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International Conference Laser Optics (ICLO)

Optical fuse as a countermeasure against light injection attacks on quantum key distribution systems

E.V. Borisova, Anastasiya Ponosova, Boris I. Galagan, Vasily V. Koltashev, N. R. A Rutyunyan, V.V. Makarov

Published Jul 1, 2024• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an original device that can protect quantum key distribution (QKD) systems from the effects of intense laser radiation. Carbon nanomaterials dispersed in a polymer can be used as a fuse for QKD systems.
DOI
10.1109/iclo59702.2024.10623944

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems provide quantum-safe key exchange. Therefore, complete security analysis of implementations of QKD protocols is in the focus of interest of a worldwide information-security community. For today, a number of QKD loopholes are closed by countermeasures, which are also considered in emerging QKD security evaluation and certification [1]–[3]. However, new threats to practical QKD implementations are still found, such as the laser-damage attack, which is a powerful hacking strategy. In investigations, CW laser radiation is most often used, but in contrast to it, the interaction of pulsed laser radiation with optical materials may lead to a wide range of effects, like nonlinear effects, dielectric breakdown, etc.