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Computational nanotechnology

Interrelation and Interpretation of effects in quantum mechanics and classical physics

R.KH. RAKHIMOV

Published Aug 15, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum mechanics based on the probabilistic approach provides a powerful tool for accurate prediction and interpretation of quantum phenomena, allowing statistically sound predictions about the behavior of microparticles and quantum systems. This statement emphasizes the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, its applicability to quantum phenomena and microparticles, as well as the statistical nature of its predictions when applied to the macro effects of classical physics. In addition, the role of statistics and probability in various fields of science, such as particle physics, thermodynamics, biology, sociology, psychology, economics and finance, is discussed. The philosophical implications of the probabilistic approach and the associated limitations and challenges are also considered.

DOI
10.33693/2313-223x-2024-11-3-98-124

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Quantum mechanics based on the probabilistic approach provides a powerful tool for accurate prediction and interpretation of quantum phenomena, allowing statistically sound predictions about the behavior of microparticles and quantum systems. This statement emphasizes the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, its applicability to quantum phenomena and microparticles, as well as the statistical nature of its predictions when applied to the macro effects of classical physics. In addition, the role of statistics and probability in various fields of science, such as particle physics, thermodynamics, biology, sociology, psychology, economics and finance, is discussed. The philosophical implications of the probabilistic approach and the associated limitations and challenges are also considered.
Characteristic features of the probabilistic models used in classical mechanics, statistical physics, and quantum theory are discussed. The viewpoint according to which there is no room for probabilities in Nature, as such, is consistently substantiated; the researcher is forced to introduce probabilistic concepts and the corresponding models in conditions that provide only partial predictability of the phenomena being studied. This approach allows one to achieve a consistent interpretation of some important physical phenomena, in particular, the relationship between instability and irreversibility in time, the stochastic evolution of systems in the theory of deterministic chaos, Boltzmann’s H -theorem, and paradoxes of quantum mechanics.
In this expository paper we discuss the role of probability in statistical physics: it should be that of a general tool guiding induction and must not be restricted only to the empirical interpretation coming from its evaluation by an observed frequency. It is true that in many cases the value of a probability can be sensibly expressed by a suitable frequency, but this does not entails that the latter can be taken as definition of probability. Moreover, in each situation in which one thinks that probabilities are physically real things and believes that something which is only “very probable” can be regarded as being “practically certain”, some “small” probabilities are actually ignored: this attitude of mind may render illegitimate also the probabilistic interpretation of the relevant physical laws. A “law” which is based on a probabilistic interpretation cannot aim at explaining why a fact that we forecast will occur, but rather at explaining why we forecast that this fact will occur. Finally, we emphasize the role of conditional probability, and we show that looking at it from the right perspective allows to avoids also classic paradoxical aspects of quantum mechanics, without the need to resort to the interpretation based on the dualism “particle-wave”.
In this chapter, we consider the way quantum theory represents deterministic, statistical, and probabilistic aspects of Nature. After a discussion in Section 3.1 of uncertainty in general, we discuss in Sections 3.2-3.4 several formal notions of classical probability, their relation to the probability concept used in applied statistics, and their dependence on the description used. Section 3.5 briefly discusses various examples, where probabilistic features emerge from fully deterministic situations-a theme to be taken up in much more detail in Chapter 11. Section 3.6 then shows how the statistical aspects of the quantum formalism naturally follow from the weak law of large numbers. The notions of c-probability in the classical case and of q-probability in the quantum case are formally defined in Section 3.7. Historically, the concept of classical probability (including its use in stochastic processes) was given an undisputed formal mathematical foundation in 1933 in terms of the measure-theoretic setting of Kolmogorov [164]. Apart from this traditional axiomatic foundation of classical probability theory, there is a less well-known equivalent axiomatic treatment by Whittle [302] in terms of expectations. Here probabilities appear as the expectations of statements, {0, 1}-valued random variables. von Plato [240] discusses the history of the concept of probability. Krüger et al. [169] discuss the history of probability in the various fields of application. Sklar [275] discusses the philosophical problems of the probability concept, with an emphasis on statistical mechanics.
I review the role of probability in contemporary physics and the origin of probabilistic time asymmetry, beginning with the pre-quantum case (both stochastic mechanics and classical statistical mechanics) but concentrating on quantum theory. I argue that quantum mechanics radically changes the pre-quantum situation and that the philosophical nature of objective probability in physics, and of probabilistic asymmetry in time, is dependent on the correct resolution of the quantum measurement problem.
This review is devoted to a discussion of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The heuristic role and limitations of the principle of observability and of operationalism are discussed. It is shown that the probabilistic approach to quantum mechanics is essential as a way of reconciling the conflicting concepts of particle and wave. The reason why the reduction of the wave packet is not a physical process, but a logical act is explained. The discussion of the paradoxes of quantum mechanics covers many well known examples and includes the Aharonov-Bohm effect and interference between two independent laser beams. It is suggested that the causality principle does not reduce to determinism, but has certain other manifestations too. This is illustrated by the fact that Newtonian mechanics was at one time considered as abstract and impenetrable, in contrast to the 'natural', but eventually fruitless mechanics of Descartes. It is shown that a classical foundation cannot be provided for quantum mechanics, i.e., it is impossible to introduce hidden variables into quantum mechanics. Mathematical manipulation is reduced to the essential minimum, and many examples are provided to illustrate the discussion. Outstanding contributors to physics are extensively quoted. The review is intended for readers with higher education in both the natural sciences and the humanities, who are interested in conceptual problems in modern science.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.