant speedups in a variety of quantum algorithms. However, as demonstrated in this work, when used in remote cloud-based quantum computers QRAM is vulnerable to different security attacks. The work demonstrates side-channel attacks, e.g., the timing attacks, as well as fault-injection-like attacks, e.g., the higher-energy attacks. This work evaluates the attacks on QRAM and different circuits that use QRAM. The work also proposes a set of defenses.
The development of quantum computers has been advancing rapidly in recent years. As quantum computers become more widely accessible, potentially malicious users could try to execute their code on the machines to leak information from other users, interfere with or manipulate the results of other users, or reverse engineer the underlying quantum computer architecture and its intellectual property. Among different security threats, previous work has demonstrated information leakage across the reset operations, and it then proposed a secure reset operation could be an enabling technology that allows the sharing of a quantum computer among different users or different quantum programs of the same user. In this study, we delve deeper into the reset attack, aiming to augment its efficacy and capabilities and the countermeasure to protect from this attack. First, we propose a set of new extended reset attacks that could be more stealthy by hiding the intention of the attacker's circuit. This work shows various concealing circuits and how attackers can retrieve information from the execution of a previous shot of a circuit, even if the concealing circuit is used between the reset operation (of the victim, after the shot of the circuit is executed) and the measurement (of the attacker). Second, based on the uncovered new possible attacks, this work proposes a set of heuristic checks that could be applied at transpile time to check for the existence of malicious circuits that try to steal information via the attack on the reset operation. Unlike run-time protection or added secure reset gates, this work proposes a complimentary, compile-time security solution to the attacks on reset operation.
The rapid growth of interest in quantum computing has brought about the need to secure these powerful machines against a range of physical attacks. As qubit counts increase and quantum computers achieve higher levels of fidelity, their potential to execute novel algorithms and generate sensitive intellectual property becomes more promising. However, there is a significant gap in our understanding of the vulnerabilities these computers face in terms of security and privacy attacks. Among the potential threats are physical attacks, including those orchestrated by malicious insiders within data centers where the quantum computers are located, which could compromise the integrity of computations and resulting data. This paper presents an exploration of fault-injection attacks as one class of physical attacks on quantum computers. This work first introduces a classification of fault-injection attacks and strategies, including the domain of fault-injection attacks, the fault targets, and fault manifestations in quantum computers. The resulting classification highlights the potential threats that exist. By shedding light on the vulnerabilities of quantum computers to fault-injection attacks, this work contributes to the development of robust security measures for this emerging technology.
Linear systems of equations lie at the heart of numerous scientific and engineering challenges. In cutting-edge arena like artificial intelligence, machine learning and neuro-computation, these systems serve as a fundamental tool for mathematical modeling. Classical algorithms for solving linear systems have been extensively developed and forms the backbone of diverse applications across various scientific disciplines. While classical algorithms exist for solving linear systems, they often encounter limitations termed “NP-completeness” as data complexity increases. The emerging field of quantum computing offers a revolutionary approach to deal with these kinds of problems. The Harrow–Hassidim–Lloyd (HHL) algorithm tackles these challenges and opens new avenues for research. This study delves into the contemporary effectiveness of the HHL algorithm to address systems of linear equations. By examining recent research in quantum machine learning, we aim to assess the HHL algorithm’s potential to revolutionize the process of optimizing hyperparameters for machine learning models, resulting in increased efficiency and cost savings. This paper meticulously analyzes the HHL algorithm and explores its evolution from conception to the latest advancements. A comprehensive examination of the HHL algorithm, including its evolution over time, is thoroughly explored. The investigation delves into the potential challenges and limitations that might hinder the practical deployment of the HHL algorithm. Identifying these roadblocks will pave the way for future research and development efforts.
With the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing, cybersecurity threats have evolved, giving rise to adversarial quantum attacks. These attacks exploit the vulnerabilities of AI models using quantum algorithms, posing a significant risk to data security, model robustness, and decision-making systems. This paper presents a comprehensive review of adversarial quantum attacks on AI, analyzing their mechanisms, potential impacts, and countermeasures. It explores how quantum computing can enhance adversarial attacks by accelerating the generation of adversarial examples, breaking cryptographic protections, and undermining AI model integrity. Additionally, the study examines different attack vectors, including quantum-enhanced adversarial perturbations, quantum machine learning (QML) vulnerabilities, and quantum decryption threats. The paper also discusses defensive strategies such as quantum-resistant AI models, quantum cryptographic defenses, and hybrid quantum-classical security frameworks that can mitigate these risks. By evaluating existing research and emerging trends, this review provides insights into the growing intersection of AI security and quantum computing. The findings emphasize the urgent need for robust quantum-aware AI security frameworks to safeguard AI-driven systems in the quantum era. Future research directions include developing quantum-adaptive AI models, post-quantum cryptographic techniques, and real-world applications of quantum-safe AI architectures. This review aims to contribute to the ongoing discourse on ensuring AI resilience against adversarial quantum threats, paving the way for a secure and quantum-resistant future.