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Journal of Cryptology

Randomness Recoverable Secret Sharing Schemes

Mohammad Hajiabadi, Shahram Khazaei, Behzad Vahdani

Published Aug 20, 2024• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is well-known that randomness is essential for secure cryptography. The randomness used in cryptographic primitives is not necessarily recoverable even by the party who can, e.g., decrypt or recover the underlying secret/message. Several cryptographic primitives that support randomness recovery have turned out useful in various applications. In this paper, we study randomness recoverable secret sharing schemes (RR-SSS), in both information-theoretic and computational settings and provide two results. First, we show that while every access structure admits a perfect RR-SSS, there are very simple access structures (e.g., in monotone $$\textsf{AC}^0$$ ) that do not admit efficient perfect (or even statistical) RR-SSS. Second, we show that the existence of efficient computational RR-SSS for certain access structures in monotone $$\textsf{AC}^0$$ implies the existence of one-way functions. This stands in sharp contrast to (non-RR) SSS schemes for which no such results are known. RR-SSS plays a key role in making advanced attributed-based encryption schemes randomness recoverable, which in turn have applications in the context of designated-verifier non-interactive zero knowledge.

DOI
10.1007/s00145-024-09515-4

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It is well-known that randomness is essential for secure cryptography. The randomness used in cryptographic primitives is not necessarily recoverable even by the party who can, e.g., decrypt or recover the underlying secret/message. Several cryptographic primitives that support randomness recovery have turned out useful in various applications. In this paper, we study randomness recoverable secret sharing schemes (RR-SSS), in both information-theoretic and computational settings and provide two results. First, we show that while every access structure admits a perfect RR-SSS, there are very simple access structures (e.g., in monotone AC0\textsf{AC}^0AC0 ) that do not admit efficient perfect (or even statistical) RR-SSS. Second, we show that the existence of efficient computational RR-SSS for certain access structures in monotone AC0\textsf{AC}^0AC0 implies the existence of one-way functions. This stands in sharp contrast to (non-RR) SSS schemes for which no such results are known. RR-SSS plays a key role in making advanced attributed-based encryption schemes randomness recoverable, which in turn have applications in the context of designated-verifier non-interactive zero knowledge.
Most cryptographic primitives require randomness (for example, to generate secret keys). Usually, one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but, conceivably, such primitives might be built under weaker, more realistic assumptions. This is known to be achievable for many authentication applications, when entropy alone is typically sufficient. In contrast, all known techniques for achieving privacy seem to fundamentally require (nearly) perfect randomness. We ask the question whether this is just a coincidence, or, perhaps, privacy inherently requires true randomness? We completely resolve this question for information-theoretic private-key encryption, where parties wish to encrypt a b-bit value using a shared secret key sampled from some imperfect source of randomness [special characters omitted]. Our main result shows that if such n-bit source [special characters omitted] allows for a secure encryption of b bits, where b > log n, then one can deterministically extract nearly b almost perfect random bits from [special characters omitted]. Further, the restriction that b > log n is nearly tight: there exist sources [special characters omitted] allowing one to perfectly encrypt (log n – loglog n) bits, but not to deterministically extract even a single slightly unbiased bit. Hence, to a large extent, true randomness is inherent for encryption : either the key length must be exponential in the message length b, or one can deterministically extract nearly b almost unbiased random bits from the key. In particular, the one-time pad scheme is essentially "universal". Our technique also extends to related primitives which are sufficiently binding and hiding, including computationally secure commitments and public-key encryption.
Randomness plays a central role in computer science, in particular cryptography. Almost all cryptographic primitives depend crucially on randomness because randomness and unpredictability in secret keys provides the means for security. Usually one assumes that perfect randomness, a sequence of independently and uniformly distributed bits, are accessible to algorithms. This is a strong assumption. Physical sources of randomness are neither uniformly random, nor produce necessarily independent bits. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to start from a realistic model of randomness, investigate notions of secrecy and their randomness requirements and finally find practical methods for generation of randomness that matches the requirements of cryptographic primitives. We consider a model of random source where the source output follows one distribution from a set of possible distributions, each with the property that the maximum probability of symbols is bounded and can not be arbitrarily close to 1. This model does not assume independence or uniformity of the output symbols, and is considered to be a realistic model of randomness. From this point, the thesis can be divided into two main parts: In the first part, considering various notions of information theoretic secrecy, a fundamental problem is to find the properties of randomness needed to achieve security in these notions. Traditional cryptographic protocols simply assume perfect randomness and build on this assumption. We explore the results that show secrecy can not be based on imperfect randomness that is not uniform or independent. Thus a line of work attempts to relax notions of secrecy in such a way that they can be constructed with non-perfect sources, and possibly require smaller key sizes. Yet they should match real life applications. An important work in this context is entropic security where the key size could be smaller than the message depending on message distribution. Inspired by this, we propose two relaxed notions of secrecy that are motivated by practical applications. In the first notion, motivated by an application in biometrics authentication, we propose guessing secrecy where the probability of guessing the message for a computational unbounded adversary with the best strategy remains the same when a ciphertext is given or when it is not. We compare the randomness requirements of guessing secrecy with stronger notions and show that in some cases such as key length, the requirements are the same. For key distribution however, we found a family of distributions that provide guessing secrecy but not perfect secrecy. In the second notion, we investigate randomness requirements of multiple message encryption. Considering a natural extension of secrecy definition to multiple messages, we show that independent keys are needed to encrypt each message. We then propose a relaxed notion in which the security of last message is more important than past messages, although the leakage of past messages is bounded using entropic security. By this assumption, we achieve smaller key length compared to indistinguishability, and comparable to key length for entropic security. This notion has applications such as location privacy. In the second part of the thesis, since secrecy crucially depends on perfect randomness, we investigate how perfect randomness can be practically generated, specifically from human game-play. Unlike many random number generators that assume independent or uniform random bits in the random source, we base our work on the realistic model of randomness. Our main observation is that human game-play has an element of randomness coming from the errors in their game-play which is the main entertaining factor of the game. We also observed that this game-play can distinguish among a group of people if the right features are collected from the game-play. We incrementally changed our game design until the distinguishability among a small population is maximized, and then run the experiments required to show the viability of this approach over a larger population. This approach can also provide a hard to delegate authentication property where a human could not emulate the behavior of another human even given statistical information about their game-play.
Fundamental results on secret sharing schemes (SSSs) are discussed in the setting where security and share size are measured by (conditional) min-entropies. We first formalize a unified framework of SSSs based on (conditional) Rέnyi entropies, which includes SSSs based on Shannon and min entropies etc. as special cases. By deriving the lower bound of share sizes in terms of Rέnyi entropies based on the technique introduced by Iwamoto-Shikata, we obtain the lower bounds of share sizes measured by min entropies as well as by Shannon entropies in a unified manner. As the main contributions of this paper, we show two existential results of non-perfect SSSs based on min-entropies under several important settings. We first show that there exists a nonperfect SSS for arbitrary binary secret information and arbitrary monotone access structure. In addition, for every integers k and n (k ≤ n), we prove that the ideal non-perfect (k, n)-threshold scheme exists even if the distribution of the secret is not uniformly distributed.
Cryptographic protocols, though used in a wide range of everyday tasks, are typically built for certain unrealistic ideal conditions in which the user is assumed to work. For example, one such condition that is implicitly assumed is that the user has perfect randomness that she can use as her cryptographic secret key. Another commonly made assumption is that the user runs her cryptographic tasks (such as encryption) on a device that is perfectly secure; that is, its internals are not tampered with or even observed by an adversary. In this thesis, we focus on designing cryptographic techniques that are secure under less-than-ideal conditions. In order to remove the assumption that users share perfectly random secret keys, we study the problem of privacy amplification: key agreement between two parties who both know a weak secret w, such as a password. The goal of the protocol is to convert this non-uniform secret w into a uniformly distributed string R that is fully secret from the adversary. R may then be used as a key for running symmetric cryptographic protocols (such as encryption or authentication). Because we make no computational assumptions, the entropy in R can come only from w. Thus such a protocol must minimize the entropy loss during its execution, so that R is as long as possible. In this thesis, we present the first protocol for information-theoretic key agreement that has entropy loss linear in the security parameter. The result is optimal up to constant factors. We also extend our results to the case where the users share correlated secrets w and w' . This setting occurs, for example, when the secrets are biometric readings taken at different points of time and is more generally known as information-reconciliation.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) allows a dealer to distribute a secret quantum state among a set of parties so that certain subsets can reconstruct the secret, while unauthorized subsets obtain no information. While QSS was introduced over twenty years ago, previous works focused only on existence of perfectly secure schemes, and the share size of the known schemes is exponential even for access structures computed by polynomial size monotone circuits. This stands in contrast to the classical case, where efficient computationally-secure schemes have been long known for all access structures in monotone P\mathsf{monotone~P}monotone P, and one can even obtain shares which are much shorter than the secret which is impossible with perfect security. In this work, we initiate the study of computationally-secure QSS and show that computational assumptions help significantly in building QSS schemes. We present a simple compiler and use it to obtain a large variety results: We construct polynomial-time QSS schemes under standard assumptions for a rich class of access structures. This includes many access structures for which previous results in QSS required exponential share size. We also construct QSS schemes for which the size of the shares is significantly smaller than the size of the secret. As in the classical case, this is impossible with perfect security. We also use our compiler to obtain results beyond computational QSS. In the information-theoretic setting, we improve the share size of perfect QSS schemes for a large class of access structures to 1.5n+o(n)1.5^{n+o(n)}1.5n+o(n), improving upon best known schemes and matching the best known result for general access structures in the classical case. Finally, we show construct efficient schemes for all access structures in P\mathsf{P}P and NP\mathsf{NP}NP when the quantum secret sharing scheme is given multiple of copies of the secret.
We investigate the feasibility of a variety of cryptographic tasks with imperfect randomness. The kind of imperfect randomness we consider are entropy sources, such as those considered by Santha and Vazirani, Chor and Goldreich, and Zuckerman. We show the following: (1) certain cryptographic tasks like bit commitment, encryption, secret sharing, zero-knowledge, non-interactive zero-knowledge, and secure two-party computation for any non-trivial junction are impossible to realize if parties have access to entropy sources with slightly less-than-perfect entropy, i.e., sources with imperfect randomness. These results are unconditional and do not rely on any un-proven assumption. (2) On the other hand, based on stronger variants of standard assumptions, secure signature schemes are possible with imperfect entropy sources. As another positive result, we show (without any unproven assumption) that interactive proofs can be made sound with respect to imperfect entropy sources.