Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)

Analysis of A Malicious Deutsch-Jozsa Circuit

Jaden Hawley, Chi‐Ren Shyu

Published Sep 15, 2024• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Active research into multi-tenancy means multitenant quantum computers could be soon. However, the growth of quantum computing introduces new security risks. One such risk is crosstalk error in multi-tenant superconducting quantum computers, which can be used to inject faults into other users' circuits. Concurrent works in the field have designed malware that exploits this vulnerability. This work demonstrates a malicious Deutsch-Jozsa malware that resists mitigation. This is created by designing a Deutsch-Jozsa circuit that contains a malicious payload. To analyze this malware, we assess both covertness and mitigation resilience. For covertness, we evaluated the impact on the integrity of the Deutsch-Jozsa circuit it hides in. Our findings show that the malware closely mimics the performance of an innocent Deutsch-Jozsa circuit at all optimization levels, which shows success in covertness. To assess mitigation resilience, we use Qiskit's circuit optimization. We found that our malware remains mostly unmitigated by optimization and almost doubles the victim error rate at the highest level of optimization offered by IBM. This shows that hiding a well-designed payload within a wrapping circuit does not reduce the malware's effectiveness, and it even performs better than the non-deceptive variant.

DOI
10.1109/qce60285.2024.10425

Related papers

Towards an Antivirus for Quantum Computers

Sanjay R. Deshpande, Chuanqi Xu, Theodoros Trochatos +2 more

Researchers are today exploring models for cloud-based usage of quantum computers where multi-tenancy can be used to share quantum computer hard-ware among multiple users. Multi-tenancy has a promise of allowing better utilization of the quantum computer hardware, but also opens up the quantum computer to new types of security attacks. As this and other recent research shows, it is possible to perform a fault injection attack using crosstalk on quantum computers when a victim and attacker circuits are instantiated as co-tenants on the same quantum computer. To ensure such attacks do not happen, this paper proposes that new techniques should be developed to help catch malicious circuits before they are loaded onto quantum computer hardware. Following ideas from classical computers, a compile-time technique can be designed to scan quantum computer programs for mali-cious or suspicious code patterns before they are compiled into quantum circuits that run on a quantum computer. This paper presents ongoing work which demonstrates how crosstalk can affect Grover's algorithm, and then presents suggestions of how quantum programs could be analyzed to catch circuits that generate large amounts of crosstalk with malicious intent.

arXiv:2203.02649•IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)•Jun 27, 2022•31 citations

Pulse-Level Simulation of Crosstalk Attacks on Superconducting Quantum Hardware

Syed Emad Uddin Shubha, Tasnuva Farheen

Hardware crosstalk in multi-tenant superconducting quantum computers poses a severe security threat, allowing adversaries to induce targeted errors across tenant boundaries by injecting carefully engineered pulses. We present a simulation-based study of active crosstalk attacks at the pulse level, analyzing how adversarial control of pulse timing, shape, amplitude, and coupling can disrupt a victim's computation. Our framework models the time-dependent dynamics of a three-qubit system in the rotating frame, capturing both always-on couplings and injected drive pulses. We examine two attack strategies: attacker-first (pulse before victim operation) and victim-first (pulse after), and systematically identify the pulse and coupling configurations that cause the largest logical errors. Protocol-level experiments on quantum coin flip and XOR classification circuits show that some protocols are highly vulnerable to these attacks, while others remain robust. Based on these findings, we discuss practical methods for detection and mitigation to improve security in quantum cloud platforms.

arXiv:2507.16181•IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)•Aug 30, 2025•4 citations

QubitVise: Double-Sided Crosstalk Attack in Superconducting Quantum Computers

Adriana Aranguren Arellano, He Xie, Jakub M. Szefer

This work presents a novel security attack based on CNOT gate induced crosstalk in superconducting qubit systems. Compared to previous work, this work introduces a double-sided crosstalk attack where attacker's circuits are located on either side of the victim circuit executing in a multi-tenant cloud-based quantum computer. The attacker, a malicious tenant or user, can interfere with, or disrupt, the state of neighboring qubits in the victim tenant or user without direct access to victim's qubits, by taking advantage of interference and crosstalk among the otherwise logically isolated qubits. New aspect of this attack is the location of the attacker's circuits on both sides of the victim. Experimental validation on cloud-based Rigetti quantum devices demonstrates that these attacks can compromise data integrity and cause the victim's circuit's outputs to change. Magnitude of the change is evaluated using total variational distance and tested on number of common benchmarks that can execute on today's quantum computers. This work underscores the need for improved isolation mechanisms and secure scheduling in multitenant quantum computing cloud environments.

IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)•Aug 30, 2025•0 citations

Quantum Anti-Spyware Protocols for Fault Injection Detection

Nakshathra Nazer

Multi-tenancy schemes for quantum computing hardware are vulnerable to fault injection attacks through crosstalk effects. Research studies have experimentally demonstrated the change in output probabilities of victim circuits where the victim and the adversary share the same quantum hardware. To detect adversary circuits, this paper proposes compile time and simulation based protocols to scan quantum computer programs for malicious code patterns. In the compile time approach, with the help of databases of known malicious patterns, the number of gates and the repeating patterns in the code structures are tracked and validated for malicious intent. In the simulation based approach, Idle Tomography (IDT) using pyGSTi software framework is employed for crosstalk error rate extraction. Hamiltonian and Stochastic errors of relevant qubit pairs in accordance with the quantum hardware’s connectivity mapping are analyzed for the detection of unrecognized malicious adversary patterns. Both the protocols output metrics and error rates information that can be used as a "confidence ruler" over a concerned quantum hardware. These protocols safeguard honest quantum circuit parties from possible interference and resulting tampered computational outcomes brought about by adversary parties.

IEEE International Conference on Signal Processing, Informatics, Communication and Energy Systems (SPICES)•Sep 20, 2024•1 citation

Analysis of the Effects of Crosstalk Errors on Various Quantum Circuits

Soumen Bajpayee, Imon Mukherjee

Real-time computers of the Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) era undergo the undesirable coupling among qubits known as crosstalk. The negative effects of crosstalk errors can lead to degradation in the performance of various quantum circuits. In this paper, we present four crosstalk models that negatively affect the outcome of Grover’s search algorithm, Simon’s algorithm and the performance of the quantum teleportation protocol. The crosstalk models presented in this work are used as malicious circuits running alongside the victim circuits of the said quantum algorithms and protocol. This is possible in the shared cloud quantum computing environment which is right now offered by some of the industries. This work demonstrates the formation of some of the possible patterns as parts of the malicious circuits and their repetitions to inject crosstalk errors in the victim circuits. The analysis of the affected outputs for each pattern along with the corresponding diagrammatic representation is also done in this article along with the discussion on the degraded results for the used victim circuits other than the state-of-the-art works for the available ones. Moreover, this work highlights the need for proper counter-measures in order to detect and eliminate the malicious patterns that can harm the performance of a quantum circuit.

International Conference on VLSI Design•Jan 6, 2024•4 citations

Towards defending crosstalk-mediated attacks in multi-tenant quantum computing

Devika Mehra, Amir Kalev

Abstract With the increasing demand for quantum hardware, shared and multi-tenant environments have been proposed to optimize resource utilization. However, the multi-tenancy paradigm in quantum computing inherently introduces security threats. This paper examines crosstalk-mediated attacks targeting three-qubit Grover’s search algorithm and explores two fundamental mitigation strategies: gate-based dynamical decoupling and the use of a buffer qubit. We evaluate the effectiveness of each method individually and in combination, finding that while both strategies offer some level of attack mitigation, their combined application yields the most significant performance improvement. Beyond security vulnerabilities, our work also has implications for unintentional circuit interference that can occur when multiple quantum circuits are executed in close proximity.

arXiv:2409.14598•Physica Scripta•Feb 10, 2026•8 citations
Active research into multi-tenancy means multitenant quantum computers could be soon. However, the growth of quantum computing introduces new security risks. One such risk is crosstalk error in multi-tenant superconducting quantum computers, which can be used to inject faults into other users' circuits. Concurrent works in the field have designed malware that exploits this vulnerability. This work demonstrates a malicious Deutsch-Jozsa malware that resists mitigation. This is created by designing a Deutsch-Jozsa circuit that contains a malicious payload. To analyze this malware, we assess both covertness and mitigation resilience. For covertness, we evaluated the impact on the integrity of the Deutsch-Jozsa circuit it hides in. Our findings show that the malware closely mimics the performance of an innocent Deutsch-Jozsa circuit at all optimization levels, which shows success in covertness. To assess mitigation resilience, we use Qiskit's circuit optimization. We found that our malware remains mostly unmitigated by optimization and almost doubles the victim error rate at the highest level of optimization offered by IBM. This shows that hiding a well-designed payload within a wrapping circuit does not reduce the malware's effectiveness, and it even performs better than the non-deceptive variant.
Researchers are today exploring models for cloud-based usage of quantum computers where multi-tenancy can be used to share quantum computer hard-ware among multiple users. Multi-tenancy has a promise of allowing better utilization of the quantum computer hardware, but also opens up the quantum computer to new types of security attacks. As this and other recent research shows, it is possible to perform a fault injection attack using crosstalk on quantum computers when a victim and attacker circuits are instantiated as co-tenants on the same quantum computer. To ensure such attacks do not happen, this paper proposes that new techniques should be developed to help catch malicious circuits before they are loaded onto quantum computer hardware. Following ideas from classical computers, a compile-time technique can be designed to scan quantum computer programs for mali-cious or suspicious code patterns before they are compiled into quantum circuits that run on a quantum computer. This paper presents ongoing work which demonstrates how crosstalk can affect Grover's algorithm, and then presents suggestions of how quantum programs could be analyzed to catch circuits that generate large amounts of crosstalk with malicious intent.
Hardware crosstalk in multi-tenant superconducting quantum computers poses a severe security threat, allowing adversaries to induce targeted errors across tenant boundaries by injecting carefully engineered pulses. We present a simulation-based study of active crosstalk attacks at the pulse level, analyzing how adversarial control of pulse timing, shape, amplitude, and coupling can disrupt a victim's computation. Our framework models the time-dependent dynamics of a three-qubit system in the rotating frame, capturing both always-on couplings and injected drive pulses. We examine two attack strategies: attacker-first (pulse before victim operation) and victim-first (pulse after), and systematically identify the pulse and coupling configurations that cause the largest logical errors. Protocol-level experiments on quantum coin flip and XOR classification circuits show that some protocols are highly vulnerable to these attacks, while others remain robust. Based on these findings, we discuss practical methods for detection and mitigation to improve security in quantum cloud platforms.
This work presents a novel security attack based on CNOT gate induced crosstalk in superconducting qubit systems. Compared to previous work, this work introduces a double-sided crosstalk attack where attacker's circuits are located on either side of the victim circuit executing in a multi-tenant cloud-based quantum computer. The attacker, a malicious tenant or user, can interfere with, or disrupt, the state of neighboring qubits in the victim tenant or user without direct access to victim's qubits, by taking advantage of interference and crosstalk among the otherwise logically isolated qubits. New aspect of this attack is the location of the attacker's circuits on both sides of the victim. Experimental validation on cloud-based Rigetti quantum devices demonstrates that these attacks can compromise data integrity and cause the victim's circuit's outputs to change. Magnitude of the change is evaluated using total variational distance and tested on number of common benchmarks that can execute on today's quantum computers. This work underscores the need for improved isolation mechanisms and secure scheduling in multitenant quantum computing cloud environments.
Multi-tenancy schemes for quantum computing hardware are vulnerable to fault injection attacks through crosstalk effects. Research studies have experimentally demonstrated the change in output probabilities of victim circuits where the victim and the adversary share the same quantum hardware. To detect adversary circuits, this paper proposes compile time and simulation based protocols to scan quantum computer programs for malicious code patterns. In the compile time approach, with the help of databases of known malicious patterns, the number of gates and the repeating patterns in the code structures are tracked and validated for malicious intent. In the simulation based approach, Idle Tomography (IDT) using pyGSTi software framework is employed for crosstalk error rate extraction. Hamiltonian and Stochastic errors of relevant qubit pairs in accordance with the quantum hardware’s connectivity mapping are analyzed for the detection of unrecognized malicious adversary patterns. Both the protocols output metrics and error rates information that can be used as a "confidence ruler" over a concerned quantum hardware. These protocols safeguard honest quantum circuit parties from possible interference and resulting tampered computational outcomes brought about by adversary parties.
Real-time computers of the Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) era undergo the undesirable coupling among qubits known as crosstalk. The negative effects of crosstalk errors can lead to degradation in the performance of various quantum circuits. In this paper, we present four crosstalk models that negatively affect the outcome of Grover’s search algorithm, Simon’s algorithm and the performance of the quantum teleportation protocol. The crosstalk models presented in this work are used as malicious circuits running alongside the victim circuits of the said quantum algorithms and protocol. This is possible in the shared cloud quantum computing environment which is right now offered by some of the industries. This work demonstrates the formation of some of the possible patterns as parts of the malicious circuits and their repetitions to inject crosstalk errors in the victim circuits. The analysis of the affected outputs for each pattern along with the corresponding diagrammatic representation is also done in this article along with the discussion on the degraded results for the used victim circuits other than the state-of-the-art works for the available ones. Moreover, this work highlights the need for proper counter-measures in order to detect and eliminate the malicious patterns that can harm the performance of a quantum circuit.
Abstract With the increasing demand for quantum hardware, shared and multi-tenant environments have been proposed to optimize resource utilization. However, the multi-tenancy paradigm in quantum computing inherently introduces security threats. This paper examines crosstalk-mediated attacks targeting three-qubit Grover’s search algorithm and explores two fundamental mitigation strategies: gate-based dynamical decoupling and the use of a buffer qubit. We evaluate the effectiveness of each method individually and in combination, finding that while both strategies offer some level of attack mitigation, their combined application yields the most significant performance improvement. Beyond security vulnerabilities, our work also has implications for unintentional circuit interference that can occur when multiple quantum circuits are executed in close proximity.