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Lecture notes in computer science

Mind the Bad Norms: Revisiting Compressed Oracle-Based Quantum Indistinguishability Proofs

Ritam Bhaumik, Benoît Cogliati, Jordan Ethan, Ashwin Jha

Published Dec 7, 2024• 7 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-981-96-0947-5_8

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Cryptographic security proofs often involve an adversary interacting with a larger, keyed oracle that consists of (potentially exponentially) many independent instances of a smaller, base oracle. However, showing quantum indistinguishability between two such keyed oracles can be tricky, since a single query made by an adversary may involve a superposition that covers all instances of the base oracles simultaneously. In this paper, we establish a generic indistinguishability lifting theorem of the following form: if the two base oracles are indistinguishable under quantum queries, then their corresponding keyed oracles are too, up to an O(q^2) multiplicative loss in distinguishing advantage, where q is the number of queries made by the adversary. Our lifting theorem applies to both statistical and computational settings, and to oracles that are stateful as well. It is also optimal in that it matches the obvious Grover search attack for a certain (contrived) choice of oracles. As an immediate application, we extend Carolan's compressed permutation oracle to an efficiently implementable compressed ideal cipher, and use it to prove preimage resistance of the Davies-Meyer compression function in the quantum ideal cipher model. Thanks to our lifting theorem, the soundness of our compressed ideal cipher reduces to that of Carolan's oracle, and any further improvement on the latter would automatically carry over to the former. As our second application, we give a modular construction that doubles the message length of any quantum-secure strong pseudorandom permutation. Along the way, we show that an existing two-round tweakable Feistel construction is indistinguishable from a random permutation under quantum bidirectional queries. This is done via a dedicated polynomial-method argument, which may be of independent interest.

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Cryptographic security proofs often involve an adversary interacting with a larger, keyed oracle that consists of (potentially exponentially) many independent instances of a smaller, base oracle. However, showing quantum indistinguishability between two such keyed oracles can be tricky, since a single query made by an adversary may involve a superposition that covers all instances of the base oracles simultaneously. In this paper, we establish a generic indistinguishability lifting theorem of the following form: if the two base oracles are indistinguishable under quantum queries, then their corresponding keyed oracles are too, up to an O(q^2) multiplicative loss in distinguishing advantage, where q is the number of queries made by the adversary. Our lifting theorem applies to both statistical and computational settings, and to oracles that are stateful as well. It is also optimal in that it matches the obvious Grover search attack for a certain (contrived) choice of oracles. As an immediate application, we extend Carolan's compressed permutation oracle to an efficiently implementable compressed ideal cipher, and use it to prove preimage resistance of the Davies-Meyer compression function in the quantum ideal cipher model. Thanks to our lifting theorem, the soundness of our compressed ideal cipher reduces to that of Carolan's oracle, and any further improvement on the latter would automatically carry over to the former. As our second application, we give a modular construction that doubles the message length of any quantum-secure strong pseudorandom permutation. Along the way, we show that an existing two-round tweakable Feistel construction is indistinguishable from a random permutation under quantum bidirectional queries. This is done via a dedicated polynomial-method argument, which may be of independent interest.
Given a quantum adversary that queries a random oracle, how do we characterize the information that they "know"? The Compressed Oracle method of Zhandry (CRYPTO 2019) is one method that records the queries that the adversary makes; this recording serves as a representation of the information that is learned. However, a significant limitation of the Compressed Oracle method is that it may continue to store information that the adversary has "forgotten." This issue is especially pertinent in the space-bounded setting, where the adversary may uncompute information to free up space, while the information may still reside in the compressed oracle. In this work, we present a simple and interpretable framework called "Compressed Oracle Duality," which extends the Compressed Oracle method for space-bounded algorithms. By applying an isometry to the memory of a quantum adversary, we obtain a pair of compressed oracles with identical marginal distributions and classical correlations which correspond to the knowledge the adversary retains. In fact, we show that the outcome of measuring the new compressed oracle database corresponds exactly to applying the pretty-good measurement on the adversary's memory. As an application of our framework for collision search, we give a simplified proof of the recent T2S=Ω(Nlog⁡N)T^2S = Ω(N\log N)T2S=Ω(NlogN) quantum time-space tradeoff for label-symmetric algorithms due to Magniez-Zur (arXiv:2609.10808); we also prove a stronger classical tradeoff of TS=Ω(Nlog⁡N)TS=Ω(N\log N)TS=Ω(NlogN) assuming label symmetry. The proofs under our framework do not require representation theory and instead bound the mutual information between the compressed oracle pairs. This highlights both how the label symmetry assumption bypasses known proof barriers as well as the challenges that remain in achieving unconditional quantum time-space tradeoffs.
The compressed permutation oracle has been used to analyze the quantum security of a number of cryptographic constructions which resisted prior techniques. However, these analyses were fundamentally limited by the poor soundness of the method: the technique was proven sound only up to O(N1/12)O(N^{1/12})O(N1/12) queries to permutations on NNN elements. We revisit this analysis, improving the soundness bound to a tight Ω(N1/2)Ω(N^{1/2})Ω(N1/2). In addition to being tighter, our proof is conceptually simpler and more direct, and gives the same bound in the ideal cipher model. The main technical idea is to construct the compression isometry from a simple POVM on the naive purification, a technique which may find wider applications. As immediate applications, our results yield tight, concrete collision and pre-image lower bounds for the sponge hash construction underlying SHA3 and the Davies--Meyer compression function used in SHA1 and SHA2. More broadly, the improved soundness theorem provides a general-purpose tool for analyzing quantum security in settings where random permutations or ideal ciphers serve as the underlying primitive.