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Designs Codes and Cryptography

$$\textsf {TOPAS}$$2-pass key exchange with full perfect forward secrecy and optimal communication complexity

Sven Schäge

Published Jul 27, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract We present Transmission optimal protocol with active security ( $$\textsf {TOPAS}$$ TOPAS ), the first key agreement protocol with optimal communication complexity (message size and number of rounds) that provides security against fully active adversaries. The size of the protocol messages and the computational costs to generate them are comparable to the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves (which is well-known to only provide security against passive adversaries). Session keys are indistinguishable from random keys—even under reflection and key compromise impersonation attacks. What makes $$\textsf {TOPAS}$$ TOPAS stand out is that it also features a security proof of full perfect forward secrecy (PFS), where the attacker can actively modify messages sent to or from the test-session. The proof of full PFS relies on two new extraction-based security assumptions. It is well-known that existing implicitly-authenticated 2-message protocols like $$\textsf {HMQV}$$ HMQV cannot achieve this strong form of (full) security against active attackers (Krawczyk, Crypto’05). This makes $$\textsf {TOPAS}$$ TOPAS the first key agreement protocol with full security against active attackers that works in prime-order groups while having optimal message size. We also present a variant of our protocol, $$\textsf {TOPAS+}$$ TOPAS + , which, under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, provides better computational efficiency in the key derivation phase. Finally, we present a third protocol termed $$\textsf {FACTAS}$$ FACTAS (for factoring-based protocol with active security) which has the same strong security properties as $$\textsf {TOPAS}$$ TOPAS and $$\textsf {TOPAS+}$$ TOPAS + but whose security is solely based on the factoring assumption in groups of composite order (except for the proof of full PFS).

DOI
10.1007/s10623-024-01429-3

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Abstract We present Transmission optimal protocol with active security ( TOPAS\textsf {TOPAS}TOPAS TOPAS ), the first key agreement protocol with optimal communication complexity (message size and number of rounds) that provides security against fully active adversaries. The size of the protocol messages and the computational costs to generate them are comparable to the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves (which is well-known to only provide security against passive adversaries). Session keys are indistinguishable from random keys—even under reflection and key compromise impersonation attacks. What makes TOPAS\textsf {TOPAS}TOPAS TOPAS stand out is that it also features a security proof of full perfect forward secrecy (PFS), where the attacker can actively modify messages sent to or from the test-session. The proof of full PFS relies on two new extraction-based security assumptions. It is well-known that existing implicitly-authenticated 2-message protocols like HMQV\textsf {HMQV}HMQV HMQV cannot achieve this strong form of (full) security against active attackers (Krawczyk, Crypto’05). This makes TOPAS\textsf {TOPAS}TOPAS TOPAS the first key agreement protocol with full security against active attackers that works in prime-order groups while having optimal message size. We also present a variant of our protocol, TOPAS+\textsf {TOPAS+}TOPAS+ TOPAS + , which, under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, provides better computational efficiency in the key derivation phase. Finally, we present a third protocol termed FACTAS\textsf {FACTAS}FACTAS FACTAS (for factoring-based protocol with active security) which has the same strong security properties as TOPAS\textsf {TOPAS}TOPAS TOPAS and TOPAS+\textsf {TOPAS+}TOPAS+ TOPAS + but whose security is solely based on the factoring assumption in groups of composite order (except for the proof of full PFS).
We present TOPAS (Transmission Optimal Protocol with Active Security), the first key agreement protocol with optimal communication complexity that provides security against fully active adversaries. This solves a longstanding open problem. The size of the protocol messages (approx. 160 bits for 80-bit security) and the computational costs to generate them are comparable to the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves (which is well-known to only provide security against passive adversaries). Session keys are indistinguishable from random keys - even under reflection and key compromise impersonation attacks - under generalizations of TOPAS stand out is that it also features a security proof of full perfect forward secrecy (PFS), where the attacker can actively modify messages sent to or from the test-session. The proof of full PFS relies on two new extraction-based security assumptions. It is well-known that existing implicitly-authenticated 2-message protocols like HMQV cannot achieve this strong form of (full) security against active attackers (Krawczyk, Crypto'05). We also present a variant of our protocol, TOPAS+, which, under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, provides better computational efficiency in the key derivation phase.
Abstract. This paper investigates the two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) with perfect forward security. Currently, there exist no authenticated key exchange protocols which are provably secure in eCK model and meanwhile achieve perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. We propose a new two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol which enjoys following desirable properties. First, our protocol is shown secure in the eCK model under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. Moreover, our protocol does not use the NAXOS transformation, the drawback of which will be discussed in the introduction. Second, under the same assumption, we prove that our protocol achieves perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is first two-pass (one round) AKE protocol provably secure in the eCK model and achieving perfect forward security against active adversary.
Traditionally, secure one-round key exchange protocols in the PKI setting have either achieved perfect forward secrecy, or forms of deniability, but not both. On the one hand, achieving perfect forward secrecy against active attackers seems to require some form of authentication of the messages, as in signed Diffie-Hellman style protocols, that subsequently sacrifice deniability. On the other hand, using implicit authentication along the lines of MQV and descendants sacrifices perfect forward secrecy in one round and achieves only weak perfect forward secrecy instead. We show that by reintroducing signatures, it is possible to satisfy both a strong key-exchange security notion as well as a strong form of deniability, in one-round key exchange protocols. Our security notion for key exchange is stronger than, e. g., the extended CK model, and captures perfect forward secrecy. Our notion of deniability, which we call peer-and-time deniability, is stronger than that offered by, e. g., the SIGMA protocol. We propose a concrete protocol and prove that it satisfies our definition of key-exchange security in the random oracle model as well as peer-and-time deniability. The protocol combines a signed-Diffie-Hellman message exchange with an MQV-style key computation, and offers a remarkable combination of advanced security properties and efficiency
Group key agreement protocols are designed to solve the fundamental problem of securely establishing a session key among a group of parties communicating over a public channel. Although a number of protocols have been proposed to solve this problem over the years, they are not well suited for a high-delay wide area network; their communication overhead is significant in terms of the number of communication rounds or the number of exchanged messages, both of which are recognized as the dominant factors that slow down group key agreement over a networking environment with high communication latency. In this paper we present a communication-efficient group key agreement protocol and prove its security in the random oracle model under the factoring assumption. The proposed protocol provides perfect forward secrecy and requires only a constant number of communication rounds for my of group rekeying operations, while achieving optimal message complexity.
Group key agreement protocols are designed to solve the fundamental problem of securely establishing a session key among a group of parties communicating over a public channel. Although a number of protocols have been proposed to solve this problem over the years, they are not well suited for a high-delay wide area network; their communication overhead is significant in terms of the number of communication rounds or the number of exchanged messages, both of which are recognized as the dominant factors that slow down group key agreement over a networking environment with high communication latency. In this paper we present a communication-efficient group key agreement protocol and prove its security in the random oracle model under the factoring assumption. The proposed protocol provides perfect forward secrecy and requires only a constant number of communication rounds for any of group rekeying operations, while achieving optimal message complexity.
Abstract We propose the first tight security proof for the ordinary two-message signed Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol in the random oracle model. Our proof is based on the strong computational Diffie–Hellman assumption and the multiuser security of a digital signature scheme. With our security proof, the signed DH protocol can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate any security loss. We abstract our approach with a new notion called verifiable key exchange. In contrast to a known tight three-message variant of the signed Diffie–Hellman protocol (Gjøsteen and Jager, in: Shacham, Boldyreva (eds) CRYPTO 2018, Part II. LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, 2018), we do not require any modification to the original protocol, and our tightness result is proven in the “Single-Bit-Guess” model which we know can be tightly composed with symmetric cryptographic primitives to establish a secure channel. Finally, we extend our approach to the group setting and construct the first tightly secure group authenticated key exchange protocol.