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ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)

GRandLine: Adaptively Secure DKG and Randomness Beacon with (Log-)Quadratic Communication Complexity

Renas Bacho, Christoph Lenzen, Julian Loss, Simon Ochsenreither, Dimitrios Papachristoudis

Published Dec 2, 2024• 12 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A randomness beacon is a source of continuous and publicly verifiable randomness which is of crucial importance for many applications. Existing works on randomness beacons suffer from at least one of the following drawbacks: (i) security only against static (i.e., non-adaptive) adversaries, (ii) each epoch takes many rounds of communication, or (iii) computationally expensive tools such as proof-of-work (PoW) or verifiable delay functions (VDF). In this work, we introduce GRandLine, the first adaptively secure randomness beacon protocol that overcomes all these limitations while preserving simplicity and optimal resilience in the synchronous network setting. We achieve our result in two steps. First, we design a novel distributed key generation (DKG) protocol GRand that runs in O(λ n2 log n ) bits of communication but, unlike most conventional DKG protocols, outputs both secret and public keys as group elements. Here, λ denotes the security parameter. Second, following termination of GRand, parties can use their keys to derive a sequence of randomness beacon values, where each random value costs only a single asynchronous round and O(λ n2) bits of communication. We implement GRandLine and evaluate it using a network of up to 64 parties running in geographically distributed AWS instances. Our evaluation shows that GRandLine can produce about 2 beacon outputs per second in a network of 64 parties. We compare our protocol to the state-of-the-art randomness beacon protocols OptRand (NDSS '23), BRandPiper (CCS '21), and Drand, in the same setting and observe that it vastly outperforms them.

DOI
10.1145/3658644.3690287

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A randomness beacon is a source of continuous and publicly verifiable randomness which is of crucial importance for many applications. Existing works on randomness beacons suffer from at least one of the following drawbacks: (i) security only against static (i.e., non-adaptive) adversaries, (ii) each epoch takes many rounds of communication, or (iii) computationally expensive tools such as proof-of-work (PoW) or verifiable delay functions (VDF). In this work, we introduce GRandLine, the first adaptively secure randomness beacon protocol that overcomes all these limitations while preserving simplicity and optimal resilience in the synchronous network setting. We achieve our result in two steps. First, we design a novel distributed key generation (DKG) protocol GRand that runs in O(λ n2 log n ) bits of communication but, unlike most conventional DKG protocols, outputs both secret and public keys as group elements. Here, λ denotes the security parameter. Second, following termination of GRand, parties can use their keys to derive a sequence of randomness beacon values, where each random value costs only a single asynchronous round and O(λ n2) bits of communication. We implement GRandLine and evaluate it using a network of up to 64 parties running in geographically distributed AWS instances. Our evaluation shows that GRandLine can produce about 2 beacon outputs per second in a network of 64 parties. We compare our protocol to the state-of-the-art randomness beacon protocols OptRand (NDSS '23), BRandPiper (CCS '21), and Drand, in the same setting and observe that it vastly outperforms them.
Having shared access to high-quality random numbers is essential in many important applications. Yet, existing constructions of distributed random beacons still have limitations such as imperfect security guarantees, strong setup or network assumptions, or high costs. In this paper, we present Spurt, an efficient distributed randomness beacon protocol that does not require any trusted or expensive setup and is secure against a malicious adversary that controls up to one-third of the nodes in a partially synchronous network. We formally prove that each output of Spurt is unpredictable, bias-resistant, and publicly verifiable. Spurt has an amortized total communication cost of O(λn2)O(\lambda n^{2})O(λn2) per beacon output where λ\lambdaλ is the security parameter. While designing Spurt, we also design a publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme whose security is based on the standard Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and does not require a Random Oracle. We implement Spurt and evaluate it using a network of up to 128 nodes running in geographically distributed AWS instances. Our evaluation shows that Spurt can produce about 84 beacon outputs per minute in a network of 32 nodes and is comparable to systems with stronger assumptions or weaker security.
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Distributed randomness beacons enable mutually distrustful parties to jointly generate public randomness. Several existing beacons built from secret sharing use costly pairings or group operations to verify shares. Their underlying discrete-logarithm assumptions are also vulnerable to quantum attacks. Moreover, running a separate Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus instance for each output incurs repeated computation and communication costs, even when secrets are shared in batches. We present Silk, a computation-efficient, post-quantum-friendly and deterministic randomness beacon under partial synchrony. Silk's sharing protocol, Mulberry, realizes batched asynchronous verifiable secret sharing with partial output (bAVSS-PO), using hash-based share verification to reduce computation cost. Silk further amortizes BFT consensus across a batch of outputs, requiring only one BFT instance per batch. We establish Mulberry's bAVSS-PO properties and Silk's beacon properties under static corruption and the stated security assumptions. We implement Silk and Mulberry in Rust and evaluate their computation and communication costs. In WAN experiments with 121 replicas across eight AWS regions, Silk achieves a throughput of 5.414 outputs/s, 1.53× that of Rondo [NDSS'25] and 4.18× that of Spurt [IEEE S&P'22].
Distributed key generation (DKG) has been studied extensively in the cryptographic literature. However, it has never been examined outside of the synchronous setting, and the known DKG protocols cannot guarantee safety or liveness over the Internet. In this work, we present the first realistic DKG protocol for use over the Internet. We propose a practical system model for the Internet and define an efficient verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme in it. We observe the necessity of Byzantine agreement for asynchronous DKG and analyze the difficulty of using a randomized protocol for it. Using our VSS scheme and a leader-based agreement protocol, we then design a provably secure DKG protocol. We also consider and achieve cryptographic properties such as uniform randomness of the shared secret and compare static versus adaptive adversary models. Finally, we implement our DKG protocol, and establish its efficiency and reliability by extensively testing it on the PlanetLab platform. Counter to a general non-scalability perception about asynchronous systems, our experiments demonstrate that our asynchronous DKG protocol scales well with the system size and it is suitable for realizing multiparty computation and threshold cryptography over the Internet.
Distributed Key Generation (DKG) is a technique to bootstrap threshold cryptosystems without a trusted third party and is a building block to decentralized protocols such as randomness beacons, threshold signatures, and general multiparty computation. Until recently, DKG protocols have assumed the synchronous model and thus are vulnerable when their underlying network assumptions do not hold. The recent advancements in asynchronous DKG protocols are insufficient as they either have poor efficiency or limited functionality, resulting in a lack of concrete implementations. In this paper, we present a simple and concretely efficient asynchronous DKG (ADKG) protocol. In a network of n nodes, our ADKG protocol can tolerate up to t<n/3t\lt n/3t<n/3 malicious nodes and have an expected O(κn3)O(\kappa n^{3})O(κn3) communication cost, where κ\kappaκ is the security parameter. Our ADKG protocol produces a field element as the secret and is thus compatible with off-the-shelf threshold cryptosystems. We implement our ADKG protocol and evaluate it using a network of up to 128 nodes in geographically distributed AWS instances. Our evaluation shows that our protocol takes as low as 3 and 9.5 seconds to terminate for 32 and 64 nodes, respectively. Also, each node sends only 0.7 Megabytes and 2.9 Megabytes of data during the two experiments, respectively.
Quantum random number (QRNG) beacons distinguish themselves from classical counterparts by providing intrinsic unpredictability originating from the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. Most demonstrations have focused on certifiable randomness generators to guarantee the public that their genuineness is independent from imperfect implementations. These efforts however do not benefit applications where multiple distrusted users need a common set of random numbers, as they must rely on the honesty of beacon owners. In this paper, we formally introduce a design and proof-of-principle experiment of the first consensus protocol producing QRNs in a decentralized environment (dQRNG). Such protocol allows N number of participants contribute in the generation process and publicly verify numbers they collect. Security of the protocol is guaranteed given(N-1) dishonest participants. Our method is thus suited for distribute systems that requires a bias-resistant, highly secure, and public-verifiable random beacon.