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Silicon Valley Cybersecurity Conference (SVCC)

Toward Post-Quantum Digital Certificate for eSIM

Qaiser Khan, Sourav Purification, Rono Cheruiyot, Jinoh Kim, Jonghyun Kim, Sang‐Yoon Chang

Published Jun 17, 2024• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In mobile networking such as 5G, embedded SIM or eSIM does not involve a connectivity-provider-specific hardware chip to deliver the provider’s core network’s public key, in contrast to the traditional SIM. eSIM instead uses the remote digital certificate and PKI to deliver the public key. We study the post-quantum transition by introducing post-quantum digital certificates for eSIM, including how the digital certificate gets used for the mutual authentication between the mobile client and the core network server. We investigate the eSIM authentication and post-quantum digital signature ciphers and outline the plan for the post-quantum design and transition in this paper.

DOI
10.1109/svcc61185.2024.10637354

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In mobile networking such as 5G, embedded SIM or eSIM does not involve a connectivity-provider-specific hardware chip to deliver the provider’s core network’s public key, in contrast to the traditional SIM. eSIM instead uses the remote digital certificate and PKI to deliver the public key. We study the post-quantum transition by introducing post-quantum digital certificates for eSIM, including how the digital certificate gets used for the mutual authentication between the mobile client and the core network server. We investigate the eSIM authentication and post-quantum digital signature ciphers and outline the plan for the post-quantum design and transition in this paper.
In mobile networking, specifically in 5G networking, embedded SIM (eSIM) does not rely on the hardware chips to deliver the core network’s public key as traditional SIM cards do. Instead, eSIM utilizes remote digital certificates enabled by Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In this research, we study the post-quantum transition of eSIM-based mobile networking by applying and incorporating the post-quantum ciphers to the digital certificates and authentication. While building on the existing mutual authentication between the user equipment and core network, we build quantum resistance in the digital signatures used for the digital certificate and authentication so that they are secure against quantum-computing attackers. We implement our scheme using the NIST-standardized post-quantum ciphers to evaluate the computing/time and battery/power overheads, which are important for resource-constrained mobile devices. We compare the post-quantum ciphers with the current quantum-vulnerable ciphers and show that the lattice-based schemes have comparable or even better overhead performances.
The emergence of quantum computing introduces unprecedented risks to classical cryptographic schemes, particularly digital signatures that safeguard authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity across digital ecosystems. To address these concerns, this paper investigates the adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) within Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) frameworks, emphasizing its role in strengthening electronic signature (eSign) systems against quantum threats. Traditional PKI implementations rely on algorithms such as RSA and ECC in combination with Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for secure key management; however, these methods are vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor's. We examine how quantum-resistant alternatives-including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based schemes standardized by NIST-can be integrated into PKI without compromising interoperability and compliance. A comparative evaluation highlights trade-offs in performance, storage, and computational complexity while demonstrating the feasibility of embedding PQC into existing eSign infrastructures. Our findings underscore the urgency of transitioning towards quantum-safe digital signatures to ensure resilience, regulatory alignment, and long-term trust in national-scale digital services.
Current cellular authentication mechanisms rely primarily on SIM-based Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), which have scaled successfully worldwide but face challenges as the Internet of Things (IoT) grows to billions of devices. SIM provisioning and lifecycle management become increasingly costly, while reliance on long-term symmetric keys limits revocation flexibility and cross-operator support. To address these issues, we propose a SIM-less, certificate-based authentication framework that integrates Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Specifically, the framework employs Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium for digital signatures, providing quantum-resistant protection for future networks. A key challenge is the computational overhead of PQC on constrained IoT devices; we address this by offloading cryptographic operations to trusted edge servers, whose integrity is validated using attestation mechanisms such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) or secure enclaves. We implement and evaluate the framework in a simulated FutureG environment, comparing IoT-only execution against edge-assisted configurations. Results show that edge offloading reduces TLS handshake latency by up to 96% while maintaining minimal resource usage on devices. These findings demonstrate that PQC-enabled PKI, combined with edge-assisted execution, offers a scalable and practical complement to SIM/AKA for secure and quantum-resilient authentication in FutureG IoT deployments.
The advent of quantum computing offers the chance to increase the security of India's digital infrastructure, specifically the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) under the Control of Certifying Authorities (CCA). For future-proofing digital certificates against quantum attacks, this paper proposes a hybrid PKI model that harmoniously merges Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). We investigate viable PQC algorithms, including lattice-based and hash-based cryptography, in combination with QKD for secured key exchange. Our solution is designed to provide adequate security without sacrificing backward compatibility with current systems. The hybrid PKI architecture outlined here is able to support integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) to produce quantum-resistant digital certificates.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) generates and distributes digital certificates to provide the root of trust for securing digital networking systems. To continue securing digital networking in the quantum era, PKI should transition to use quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. The cryptography community is developing quantum-resistant primitives/algorithms, studying, and analyzing them for cryptanalysis and improvements. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) selected finalist algorithms for the post-quantum digital signature cipher standardization, which are Dilithium, Falcon, and Rainbow. We study and analyze the feasibility and the processing performance of these algorithms in memory/size and time/speed when used for PKI, including the key generation from the PKI end entities (e.g., a HTTPS/TLS server), the signing, and the certificate generation by the certificate authority within the PKI. The transition to post-quantum from the classical ciphers incur changes in the parameters in the PKI, for example, Rainbow I significantly increases the certificate size by 163 times when compared with RSA 3072. Nevertheless, we learn that the current X.509 supports the NIST post-quantum digital signature ciphers and that the ciphers can be modularly adapted for PKI. According to our empirical implementations-based study, the post-quantum ciphers can increase the certificate verification time cost compared to the current classical cipher and therefore the verification overheads require careful considerations when using the post-quantum-cipher-based certificates.
Development of Quantum Computers are growing rapidly, the security of today’s cryptographic systems which are working with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is at serious risk. RSA and ECC algorithms are the backbone of secure communication and digital identity can be breakable by quantum algorithms such as Shor’s. Hence, a transition is required to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which is designed to handle quantum attacks. This work provides a detailed review of how PQC can be integrated with the existing PKI, with a special focus on the auto-enrollment process. Auto-enrollment is an essential process but often overlooked mechanism, responsible for automatically issuing and renewing digital certificates. First, we explored how current PKI systems are exposed to the quantum threats and the readiness. The performance of the algorithms that are standardized by NIST, such as Kyber and Dilithium were discussed. We analyze the technical and operational challenges of transitioning to PQC by referencing both research studies and real-world implementations from major industry players such as Google and Microsoft. These include large key size, certificate size, compatibility issues, complex computations and need for crypto-agility. We also examine the hybrid approaches that combine classical and post-quantum methods as traditional strategies. The survey concludes by outlining best practices, deployment considerations, and open research challenges that must be addressed for a smooth, secure, and scalable shift to quantum-safe PKI. This work aims to guide researchers, engineers, and policymakers in building the next generation of cryptographic infrastructure that can stand the test-time even in a quantum world.