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Quantum Signature and Identity Authentication Scheme Based on Quantum Public Key

Yun‐Long Wu, jinqing Li, Xiaoqiang Di, Xusheng Li, Shi Qiu

Published Jan 1, 2024• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.4955694

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In order to ensure authenticity of the information for conference key negotiation, the information which each party sends should be authenticated. Digital signature and share secret are two methods for authentication. Identity-based public key cryptosystems from the Weil pairing on elliptic curve are introduced. Two authenticated conference key agreement protocols are designed using identitybased signature scheme and identity-based Diffie-Hellman shared key. The protocols are secure and efficient. They can be applied to all kinds of environment in which multi-parties negotiate session keys.
Certificateless public key cryptography was introduced to remove the use of certificate to ensure the authentication of the user's public key in the traditional certificate-based public key cryptography and overcome he key escrow problem in the identity-based public key cryptography. Concurrent signatures were introduced as an alternative approach to solving the problem of fair exchange of signatures. Combining the concept of certificateless cryptography with the concept of concurrent signature, in this paper, we present a notion of certificateless concurrent signature with a formal security model and propose a provably secure scheme assuming the hardness of computational Diffie-Hellman Problem.
Abstract Falcon is a compact and efficient post-quantum signature scheme based on the NTRU lattice, but it follows the conventional public-key setting and does not directly support identity-to-key binding or signer traceability. In this paper, we propose IBFS, a PKG-managed and authenticated identity-binding signature framework over Falcon. In IBFS, a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) derives Falcon-compatible NTRU signing keys for registered users and maintains an authenticated binding between user identities and public keys. Unlike pure identity-based signatures, verification uses the signer’s identity together with an authenticated public key validated against a PKG-managed repository. This framework targets managed deployments with a trusted registration backend, including IoT and edge systems. The device-side evaluation concerns signature verification on an Android smartphone in a server-assisted setting; it does not establish operation of the complete framework on tightly constrained IoT devices. The construction retains the efficiency advantages of Falcon-style signing, including compact short-vector signatures and FFT-accelerated arithmetic, and further introduces a deterministic, PKG-resolvable identity tag that enables resolution of verified signatures to registered identities. We establish correctness and identity-resolution consistency under authentic repository bindings, without claiming non-frameability against the PKG. On the security side, we make the trust boundaries of the managed setting explicit, including key escrow, insider compromise, malicious tracing, and repository integrity. We then give a security argument in the classical Random Oracle Model that reduces the unforgeability of the signing layer, with a concrete advantage bound, to the decisional NTRU and inhomogeneous NTRU short-preimage (NTRU-ISIS) assumptions, together with the PRF security of the key-derivation function. The analysis is restricted to classical adversaries and does not constitute a Quantum Random Oracle Model proof. We therefore position IBFS as a classical-ROM construction whose security relies on these NTRU-based assumptions and on the authenticity of the PKG-managed binding repository.