In recent years, the zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-SNARK) have drawn significant attention as privacy-enhancing technologies in various domains. A post-quantum designated verifier type zk-SNARK for Boolean circuits was proposed by Gennaro et al. in ACM CCS '18. However, this scheme does not include arithmetic circuits and they claim that a construction of post zk-SNARKs for arithmetic circuits as open problem. In this paper we give answers to this problem. Our first proposal is based on the data structure used in Pinocchio, a previous study, and can be easily implemented using the existing Pinocchio-based systems. In our second proposal, which also employs QAPs, the zero-knowledge proof comprises three learning with errors (LWE) ciphertexts, and the size of the proof is smaller compared with that of the first proposal. Our second proposal is also more efficient than the first one or all other known post-quantum zk-SNARKs.
In recent years, the zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-SNARK) have drawn significant attention as privacy-enhancing technologies in various domains. A post-quantum designated verifier type zk-SNARK for Boolean circuits was proposed by Gennaro et al. in ACM CCS '18. However, this scheme does not include arithmetic circuits and they claim that a construction of post zk-SNARKs for arithmetic circuits as open problem. In this paper we give answers to this problem. Our first proposal is based on the data structure used in Pinocchio, a previous study, and can be easily implemented using the existing Pinocchio-based systems. In our second proposal, which also employs QAPs, the zero-knowledge proof comprises three learning with errors (LWE) ciphertexts, and the size of the proof is smaller compared with that of the first proposal. Our second proposal is also more efficient than the first one or all other known post-quantum zk-SNARKs.
Abstract Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs) are cryptographic protocols that offer efficient and privacy-preserving means of verifying NP language relations and have drawn considerable attention for their appealing applications, e.g., verifiable computation and anonymous payment protocol. Compared with the pre-quantum case, the practicability of this primitive in the post-quantum setting is still unsatisfactory, especially for the space complexity. To tackle this issue, this work seeks to enhance the efficiency and compactness of lattice-based zk-SNARKs, including proof length and common reference string (CRS) length. In this paper, we develop the framework of square span program-based SNARKs and design new zk-SNARKs over cyclotomic rings. Compared with previous works, our construction is without parallel repetition and achieves shorter proof and CRS lengths than previous lattice-based zk-SNARK schemes. Particularly, the proof length of our scheme is around 23.3% 23.3 % smaller than the recent shortest lattice-based zk-SNARKs by Ishai et al. (in: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security, pp 212–234, 2021), and the CRS length is 3.6× 3.6 × smaller. Our constructions follow the framework of Gennaro et al. (in: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security, pp 556–573, 2018), and adapt it to the ring setting by slightly modifying the knowledge assumptions. We develop concretely small constructions by using module-switching and key-switching procedures in a novel way.
With the emergence of quantum computing, traditional cryptographic methods used in blockchain systems face increasing risk. One such area of concern is the Layer-2 protocols zk-Rollups designed to improve scalability and privacy in platforms like Ethereum, which are heavily dependent on classical zero-knowledge proofs such as zk-SNARKs and zk-STARKs. These systems may be compromised by quantum algorithms. To address this, we propose a quantum-secure zk-Rollup model using Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proofs (QZKPs), implemented with IBM’s Qiskit simulator. The protocol uses quantum features like superposition and random basis selection to verify transactions without leaking private data. Simulation results confirm key properties: valid proofs are reliably accepted, while invalid ones are rejected. This demonstrates both the feasibility and future relevance of integrating QZKPs into blockchain systems for post-quantum security.
The concept of zero-knowledge (ZK) has become of fundamental importance in cryptography. However, in a setting where entities are modeled by quantum computers, classical arguments for proving ZK fail to hold since, in the quantum setting, the concept of rewinding is not generally applicable. Moreover, known classical techniques that avoid rewinding have various shortcomings in the quantum setting. We propose new techniques for building quantum zero-knowledge (QZK) protocols, which remain secure even under (active) quantum attacks. We obtain computational QZK proofs and perfect QZK arguments for any NP language in the common reference string model. This is based on a general method converting an important class of classical honest-verifier ZK (HVZK) proofs into QZK proofs. This leads to quite practical protocols if the underlying HVZK proof is efficient. These are the first proof protocols enjoying these properties, in particular the first to achieve perfect QZK. As part of our construction, we propose a general framework for building unconditionally hiding (trapdoor) string commitment schemes, secure against quantum attacks, as well as concrete instantiations based on specific (believed to be) hard problems. This is of independent interest, as these are the first unconditionally hiding string commitment schemes withstanding quantum attacks. Finally, we give a partial answer to the question whether QZK is possible in the plain model. We propose a new notion of QZK, non-oblivious verifier QZK, which is strictly stronger than honest-verifier QZK but weaker than full QZK, and we show that this notion can be achieved by means of efficient (quantum) protocols.
We initiate the study of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments for languages in QMA. Our first main result is the following: if Learning With Errors (LWE) is hard for quantum computers, then any language in QMA has an NIZK argument with preprocessing. The preprocessing in our argument system consists of (i) the generation of a CRS and (ii) a single (instance-independent) quantum message from verifier to prover. The instance-dependent phase of our argument system involves only a single classical message from prover to verifier. Importantly, verification in our protocol is entirely classical, and the verifier needs not have quantum memory; its only quantum actions are in the preprocessing phase. Our second contribution is to extend the notion of a classical proof of knowledge to the quantum setting. We introduce the notions of arguments and proofs of quantum knowledge (AoQK/PoQK), and we show that our non-interactive argument system satisfies the definition of an AoQK. In particular, we explicitly construct an extractor which can recover a quantum witness from any prover which is successful in our protocol. Finally, we show that any language in QMA has an (interactive) proof of quantum knowledge.
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates for designing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that resist emerging quantum computing attacks. The recent NIST PQC standardization process is nearing its completion, with practical lattice-based algorithms for basic cryptographic functionalities (namely digital signature and public-key encryption) selected for standardization in the near future. However, practical lattice-based solutions for more advanced privacy-preserving protocols, in particular, Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), have only emerged recently and are an active area of research. We discuss some recent developments in design and analysis of practical lattice-based post-quantum ZKPs and their applications. In particular, we review some challenges that arise in designing ZKPs in the lattice setting and some recent progress on efficient lattice-based Schnorr-like proofs for important relations, such as binary/range proofs, one-out-of-many proofs and rounding proofs [1, 2, 4]. We discuss applications and optimization of such proof systems as building blocks for practical advanced cryptographic protocols such as ring signatures and balance proofs for privacy-preserving cryptocurrency payment protocols [2, 3]. We also discuss our recent work on succinct designated-verifier ZKPs (DV-ZKSNARKS) for verifying correctness of general delegated computations [5].
The development of proof systems whose security relies on the hardness of lattice problems has been a fruitful research area in recent years. By leveraging the techniques introduced in LaBRADOR (Beullens, Seiler, Crypto 2023), the state-of-the-art lattice-based schemes have very fast provers and have output sizes under 100KB for arbitrarily large statements. These proofs are in fact the smallest, and often have the fastest provers, out of all post-quantum schemes. In addition to succinctness, many applications also require witness privacy. Achieving this can, in theory, be done by combining LaBRADOR with a linear-size zero-knowledge proof. While such a combination has already been described in the LaBRADOR paper itself, as well as in the works of Albrecht et al. (Eurocrypt 2024) and del Pino et al. (Crypto 2025), its concrete costs remained unexplored. In this work, we provide the first concrete construction and implementation that adds zero-knowledge proofs to LaBRADOR by integrating the linear-size zero-knowledge proof from (Lyubashevsky, Nguyen, Plançon, Crypto 2022) into the protocol. We describe the non-trivial challenges that this entails and show practicality of the construction by benchmarking several use-cases. We make the proof system and primitives accessible by extending the LaZer library (Lyubashevsky, Seiler, Steuer, CCS 2024) in a way that they can easily be used in other applications.