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Optics Express

Amplitude-boosting attack against practical discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution

Mingze Wu, Yiming Bian, Junhui Li, Song Yu, Yichen Zhang

Published Aug 26, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution offers significant practical deployment advantages due to its straightforward state preparation and high compatibility with coherent optical communication systems. However, security analysis and parameter estimation of discrete-modulated protocol are different with Gaussian-modulated protocols, which could cause different practical security problems. Herein, we investigate the amplitude-boosting attack against discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems and assess its impact on system performance. Our findings reveal that this attack could cause overestimation of secret key rate perceived by Alice and Bob, thereby opening a security loophole, and the vulnerability could be severer than Gaussian modulation. Additionally, we summarize defensive countermeasures, marking a crucial step towards enhancing the practical security of discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution.

DOI
10.1364/oe.532431

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Discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution offers significant practical deployment advantages due to its straightforward state preparation and high compatibility with coherent optical communication systems. However, security analysis and parameter estimation of discrete-modulated protocol are different with Gaussian-modulated protocols, which could cause different practical security problems. Herein, we investigate the amplitude-boosting attack against discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems and assess its impact on system performance. Our findings reveal that this attack could cause overestimation of secret key rate perceived by Alice and Bob, thereby opening a security loophole, and the vulnerability could be severer than Gaussian modulation. Additionally, we summarize defensive countermeasures, marking a crucial step towards enhancing the practical security of discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the optical attenuator can adjust the Gaussian-modulated coherent states and the local oscillator signal to an optimal value for guaranteeing the security of the system and optimizing the performance of the system. However, the performance of the optical attenuator may deteriorate due to the intentional and unintentional damage of the device. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with reduced optical attenuation. We find that the secret key rate of the system may be overestimated based on the investigation of parameter estimation under the effects of reduced optical attenuation. This opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack in a practical CVQKD system. To close this loophole, we add an optical fuse at Alice's output port and design a scheme to monitor the level of optical attenuation in real time, which can make the secret key rate of the system evaluated precisely. The analysis shows that these countermeasures can effectively resist this potential attack.
Abstract Unidimensional continuous variable quantum key distribution (UD-CVQKD) applies Gaussian modulation on one single quadrature of the coherent state. However, in practical experimentations, the finite resolution of modulator driving voltages will result in Gaussian modulation discretization. To investigate its impact on the security of UD-CVQKD, the discretization of amplitude modulation is modeled and analyzed, with the secret key rate formulated against entangling cloner attack. Simulation results demonstrate that despite the performance degradation, UD-CVQKD protocol with discretized amplitude modulation may relax the restriction on correlation parameters to extend the secure region under certain parameters, which can be beneficial to the practicability of UD-CVQKD.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV–QKD) is a system that provides secret keys for symmetric key systems. In the application of CV–QKD, the practical security of the system is crucial. In this article, we investigate the practical security issues caused by non–ideal Gaussian modulation, which is caused by fitting defects of the amplitude modulator’s (AM) modulation curve. We provide the effect of fitting error on parameter estimation. We also give the relationship between the fitting order and the secret key rate. The simulation results indicate that the system is completely unable to communicate during first–order fitting. During second–order fitting, the system’s performance decreases by more than half. During third–order fitting, the system’s performance will be consistent with the ideal. Therefore, to ensure the performance of the CV–QKD system, the fitting order must be at least three or higher.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution is proven in theory secure against general attacks, but side channel is still a crucial problem for practical setup, since security proofs do not take into account all possible experimental imperfections. In this paper, we consider a loophole that links to electronics limitation of homodyne detection. By using this loophole, we propose a saturation attack combined with intercept-resend attack on the practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution using Gaussian-modulated coherent state protocol. Under this attack, Eve can launch a full intercept-resend attack and further influence the excess noise estimated by Alice and Bob. We analyse this saturation attack with operating protocol and show that our attack could render secret key without being discovered. We also propose a countermeasure against such saturation attack.
We identify and study a security loophole in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) implementations, related to the imperfect linearity of the homodyne detector. By exploiting this loophole, we propose an active side-channel attack on the Gaussian-modulated coherent-state CVQKD protocol combining an intercept-resend attack with an induced saturation of the homodyne detection on the receiver side (Bob). We show that an attacker can bias the excess noise estimation by displacing the quadratures of the coherent states received by Bob. We propose a saturation model that matches experimental measurements on the homodyne detection and use this model to study the impact of the saturation attack on parameter estimation in CVQKD. We demonstrate that this attack can bias the excess noise estimation beyond the null key threshold for any system parameter, thus leading to a full security break. If we consider an additional criterion imposing that the channel transmission estimation should not be affected by the attack, then the saturation attack can only be launched if the attenuation on the quantum channel is sufficient, corresponding to attenuations larger than approximately 6 dB. We moreover discuss the possible countermeasures against the saturation attack and propose a countermeasure based on Gaussian postselection that can be implemented by classical postprocessing and may allow one to distill the secret key when the raw measurement data are partly saturated.