To improve data security and authentication, we designed and fabricated a cryptographic key generator based on a photonic integrated circuit that converts a digital input key into a digital output key by means of a physical unclonable function (PUF). The PUF is realized by an imperfect multi-mode interferometer controlled by low-power micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) phase shifters. An analytical model was derived and used to prove the randomness of the generated digital keys, and the model was validated by measurements of a first proof-of-concept demonstrator. The demonstrator was fabricated using a silicon nitride photonic integrated circuit (PIC) platform and our recently developed MEMS-on-PIC technology.
To improve data security and authentication, we designed and fabricated a cryptographic key generator based on a photonic integrated circuit that converts a digital input key into a digital output key by means of a physical unclonable function (PUF). The PUF is realized by an imperfect multi-mode interferometer controlled by low-power micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) phase shifters. An analytical model was derived and used to prove the randomness of the generated digital keys, and the model was validated by measurements of a first proof-of-concept demonstrator. The demonstrator was fabricated using a silicon nitride photonic integrated circuit (PIC) platform and our recently developed MEMS-on-PIC technology.
The hallmark of the information age is the ease with which information is stored, accessed, and shared throughout the globe. This is enabled, in large part, by the simplicity of duplicating digital information without error. Unfortunately, an ever-growing consequence is the global threat to security and privacy enabled by our digital reliance. Specifically, modern secure communications and authentication suffer from formidable threats arising from the potential for copying of secret keys stored in digital media. With relatively little transfer of information, an attacker can impersonate a legitimate user, publish malicious software that is automatically accepted as safe by millions of computers, or eavesdrop on countless digital exchanges. To address this vulnerability, a new class of cryptographic devices known as physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are being developed. PUFs are modern realizations of an ancient concept, the physical key, and offer an attractive alternative for digital key storage. A user derives a digital key from the PUF’s physical behavior, which is sensitive to physical idiosyncrasies that are beyond fabrication tolerances. Thus, unlike conventional physical keys, a PUF cannot be duplicated and only the holder can extract the digital key. However, emerging machine learning (ML) methods are remarkably adept at learning behavior via training, and if such algorithms can learn to emulate a PUF, then the security is compromised. Unfortunately, such attacks are highly successful against conventional electronic PUFs. Here, we investigate ML attacks against a nonlinear silicon photonic PUF, a novel design that leverages nonlinear optical interactions in chaotic silicon microcavities. First, we investigate these devices’ resistance to cloning during fabrication and demonstrate their use as a source of large volumes of cryptographic key material. Next, we demonstrate that silicon photonic PUFs exhibit resistance to state-of-the-art ML attacks due to their nonlinearity and finally validate this resistance in an encryption scenario.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are hardware security primitives whose inherent physical complexity can be exploited for secure authentication and cryptographic key generation. Silicon photonic devices, owing to their suitability for quantum and artificial intelligence applications alongside standard CMOS fabrication processes, constitute a highly promising substrate for integrated multifunctional PUFs. Despite the advanced security guarantees offered by quantum cryptographic protocols and the central role of silicon photonics in quantum technologies, quantum readout strategies based on single-photon states for photonic PUFs remain largely unexplored. In this work, we experimentally demonstrate a silicon nitride (SiN) programmable photonic Mach Zehnder interferometer mesh that implements a unitary transformation and operates as a PUF, whose secret physical signature arises from uncontrollable waveguide variations during fabrication. Using experimentally derived parameters from the SiN integrated mesh, we further introduce and numerically evaluate a quantum readout protocol that combines single-photon states with PUFs. Maximally mixed quantum states are employed to conceal the underlying unitary transformation from passive eavesdropping. Security against adversaries possessing devices fabricated under similar conditions is assessed, with authentication performance quantified through Monte Carlo analysis of the false acceptance and false rejection rates as a function of the number of detected events and corrected errors. The results indicate exceptional performance with equal error rates as low as 10 to the minus 14, highlighting the potential of quantum secure PUFs for high security authentication applications.
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as a promising hardware security primitive, and recent years have seen growing interest in realizing PUFs on photonic integrated circuits (PICs). We classify existing PIC-based PUFs into electrically configured and optically encoded designs. Notably, security properties remain insufficiently analyzed, with mathematical unclonability often assumed without supporting argument. To illustrate this issue, we introduce a modeling attack against the subclass of optically encoded PUFs that operate in a linear optical regime. We show that, for a representative simulated PUF construction, observing as few as 200 challenge-response pairs allows learning the challenge-response mapping. Under canonical modeling assumptions, linear optically encoded PUFs are therefore mathematically clonable, calling for a careful assessment of their suitability for authentication protocols that rely on mathematical unclonability.
The rapid proliferation of IoT devices has heightened the demand for efficient security solutions. Optical physical unclonable functions (O-PUFs) present a promising alternative due to their intrinsic strong physical randomness and unclonability. However, conventional O-PUFs are restricted by fixed configurations, leading to limited key generation capacity. This work proposes a multi-level modulated O-PUF key generation scheme. For phase-encoded challenges, the proposed scheme introduces a diffuser to distort the wavefront and enhance modulation sensitivity. Dynamic modulation is realized by the rotation and translation of the O-PUF and the adjustment of a half-wave plate and a linear polarizer. A key generation system with ZnO-particle-embedded O-PUF is demonstrated, and a simulated annealing algorithm is introduced to optimize phase encoding for enhanced response randomness. A logistic regression-based matched filter is designed to improve the entropy of initial keys, and a fuzzy extractor enables the generation of a reliable, unique, large-capacity cryptographic key. This work advances optical PUF key generation and provides a robust foundation for cryptographic security.
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) optical circuits are described and implemented within a Photonic Integrated Circuit (PIC) to enhance certain security properties such as device authentication, anti-tamper properties, or for use as a root-of-trust value. Optical processing is advantageous for security applications such as these since they are less susceptible to eavesdropping and side channel monitoring via the difficulty of observing electromagnetic radiation emissions during PIC operation. We employ the use of State of Output Polarization (SOP) variability arising from inherent stresses, strains and manufacturing tolerances present within a fabricated PIC. A customized optical signal processing element is used in our PUF circuit that contains a very narrow "trench" structure with tiny structural variations induced during fabrication that enhances SOP variability. The tiny structural changes in fabricated PICs are fixed resulting in repeatable SOP variation of the optical signals. To avoid a need for PUF calibration, to increase robustness with respect to input power level variation, measurement device resolution and sensitivity; we show that PUF functionality can be conveniently modeled as a discrete MultipleValued Logic (MVL) function. The proposed MVL PUF formulation avoids the need to characterize and measure exact polarization states as well as enabling the use of PUF output measurement devices that have a wide range of resolution and sensitivity specifications. Several different PUF circuits are implemented within a single fabricated PIC and are experimentally evaluated to demonstrate its efficacy.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum random number generation (QRNG) will play a key role in the future of data communication security. QKD can be used by trusted parties to share a secret key, leading to long-term secure communications. QRNG allows the production of fully unpredictable and certifiable random numbers, which can be used in numerous applications, including cryptography and large stochastic simulations. Both QKD and QRNG can be implemented using commercially available photonic components, which are mostly bulky and assembled into a discrete module. Although this approach can benefit from the superior performance and maturity of each individual component, it does not guarantee the large-scale deployment and commercial viability of the technology. A preferable alternative relies on integrating some or all functionalities in a single photonic integrated circuit (PIC) fabricated at the wafer scale, in this way reducing size, weight, complexity, cost, and power consumption. Integrated photonics can thus dramatically improve the performance and reliability of QKD systems and QRNG devices. Here, we review recent literature on designs, related materials, and fabrication processes, which is representative of state-of-the-art PIC-based QKD and QRNG. We conclude the paper by pointing out the challenges that need to be addressed in the future for reaching a wide-scale deployment of these integrated technologies.