Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Physics Conference Series

Who am I in the Multiverse? Everettian quantum mechanics and the mental

Richard Dawid

Published Oct 1, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Physics and mentality are most often understood to be paradigmatically separate fields of inquiry. The foundational debate has a long history of attempts, however, to introduce aspects of mentality into physical analysis. In the context of Everettian quantum mechanics considerations of this kind play out in a different way than in collapse theories. This paper reviews some of those thoughts.

DOI
10.1088/1742-6596/2877/1/012076

Related papers

The Case for the Everettian Multiverse

David Wallace

I give a non-technical presentation of the argument that quantum mechanics, in the form in which it is currently used, needs to be understood in many-worlds (Everettian) terms; the alternatives that have been discussed are at present not able to reproduce the full empirical content of the theory. This is a draft of a chapter for the forthcoming Blackwell Companion to Philosophy and the Multiverse (Klaas Kraay and Daniel Rubio, eds.).

•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations

The Case for the Everett Multiverse

David Wallace

I give a non-technical presentation of the argument that quantum mechanics, in the form in which it is currently used, needs to be understood in many-worlds (Everettian) terms; the alternatives that have been discussed are at present not able to reproduce the full empirical content of the theory. This is a draft of a chapter for the forthcoming \emph{Blackwell Companion to Philosophy and the Multiverse (Klaas Kraay and Daniel Rubio, eds.) }

quant-pharXiv:2608.07706•Aug 11, 2026•0 citations

Metaphysical indeterminacy in Everettian quantum mechanics

David Glick, Baptiste Le Bihan

The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science•Jan 4, 2024•4 citations

Mental and Physical Objects in Quantum Mechanics:Any Lessons for Other Disciplines?

Marcello Cini

Abstract: The standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics has raised from its beginning animated discussions about the interpretation of the counterintuitive properties of mental objects (wave functions or Schrödinger waves) introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects.Two questions have since then been formulated to which a universally accepted answer is still lacking. The first one (Bohr, von Neumann) concerns the ontological nature of physical reality (the existence of classical objects) and the role of the observer (wave packet collapse) in assessing it. The second one is the non local character of quantum physical quantities (Einstein Podolski Rosen [EPR] long distance correlation of particles). An alternative formulation of Quantum Mechanics, originally proposed in 1932 by Eugene Wigner, taken up by Richard Feynman in 1987, and reelaborated by myself in the years from 1998 to 2003, is possible. The mental objects of standard Quantum Mechanics (Schrödinger waves) no longer appear in this new formulation and are replaced by new ones (Wigner functions) which do not show any more the puzzling properties which worried Einstein. My conclusion from the preceding discussion is that different explanations of a given set of experimental data may be derived according to the different nature of the mental objects introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects involved. The confusion between these two kind of objects may be, however, very misleading. I will finally discuss two examples of this conclusion from Biology

•Jan 1, 2007•1 citation

Consciousness in the light of quantum theory

Paavo Pylkkänen

This paper explores the theme “quantum approaches to consciousness” by considering the work of one of the pioneers in the field. The physicist David Bohm (1917-1992) not only made important contributions to quantum physics, but also had a long-term interest in interpreting the results of quantum physics and relativity in order to develop a general world view. His idea was further that living and mental processes could be understood in a new, scientifically and philosophically more coherent way in the context of such a new world view. This paper gives a brief overview of different – and sometimes contradictory - aspects of Bohm’s research programme, and evaluates how they can be used to give an account of topics of interest in contemporary consciousness studies, such as analogies between thought and quantum processes, the problem of mental causation, the mind-body problem and the problem of time consciousness.

•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations

A thinking on Quantum Physics and common sense

Carlo Artemi

The author attempts to answer the questions there are in the title of this paper. These questions are questions that scientists and philosophers have been asking themselves for many decades since Quantum Mechanics was formulated to explain the phenomena of the atomic and subatomic world. First of all a short but complete historical review of the transition between Classical Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics there is. It is preceded by some of the methodological premises that fit a certain vision of science. Then the author examines the issues and debates that have occurred on aspects of quantum mechanics such as realism, non-locality and probabilism (in contrast to determinism of Classic Mechanics). In doing this author llustrates the foundations of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics which, in an attempt to resolve these problems, have been given. The absurdities, and conflicts with the common sense, of quantum mechanics are shown to be largely apparent. In doing this, we examine the analogies of classical physics, as well as those of everyday life. Recent experimental results are taken into consideration. It is concluded that Quantum Mechanics presents elements of rupture more with Classical Physics than with the everyday experience.

Advanced Research Journal•Feb 22, 2025•0 citations
Abstract Physics and mentality are most often understood to be paradigmatically separate fields of inquiry. The foundational debate has a long history of attempts, however, to introduce aspects of mentality into physical analysis. In the context of Everettian quantum mechanics considerations of this kind play out in a different way than in collapse theories. This paper reviews some of those thoughts.
The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.
Abstract: The standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics has raised from its beginning animated discussions about the interpretation of the counterintuitive properties of mental objects (wave functions or Schrödinger waves) introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects.Two questions have since then been formulated to which a universally accepted answer is still lacking. The first one (Bohr, von Neumann) concerns the ontological nature of physical reality (the existence of classical objects) and the role of the observer (wave packet collapse) in assessing it. The second one is the non local character of quantum physical quantities (Einstein Podolski Rosen [EPR] long distance correlation of particles). An alternative formulation of Quantum Mechanics, originally proposed in 1932 by Eugene Wigner, taken up by Richard Feynman in 1987, and reelaborated by myself in the years from 1998 to 2003, is possible. The mental objects of standard Quantum Mechanics (Schrödinger waves) no longer appear in this new formulation and are replaced by new ones (Wigner functions) which do not show any more the puzzling properties which worried Einstein. My conclusion from the preceding discussion is that different explanations of a given set of experimental data may be derived according to the different nature of the mental objects introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects involved. The confusion between these two kind of objects may be, however, very misleading. I will finally discuss two examples of this conclusion from Biology
This paper explores the theme “quantum approaches to consciousness” by considering the work of one of the pioneers in the field. The physicist David Bohm (1917-1992) not only made important contributions to quantum physics, but also had a long-term interest in interpreting the results of quantum physics and relativity in order to develop a general world view. His idea was further that living and mental processes could be understood in a new, scientifically and philosophically more coherent way in the context of such a new world view. This paper gives a brief overview of different – and sometimes contradictory - aspects of Bohm’s research programme, and evaluates how they can be used to give an account of topics of interest in contemporary consciousness studies, such as analogies between thought and quantum processes, the problem of mental causation, the mind-body problem and the problem of time consciousness.
The author attempts to answer the questions there are in the title of this paper. These questions are questions that scientists and philosophers have been asking themselves for many decades since Quantum Mechanics was formulated to explain the phenomena of the atomic and subatomic world. First of all a short but complete historical review of the transition between Classical Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics there is. It is preceded by some of the methodological premises that fit a certain vision of science. Then the author examines the issues and debates that have occurred on aspects of quantum mechanics such as realism, non-locality and probabilism (in contrast to determinism of Classic Mechanics). In doing this author llustrates the foundations of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics which, in an attempt to resolve these problems, have been given. The absurdities, and conflicts with the common sense, of quantum mechanics are shown to be largely apparent. In doing this, we examine the analogies of classical physics, as well as those of everyday life. Recent experimental results are taken into consideration. It is concluded that Quantum Mechanics presents elements of rupture more with Classical Physics than with the everyday experience.