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ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)

Practical Post-Quantum Signatures for Privacy

Sven Argo, Tim E. Güneysu, Corentin Jeudy, Georg Land, Adeline Roux-Langlois, Olivier Sanders

Published Dec 2, 2024• 22 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The transition to post-quantum cryptography has been an enormous challenge and effort for cryptographers over the last decade, with impressive results such as the future NIST standards. However, the latter has so far only considered central cryptographic mechanisms (signatures or KEM) and not more advanced ones, e.g., targeting privacy-preserving applications. Of particular interest is the family of solutions called blind signatures, group signatures and anonymous credentials, for which standards already exist, and which are deployed in billions of devices. Such a family does not have, at this stage, an efficient post-quantum counterpart although very recent works improved this state of affairs by offering two different alternatives: either one gets a system with rather large elements but a security proved under standard assumptions or one gets a more efficient system at the cost of ad-hoc interactive assumptions or weaker security models. Moreover, all these works have only considered size complexity without implementing the quite complex building blocks their systems are composed of. In other words, the practicality of such systems is still very hard to assess, which is a problem if one envisions a post-quantum transition for the corresponding systems/standards.

DOI
10.1145/3658644.3670297

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The security of most widely used public-key cryptography is fundamentally based on two computationally intractable problems: the integer factorization problem and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem. However, these problems can be solved easily in polynomial time with the help of large-scale quantum computers using Shor's, Proos and Zalka's algorithm. Post-quantum cryptography provides schemes based on hard problems that are hard-to-solve not only by adversaries with classical computers but also by adversaries with large-scale quantum computers. Lattice-based cryptography is a branch of post-quantum cryptography consisting of schemes based on hard lattice problems. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently published the first set of standard post-quantum schemes. Kyber and HQC are the standard key-encapsulation mechanism/public-key encryption schemes, whereas Dilithium, Sphincs+, and Falcon are the standard digital signature algorithms. Although NIST's selection of the first set of post-quantum cryptographic standards is one of the most significant steps toward the transition from classical public-key cryptography to post-quantum cryptography, the field of post-quantum cryptography is still in a nascent stage compared to the decade-old classical public-key cryptography, such as RSA or ECDSA. Therefore, a major focus of this thesis is to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of post-quantum cryptography by exploring various problems that arise during the real-world deployment of post-quantum cryptography. Specifically, I focus on improving the practicality of lattice-based cryptography by proposing new efficient schemes, designing lightweight post-quantum schemes suitable for resource-constrained devices, efficient implementations, analyzing practical physical attacks on implementations of the post-quantum schemes, and designing their countermeasures to thwart the attacks. The first area of research of this dissertation is the exploration of various design choices for lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms to make them suitable in different environments under various operational constraints such as memory, silicon area, execution time, power requirement, etc. In our first contribution, we have explored various design choices for lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms, focusing on improving execution time on various hardware and software platforms. Our first design, Scabbard, is a suite of three key-encapsulation mechanisms that improved the state-of-the-art post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism designs by reducing execution time, stack memory requirements, and/or area footprint. In our second contribution, we performed another design space exploration based on hardware resources (such as block RAM, distributed RAM, look-up tables, etc.) estimation and proposed the lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism, Rudraksh, for resource-constrained devices. We also substantiate our claim of its usefulness with real-world implementations on an FPGA. The second area of research of this dissertation is the analysis of physical attacks. This attack analysis is essential when the attacker can access a device that executes cryptographic implementations, and such scenarios occur frequently in real-world deployments. Therefore, this is a crucial problem to address before deploying post-quantum cryptographic schemes in real-world applications, and countermeasures against physical attacks need to be developed as a prevention measure. In our third contribution, we proposed side-channel attack-resistant masked implementations of lattice-based KEM, Saber KEM, one of the NIST finalist KEMs. We showed that masked Saber outperforms the state-of-the-art masked implementations of Kyber, one of the NIST standards. Our investigations show that this is largely due to power-of-two moduli. Our final contribution to this thesis is physical attack analyses on implementations of the standard key-encapsulation mechanism Kyber. We proposed a cross-attack, fault-injection attack on the masked implementation of Kyber. We showed that the exploited vulnerability was introduced due to the algorithmic change caused by masking.

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The transition to post-quantum cryptography has been an enormous challenge and effort for cryptographers over the last decade, with impressive results such as the future NIST standards. However, the latter has so far only considered central cryptographic mechanisms (signatures or KEM) and not more advanced ones, e.g., targeting privacy-preserving applications. Of particular interest is the family of solutions called blind signatures, group signatures and anonymous credentials, for which standards already exist, and which are deployed in billions of devices. Such a family does not have, at this stage, an efficient post-quantum counterpart although very recent works improved this state of affairs by offering two different alternatives: either one gets a system with rather large elements but a security proved under standard assumptions or one gets a more efficient system at the cost of ad-hoc interactive assumptions or weaker security models. Moreover, all these works have only considered size complexity without implementing the quite complex building blocks their systems are composed of. In other words, the practicality of such systems is still very hard to assess, which is a problem if one envisions a post-quantum transition for the corresponding systems/standards.
Blind signatures are fundamental cryptographic primitives enabling privacy-preserving authentication and have seen renewed interest in the post-quantum literature. Existing efficient constructions predominantly rely on Fischlin’s generic paradigm instantiated over lattice assumptions, while blinding techniques for Σ-protocol-based blind signatures remain sparse beyond lattices. Moreover, achieving provable concurrent security under polynomially many sessions has been a longstanding open challenge for this approach in the post-quantum literature as evidenced by the recent attacks in EC’24 and PKC’24. This work broadens the landscape of post-quantum blind signatures by introducing novel techniques and proposing four frameworks based on general cryptographic group actions, without requiring commutativity. Our constructions admit instantiations under diverse post-quantum assumptions, including CSIDH (isogeny-based), LESS (code-based, NIST round-two), and more. These frameworks offer flexible trade-offs in assumptions (from interactive one-more to the standard inversion problem) and key/signature sizes, and culminate in a construction that achieves security under polynomially many concurrent sessions. This enables the first efficient blind signatures from isogenies and codes with provable concurrent security with 4.5 and 64.7 KB respectively. We also outline several directions for optimization and further instantiations for future work.
Blind signatures are a central tool for privacy-preserving protocols. They allow users to obtain signatures from a signer without the signer seeing the signed message. For instance, it enables electronic cash: signatures correspond to coins which can be issued by the bank in a privacy-preserving manner via blind signing. To mitigate the risk of key compromise, threshold blind signatures allow the distribution of the signing key amongst N parties. While recent works have focused on improving the security of this primitive in the classical setting, no construction is known to date in the post-quantum setting. We present the first construction of a threshold blind signature secure in the post-quantum setting, based on lattices. We prove its security under an interactive variant of the SIS assumption introduced in [Agrawal et al., CCS’22]. Our construction has a reasonable overhead of a factor of roughly 1.4 X to 2.5 X in signature size over comparable non-threshold blind signatures over lattices under heuristic but natural assumptions.
Public key cryptography plays a pivotal role in maintaining digital security and privacy, with its foundations built on the hardness of certain mathematical problems. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens the security of current cryptographic systems, making the adoption of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) an urgent necessity. Digital signature schemes are essential components in secure communications, providing authentication, non-repudiation, and data integrity. This paper examines the state of post-quantum digital signature schemes across various cryptographic approaches, including lattice-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial-based, hash-based, symmetric-key-based, and isogeny-based systems, alongside advancements in Multi-Party Computation in the Head (MPC-in-the-head) schemes. The paper then explores application-specific signatures such as blind, undeniable, threshold, chameleon, aggregate, and ring signatures, explaining their main use cases and the existing post-quantum cryptographic classifications that support these constructions individually. Software implementations of selected prominent PQC digital signature schemes were carried out, and their performance was systematically analysed using metrics such as bandwidth consumption, latency, and computational efficiency. These results provide key observations regarding the suitability of different schemes for both resource-constrained and high-performance environments. Subsequently, a detailed literature review of implementations on embedded and hardware platforms is presented, focusing on ARM-based devices and FPGA accelerators to evaluate deployment feasibility beyond general-purpose processors. Based on the software and implementation-level findings, a comparative analysis across software, embedded, and hardware platforms is conducted to highlight architectural influences on performance, scalability, and practicality. Furthermore the cryptanalytic attacks on post-quantum digital signature schemes across various PQC classifications are examined in this paper, taking into account both classical and quantum adversarial models. To evaluate realistic security constraints, implementation-oriented vulnerabilities such as side-channel and fault-based attacks are also examined. In addition, the applicability of post-quantum digital signature schemes within TLS, IoT, and related practical deployment scenarios is analysed. The study also discusses possible directions for further investigation, focusing on the requirement for effective and expandable PQC systems that can satisfy changing cybersecurity requirements. In order to protect sensitive data in the digital era, this study emphasizes the need for implementing quantum-secure systems by fusing theoretical understandings with real-world applications.
Information security is a fundamental and urgent issue in the digital transformation era. Cryptographic techniques and digital signatures have been applied to protect and authenticate relevant information. However, with the advent of quantum computers and quantum algorithms, classical cryptographic techniques have been in danger of collapsing because quantum computers can solve complex problems in polynomial time. Stemming from that risk, researchers worldwide have stepped up research on post-quantum algorithms to resist attack by quantum computers. In this review paper, we survey studies in recent years on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and provide statistics on the number and content of publications, including a literature overview, detailed explanations of the most common methods so far, current implementation status, implementation comparisons, and discussion on future work. These studies focused on essential public cryptography techniques and digital signature schemes, and the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched a competition to select the best candidate for the expected standard. Recent studies have practically implemented the public key encryption/key encapsulation mechanism (PKE/KEM) and digital signature schemes on different hardware platforms and applied various optimization measures based on other criteria. Along with the increasing number of scientific publications, the recent trend of PQC research is increasingly evident and is the general trend in the cryptography industry. The movement opens up a promising avenue for researchers in public key cryptography and digital signatures, especially on algorithms selected by NIST.
The production of quantum computers with fast processing power and practical use will adversely affect the foundations of secure communication, especially for public-key cryptosystems (PKCs). Potential problems and solution scenarios are created early to design quantum-resistant PKCs. In this paper, the emergence of the concept of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and early precautionary actions are explained. In addition, cryptosystem families that are known/believed to be secure in the presence of quantum computers are discussed. Based on these classes, the selected encryption/key encapsulation (KEM) and signature schemes of the NIST PQC process are expressed. Finally, some open problems for the post-quantum era are summarized.
The security of most widely used public-key cryptography is fundamentally based on two computationally intractable problems: the integer factorization problem and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem. However, these problems can be solved easily in polynomial time with the help of large-scale quantum computers using Shor's, Proos and Zalka's algorithm. Post-quantum cryptography provides schemes based on hard problems that are hard-to-solve not only by adversaries with classical computers but also by adversaries with large-scale quantum computers. Lattice-based cryptography is a branch of post-quantum cryptography consisting of schemes based on hard lattice problems. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently published the first set of standard post-quantum schemes. Kyber and HQC are the standard key-encapsulation mechanism/public-key encryption schemes, whereas Dilithium, Sphincs+, and Falcon are the standard digital signature algorithms. Although NIST's selection of the first set of post-quantum cryptographic standards is one of the most significant steps toward the transition from classical public-key cryptography to post-quantum cryptography, the field of post-quantum cryptography is still in a nascent stage compared to the decade-old classical public-key cryptography, such as RSA or ECDSA. Therefore, a major focus of this thesis is to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of post-quantum cryptography by exploring various problems that arise during the real-world deployment of post-quantum cryptography. Specifically, I focus on improving the practicality of lattice-based cryptography by proposing new efficient schemes, designing lightweight post-quantum schemes suitable for resource-constrained devices, efficient implementations, analyzing practical physical attacks on implementations of the post-quantum schemes, and designing their countermeasures to thwart the attacks. The first area of research of this dissertation is the exploration of various design choices for lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms to make them suitable in different environments under various operational constraints such as memory, silicon area, execution time, power requirement, etc. In our first contribution, we have explored various design choices for lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms, focusing on improving execution time on various hardware and software platforms. Our first design, Scabbard, is a suite of three key-encapsulation mechanisms that improved the state-of-the-art post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism designs by reducing execution time, stack memory requirements, and/or area footprint. In our second contribution, we performed another design space exploration based on hardware resources (such as block RAM, distributed RAM, look-up tables, etc.) estimation and proposed the lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism, Rudraksh, for resource-constrained devices. We also substantiate our claim of its usefulness with real-world implementations on an FPGA. The second area of research of this dissertation is the analysis of physical attacks. This attack analysis is essential when the attacker can access a device that executes cryptographic implementations, and such scenarios occur frequently in real-world deployments. Therefore, this is a crucial problem to address before deploying post-quantum cryptographic schemes in real-world applications, and countermeasures against physical attacks need to be developed as a prevention measure. In our third contribution, we proposed side-channel attack-resistant masked implementations of lattice-based KEM, Saber KEM, one of the NIST finalist KEMs. We showed that masked Saber outperforms the state-of-the-art masked implementations of Kyber, one of the NIST standards. Our investigations show that this is largely due to power-of-two moduli. Our final contribution to this thesis is physical attack analyses on implementations of the standard key-encapsulation mechanism Kyber. We proposed a cross-attack, fault-injection attack on the masked implementation of Kyber. We showed that the exploited vulnerability was introduced due to the algorithmic change caused by masking.