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ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)

Secure Multiparty Computation with Lazy Sharing

Shuaishuai Li, Cong Zhang, Dongdai Lin

Published Dec 2, 2024• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols enable n parties, each with private inputs, to compute a given function without leaking information beyond the outputs. One of the main approaches to designing efficient MPC protocols is to use secret sharing. In general, secret sharing based MPC contains three phases: input sharing, circuit evaluation, and output recovery. If the adversary corrupts at most t parties, the protocol typically uses (t,n) threshold secret sharing to share the inputs. In this work, we consider a weaker variant of threshold secret sharing called lazy threshold secret sharing (or simply lazy sharing) and show that: Lazy sharing can serve as a viable alternative to threshold secret sharing in MPC without compromising security. Lazy sharing could be generated more efficiently than threshold secret sharing.

DOI
10.1145/3658644.3690207

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Secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols enable n parties, each with private inputs, to compute a given function without leaking information beyond the outputs. One of the main approaches to designing efficient MPC protocols is to use secret sharing. In general, secret sharing based MPC contains three phases: input sharing, circuit evaluation, and output recovery. If the adversary corrupts at most t parties, the protocol typically uses (t,n) threshold secret sharing to share the inputs. In this work, we consider a weaker variant of threshold secret sharing called lazy threshold secret sharing (or simply lazy sharing) and show that: Lazy sharing can serve as a viable alternative to threshold secret sharing in MPC without compromising security. Lazy sharing could be generated more efficiently than threshold secret sharing.
Multiparty Computation (hereafter MPC) is a technique for allowing a set ofparticipants to run a secure computation with the assurance that the output is (1) correct, and (2) that a malicious party did not learn anything about the inputs of the honest parties besides what it can glean from the output. Impor- tantly much of cryptography is based on the assumption that an honest party has a private and secret input, and if the adversary learns this input the security of the scheme is broken. Then naturally the techniques of MPC can be applied to create threshold protocols for these cryptographic schemes to ensure that the secret inputs are not leaked and moreover that no group of parties smaller than the threshold know the input at all. While we have known how to generically evaluate MPC for any function since the 80s the question of efficiency still drives progress to this day. This thesis looks at two approaches for making secure com- putation more practical to deploy: developing specialized protocols for appli- cations such as distributed key generation and signing with RSA and ECDSA; and improving the state of the art of maliciously secure generic boolean-circuit MPC. We first look at work that produced a distributed key generation protocol for RSA that utilizes a novel candidate sampling mechanism to reduce waste in primality testing. The second work builds a threshold scheme for symmetric cryptographic primitives such as AES and SHA where there is limited algebraic structure to exploit by efficiently converting a generic n-of-n MPC protocol into a threshold t-of-n MPC protocol. Future directions in this thesis are in combin- ing techniques from the prior works to create a blind signature scheme for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) that requires both alge- braic operations over elliptic curves and additionally symmetric evaluations of the SHA2 hash function.--Author's abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic primitive that lets a num- ber N of mutually distrustful parties compute a function f (x1, . . . , xN ) on their private inputs xi such that at the end of the MPC protocol, each honest party obtains the func- tion’s correct output and no adversary controlling a certain subset of parties learns any- thing about the honest parties’ inputs beyond what can be inferred from the function’s output value. In 2002, [Smi01] and [CGS02] introduced the notion of multi-party quan- tum computation (MPQC) in which arbitrary quantum circuits can be evaluated in a distributed manner, secure against a quantum adversary. Few protocols for MPQC are known. We present a fundamental study of the building blocks of MPC and MPQC in the information-theoretic setting with a focus on protocols built on top of (quantum) se- cret sharing schemes. In particular, we point out structural similarities and differences and compile an extensive list of theoretical feasibility results for the maximum number of corrupted parties within classical and quantum secret sharing and MPC protocols.
We construct a multiparty computation (MPC) protocol that is secure even if a malicious adversary, in addition to corrupting 1-ε fraction of all parties for an arbitrarily small constant ε >0, can leak information about the secret state of each honest party. This leakage can be continuous for an unbounded number of executions of the MPC protocol, computing different functions on the same or different set of inputs. We assume a (necessary) "leak-free" preprocessing stage. We emphasize that we achieve leakage resilience without weakening the security guarantee of classical MPC. Namely, an adversary who is given leakage on honest parties' states, is guaranteed to learn nothing beyond the input and output values of corrupted parties. This is in contrast with previous works on leakage in the multi-party protocol setting, which weaken the security notion, and only guarantee that a protocol which leaks l bits about the parties' secret states, yields at most l bits of leakage on the parties' private inputs. For some functions, such as voting, such leakage can be detrimental.
In a data-driven society, individuals and companies encounter numerous situations where private information is an important resource. How can parties handle confidential data if they do not trust everyone involved? This text is the first to present a comprehensive treatment of unconditionally secure techniques for multiparty computation (MPC) and secret sharing. In a secure MPC, each party possesses some private data, while secret sharing provides a way for one party to spread information on a secret such that all parties together hold full information, yet no single party has all the information. The authors present basic feasibility results from the last 30 years, generalizations to arbitrary access structures using linear secret sharing, some recent techniques for efficiency improvements, and a general treatment of the theory of secret sharing, focusing on asymptotic results with interesting applications related to MPC.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for a set of players to interactively compute a function without revealing their private inputs.MPC is of theoretical and practical importance due to its many interesting applications including voting, sealed-bid auctions and privacy-preserving machine learning.It has been an active research area in cryptography and many different approaches have been proposed to enhance security, functionality and efficiency in the literature.In particular, there are general constructions proving the existence of MPC for arbitrary functions under a set of desirable security notions.However, these general results do not give a satisfactory solution to constructing concrete protocols that are efficient enough to use in practice.It is therefore more effective to give concrete and efficient constructions of MPC protocols tailored to specific functionalities and security notions required in practical applications.In this thesis, we study different approaches to realize efficient MPC for functionalities of practical importance with enhanced security notions including non-threshold adversary structures and malicious security.We attain improvement in communication and round complexity by focusing on specific classes of functions or limited but still non-threshold adversary structures.The main contributions of this thesis consist of five parts, which concern the following specific MPC tasks: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) for symmetric functions and linear classifiers, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for low-degree polynomials, verifiably multiplicative secret sharing (VMSS), private information retrieval (PIR), and distributed noise generation for differential privacy.Concretely, we first propose efficient constructions of NIMPC protocols tailored to symmetric functions and linear classifiers.Our protocols improve the best-known communication complexity of existing protocols.In addition, we reveal that a previously proposed method to enhance security of NIMPC does not satisfy specified security requirements and we also fix the problem.Secondly, we propose constructions of HSS schemes that tolerate multipartite and general adversary structures assuming homomorphic encryption.Our schemes support parallel evaluation of a single low-degree polynomial and hence achieve better communication complexity than if we simply execute the previous HSS schemes in parallel.Thirdly, we present VMSS schemes tolerating multipartite adversary structures.Our schemes have smaller communication complexity than those obtained from the previous constructions applicable to general adversary structures.In the fourth part, we study the optimal communication complexity of error-correcting PIR.We asymptotically characterize it as a function of the database size and as a corollary, obtain more communication-efficient error-correcting PIR schemes than the previous ones.Finally, we provide three kinds of MPC protocols for generating noise drawn from probability distributions providing differential privacy.We improve the round or communication complexity of the previous protocols for distributed noise generation.We also extend our protocols so that they provide differential privacy against malicious adversaries.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is perhaps the most popular paradigm in the area of cryptographic protocols. It allows several mutually untrustworthy parties to jointly compute a function of their private inputs, without revealing to each other information about those inputs. In the case of unconditional (information-theoretic) security, protocols are known which tolerate a dishonest minority of players, who may coordinate their attack and deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification. It is typically assumed in these results that parties are connected pairwise by authenticated, private channels, and that in addition they have access to a “broadcast ” channel. Broadcast allows one party to send a consistent message to all other parties, guaranteeing consistency even if the broadcaster is corrupted. Because broadcast cannot be simulated on the point-to-point network when more than a third of the parties are corrupt, it is impossible to construct general MPC protocols in this setting without using a broadcast channel (or some equivalent addition to the model). A great deal of research has focused on increasing the efficiency of MPC, primarily in terms of round complexity and communication complexity. In this work we propose a refinement of the round complexity which we term broadcast complexity. We view the broadcast channel as an expensive resource